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l)DYNAMICS AND COMPETITION IN CHARITABLE GIVING
Nowadays potential donors receive many direct mailings from many different charities,
all soliciting their donations. As charities depend for a large part on their revenues from
direct mail it is important to uncover the precise effects of charitable direct mailings on
donating behavior. Existing studies on donating behavior generally focus on a single
decision context, that is, a single donation to a single charitable cause. In reality, however,
people receive many donation requests, and the responses to these requests may not be
independent. 
In this thesis we study the dynamic and competitive effects of charitable direct mailings
on donating behavior. We present two direct mailing response models, with the first focusing
primarily on the competitive dimension, and the second focusing mainly on the dynamic
dimension. To calibrate these models we have access to a unique dataset consisting of the
databases of multiple charity organizations, providing us with detailed information on
direct mailings and donations at the individual donor’s level. In addition, we conducted a
direct mailing field experiment in cooperation with various charities. In the analysis of this
experiment, we zoom in on the direct mailing effects on actual behavior and on the underlying
motivational process. We establish that substantial dynamic and competitive effects exist
and that the single decision context can thus not be justified for properly analyzing direct
mailing response behavior. We also provide some practical implications of these results for
charities. One of our surprising results is that - contrary to the public opinion - charities
would have to send even more mailings in order to increase their revenues.
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Charities are big business. In the Netherlands alone, charities raised a combined 4.4 
billion Euros in 2005. Although foundations and corporations contribute substantially 
to this amount, the largest part of the funds comes from individual donations. A quick 
Euro for a door-to-door collection while you’re having dinner, a direct debit 
authorization you get guilted into while shopping, a membership at the Postal Code 
Lottery; it all adds up. 
 To keep donors contributing, charities make use of all sorts of fundraising tools 
and activities, most popular being direct mail. Nowadays, potential donors are deluged 
by huge amounts of mailings from many different charities, all soliciting their donations. 
As charities depend for a large part on their revenues from direct mail it is important to 
uncover the precise effects of charitable direct mailings on donating behavior. 
 The motivation for this thesis is twofold, scientific and societal. From a 
scientific viewpoint two aspects are of particular interest, that is, dynamics and 
competitive interactions. Existing models for donating behavior focus on a single 
decision context, a single donation to a single charitable cause. In reality, however, 
people receive lots of donation requests, which intuitively are not independent. For 
example, one can imagine that if an individual recently donated to a certain cause, he 
will not donate to this cause again today. And if he receives requests from multiple 
different charities at the same time, he may decide to choose one or donate smaller 
amounts to all. 
 This thesis studies individual donating behavior towards multiple charities over 
time, providing new insights into charitable giving and the fundraising process. Through 
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cooperation with a number of large charity organizations in the Netherlands, we have 
access to individual level data of direct mailings received and donations made for 
multiple charities. This gives us the unique opportunity to study dynamic and 
competitive effects not only theoretically, but also empirically. 
 Besides the two main themes that constitute the common thread throughout 
this thesis, there is an additional issue of scientific interest. When modeling response to 
direct mailings, we have to take into account that charities do not send these mailings 
randomly. Instead, they apply target selection techniques, using past behavior variables 
to predict future behavior and targeting those individuals that are most likely to 
respond. The result of these behavior-driven decision rules is that charitable direct 
mailings are endogenous. When modeling the relationship between charitable direct 
mailings and donating behavior based on the responses to these endogenously selected 
mailings, the parameter estimates will be biased if endogeneity is ignored. In the chapters 
of this thesis, we take various approaches to avoid this endogeneity bias. 
 The second part of the motivation for this thesis is of a societal nature. As 
charities send more and more mailings, people may feel overwhelmed or even get 
irritated. Indeed, the term “junk mail” is often associated with charitable direct mail 
these days. The many contributions in newspapers and magazines devoted to charitable 
requests and the annoyance these bring about bespeak the significance of the subject. 
For example, a survey by TNS NIPO (2003) revealed that 66% of the Dutch public is 
annoyed by the amount of soliciting direct mailings they receive. According to a survey 
in the magazine of the Dutch consumers’ association (2005), 43% of the respondents 
receive more than one direct mailing a year of the same organization. Of these 
individuals, 83% find this annoying or even unacceptable. Another survey in the 
magazine “Onze Wereld” (2008) states that 76% of the Dutch public gets irritated 
sometimes about charities’ fundraising methods. 
 For one of the chapters of this thesis, we conducted a survey of our own, in 
which respondents were given the possibility to give some extra comments. Many made 
use of this opportunity to vent their frustrations. In Table 1.1 we present an overview of 
the sources of annoyance that were mentioned over ten times. Of all the complaints, two 
of the top three concern the number of direct mailings charities send, with multiple 
mailings from the same charity as the ultimate number one.  
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Table 1.1: Overview of annoyances concerning charities 
Annoyance Frequency 
Too many mailings from the same charity 121 
Including small presents in the mailings 106 
Too many mailings in general  87 
Contact by telephone 85 
Request for automatic transfer 76 
High salaries of management 52 
Too many / too fancy brochures 43 
Another request shortly after donation 42 
Once you have donated, requests keep on coming 38 
Too much overhead costs 38 
Trust issues (is the money well spent?) 25 
Aggressive / sentimental approach 24 
No hallmark / shady charities 22 
Too many charities 21 
Too many charities with the same purpose 17 
Extra requests on top of an automatic transfer 17 
Exchanging of address data 15 
A prescribed amount in a mailing 15 
 
 All in all, charities’ fundraising methods and direct mailings in particular are 
subjects that occupy society. The public opinion appears to become more and more 
dominated by negative aspects. From the charities’ point of view, the question is then 
whether their direct mailing frequencies perhaps negatively affect donating behavior in 
the long run. According to the Dutch consumers’ association survey (2005), half of the 
respondents state that they stopped donating to a certain organization out of irritation, 
and another 20% state that they considered doing so. As for the survey in the magazine 
“Onze Wereld” (2008), 76% of the irritated donators state that this irritation affects 
their donating behavior. Hence, people state they will adjust their donating behavior, 
but one may wonder if they will truly put their money where their mouth is, that is, keep 
it to themselves. After all, in marketing there are myriads of situations where what 
people say they will do bears little resemblance to what they actually do. This thesis 
therefore studies the effects of charitable direct mailings on donations, based on actual 
behavioral data as opposed to self-stated data. 
12
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 To summarize, the aim of this thesis is to study donating behavior in response 
to direct mailings from multiple organizations over time, in order to contribute to the 
charitable giving and direct mailing literature on two important yet under researched 
dimensions, and at the same time provide socially relevant insights to charities to guide 
their mailing strategies and help increase their revenues. For this we have access to a 
unique dataset consisting of the databases of multiple charity organizations, providing 
information on direct mailings and donations at the individual level. We also make use 
of the data from a direct mailing field experiment we conducted in cooperation with a 
number of charities. 
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of two parts, which both contain two chapters. The four chapters are 
written in such a way that they can be read independently. The first part focuses on 
econometric models that describe the effects of charitable direct mailings on donating 
behavior. To estimate these models we make use of the databases of a number of 
charities, that contain information on all direct mailings sent and donations made at the 
individual level. The first chapter in Part I is based on Van Diepen, Donkers and Franses 
(2008a). The second part of the thesis focuses on the analysis of a field experiment, in 
which we varied the number of charitable direct mailings experimental subjects received 
in a single week. The second chapter in Part II is based on Van Diepen, Donkers and 
Franses (2008b). 
 The first chapter of Part I, Chapter 2, proposes a dynamic direct mailing 
response model with competitive effects. The model incorporates past direct mailings 
and past purchase behavior to map the dynamic competitive interactions amongst the 
organizations sending those mailings. We investigate the impact of direct mailings on 
the revenues of each organization and its competitors over time. The model accounts for 
endogeneity of the mailing decision and for unobserved heterogeneity across 
households. Although the model is applicable to any type of organization sending direct 
mailings, we consider it in the charitable giving setting. We estimate the model using 
data from three large charities on direct mailings and donations at the individual level. 
The results show that a charity’s own mailings are short-run substitutes, that is, an extra 
mailing cannibalizes the revenues of subsequent mailings. Furthermore, competitive 
charitable direct mailings tend to be short-run complements and thus increase the total 
pie that is divided among the charities. In the long run these effects die out. The results 
13
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are also interpreted from a behavioral perspective. As charitable mailings differ from 
regular mailings in various respects, we describe the implications of a number of 
theoretical drivers of donating behavior for the model parameters. We then use the 
parameter estimates to examine the practical relevance of these drivers. 
The second chapter of Part I, Chapter 3, presents another dynamic model of 
individual donating behavior in response to direct mailings of multiple charities. Many 
people feel a moral or social obligation to support charitable causes and non-compliance 
with this standard can result in feelings of guilt. In this chapter we investigate how such 
guilt feelings affect donating behavior over time. We consider the stock of guilt, 
representing accumulated feelings of guilt, which grows over time as a result of moral 
obligation and also due to for example receiving direct mailings. Making a donation 
reduces the stock of guilt, but comes at certain costs. This stock of guilt is known to the 
donator when he makes the donating decision, but is unobserved by us. Empirically, we 
deal with this by deriving the stationary distribution of guilt, representing the overall 
distribution of guilt levels across all individuals and time. We assume that individuals 
plan their donations optimally, based on expectations of the mailing behavior of 
charities. To be more precise, when individuals decide to respond to a direct mailing, 
they are aware that their current decision affects the amount of mailings they will receive 
in the future, as a result of target selection. We incorporate this awareness in our model 
by allowing individuals to anticipate the consequences of (not) donating on both their 
future level of guilt and their future mailing frequency. 
The solution of the resulting stochastic dynamic programming model suggests 
that when the stock of guilt reaches a certain high level, this drives the individual to 
make a donation, thereby reducing their stock of guilt. We estimate this model using a 
dataset with records of all direct mailings of and donations to five charities and present a 
number of fit statistics, which show that the model fits the data quite well. The 
structural model also allows policy experiments, which reveal that there is room for 
improvement in the charities’ mailing strategies, where two cases are particularly 
relevant. The optimal mailing strategy from the donators’ point of view makes donators 
feel better but reduces revenues for the charities. The optimal mailing strategy from the 
beneficiaries’ point of view acquires more funds for the charities, but decreases donators’ 
welfare. The results of the current mailing strategies of the charities are somewhere 
between the results of the optimal strategies from both viewpoints, indicating that the 
charities seem to be taking both types of stakeholders into account. 
14
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 In Part II we describe the analysis of a field experiment we conducted. Instead 
of using naturally occurring data where mailings, and hence observations, are not 
randomly selected, and solving this issue using intricate econometric modeling 
techniques as we do in Part I, another option is to create new data that does not suffer 
from endogeneity. Hence, we induce exogenous variation in the number of mailings that 
individuals receive, so that we can draw reliable and unbiased conclusions about the 
relations between direct mailings and donating behavior through relatively simple 
analyses.  
In the first chapter of Part II, Chapter 4, we motivate our field experiment and 
describe our experimental design, which we realized with the help of five charities. We 
send our experimental subjects different numbers of experimental direct mailings and 
we collect information on the actual donations made in response to the experimental 
mailings and the responses to subsequent mailings sent out by the charities. This allows 
us to study the competitive effects of charitable direct mailings simultaneously, in the 
short run and in the long run. An analysis of this unique database reveals that 
competitive mailings sent contemporaneously have a negative effect on the response to a 
charity’s own mailing, but that this effect does not persist over time. Furthermore, 
strong cannibalization effects exist on the donations made to future mailings of the same 
charity. 
 In the second chapter of Part II, Chapter 5, we study the underlying process of 
individuals’ response behavior to charitable direct mailings. Individuals may feel 
irritated by these mailings, in particular when they receive many. Therefore, we study 
the consequences of perceived irritation on stated behavior and on actual behavior. 
Target selection by charities likely results in good donators receiving many mailings and 
hence they might be most irritated. Thus, besides the direct mailings themselves, 
irritation resulting from these direct mailings could also be endogenously determined. 
To avoid endogeneity bias, we use the data from our field experiment, which we 
combine with a survey to measure irritation. Our analysis reveals that direct mailings do 
result in irritation, but surprisingly this affects neither stated nor actual donating 
behavior. 
 In Chapter 6, the final chapter of this thesis, we conclude with an overview of 
the individual chapters and our main conclusions, implications, and recommendations 
for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Dynamic and Competitive Effects of Direct 
Mailings: 
A Charitable Giving Application 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The use of direct marketing (DM) has increased steadily over the past decades, with 
companies in the US spending more than 166 billion dollars on DM activities in 2006. 
From all direct marketing activities, direct mailings are the most important one, 
accounting for about a third of total expenditures in DM (Direct Marketing Association 
2007). 
 Research on response behavior to direct mailing activities would preferably 
include both dynamics and competitive interactions. After all, when multiple companies 
send multiple communications to individuals, there is likely to be interference and the 
response to a given message will be affected by messages received previously (Greyser 
1973).  
In practice, however, direct mailing studies have typically focused on a static 
single-firm context, neglecting potential competitive and long-term effects (e.g. Bult and 
Wansbeek 1995). Recently, some attention has been paid to the dynamics of response 
behavior at the individual level (e.g. Ansari, Mela and Neslin 2008; Simester et al. 2007) 
and corresponding improved mailing strategies (e.g. Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 
2004; Gönül and Shi 1998; Gönül and Ter Hofstede 2006; Simester, Sun and Tsitsiklis 
2006). However, these studies focus on a single company, and hence ignore competitive 
activity. Thus, so far, the direct marketing literature has focused on messages sent by the 
18
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focal firm, and neglected the individual-specific consequences of messages received from 
competing firms. The main reason for this appears to be a lack of the necessary data. 
Our present study addresses the above two issues by analyzing the dynamic 
competitive interactions among direct mailings at the household level. We focus on the 
interaction effects between competitors’ mailings on donor behavior, as opposed to 
strategic competitive behavior of competing companies. We develop a direct mailing 
response model that is applicable to all kinds of direct mailings that elicit a direct 
response, such as catalogs, promotional offers, and solicitation letters from charities. The 
model explains responses to direct mailings using past direct mailings and past purchase 
behavior, implemented through the usual RFM variables. As an individual will be more 
aware of recent events than of events in the distant past, we adopt a Koyck lag structure 
where past events receive less weight (see Ansari, Mela and Neslin (2008) for a recent 
application). 
To illustrate the use of the model we present an empirical application to 
charitable direct mailings. We construct a unique dataset by merging the databases of 
three large charity organizations in the Netherlands. This results in household level data 
on the direct mailings received and the donations made by each household to each 
charity. Hence, and this is an important novelty, we are able to empirically study 
competitive effects of direct mailings over time. 
Charitable mailings differ from regular mailings in various respects. Therefore, 
we build on research in marketing and psychology and the charitable giving literature to 
form expectations about the dynamic competitive effects of direct mailings, and in 
particular charitable direct mailings. Based on our estimation results we will discuss the 
practical relevance of various phenomena for competitive charitable direct mailings. 
Our main goals can thus be summarized as follows.  
1) Establish that competitive interactions exist among direct marketing 
communications.  
2) Illustrate the dynamic behavior of these competitive interactions. 
3)  Develop a parsimonious model that still captures the potential richness 
of these competitive dynamics.  
4) Describe the implications for the model parameters of a number of 
theoretical drivers of donating behavior and use the model to examine 
the practical relevance of these drivers. 
19
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, 
we motivate why dynamic and competitive effects of direct mailings are important and 
discuss the relevant literature. Next, we present the model. After this, we introduce the 
application of the model to charitable organizations and discuss the theoretical 
framework, followed by a description of the data and our estimation results. We 
conclude with potential limitations and future research topics.  
 
2.2 Dynamic and competitive effects 
In this section we discuss the challenges marketers face when modeling direct mailing 
response behavior. We distinguish two important dimensions: (1) the dynamics of 
customer behavior and (2) the interference of competitor activity. 
 
2.2.1 Dynamic effects 
Many marketing science studies have paid attention to dynamics. Think, for example, of 
the short / long term distinction in Fok et al. (2006), Jedidi, Mela and Gupta (1999) 
and Pauwels, Hanssens and Siddarth (2002). Also, the carry-over effect of advertising on 
sales has been acknowledged and modeled much earlier, as described, for example, in the 
meta-analytic study by Clarke (1976). However, the issue has not received much 
attention in the direct marketing literature. Traditionally, both academics and 
practitioners have focused on a static context, sidestepping potential long-term effects. 
A typical example can be found in the target selection literature and practice where 
often a selection is made for a one-event mail-shot without recognizing the overall effect 
on individuals (Kestnbaum, Kestnbaum and Ames 1998). But of course, people tend to 
(at least partially) remember past events. These memories are then integrated into an 
overall attitude, affecting current and future decisions. Hence, omitting dynamics will 
generally lead to unreliable results and suboptimal marketing activities. Direct mailing 
organizations have to bear in mind that the decision to mail an individual today does 
influence the response to future mailings (Campbell et al. 2001; Piersma and Jonker 
2004). Campbell et al. (2001) note that cannibalization can occur between successive 
mailings and that timing is an important factor in this saturation effect. The more time 
between two mailings, the smaller is the saturative impact.  
A recent stream of research has acknowledged the importance of the 
appropriate number and timing of mailings for individuals over a long-term horizon 
(e.g. Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 2004; Gönül and Shi 1998; Gönül and Ter 
20
Chapter 2 
 
 12 
Hofstede 2006; Piersma and Jonker 2004), but the exact long-term effect of a company’s 
direct mailings on revenues is not immediately clear. On the positive side, repeated 
advertising exposures can lead to familiarity and liking of a company and can prevent 
forgetting over time (Zajonc 1968; Zielske 1959). Direct mailings can thus serve as a 
reinforcement of the message. Furthermore, sending many mailings increases the 
probability that an individual reads the message. The more mailings, the higher is the 
probability that at least one mailing will not be overlooked in the large amounts of mail 
or simply discarded out of lack of interest at the time of receipt. Finally, each direct mail 
has the potential to trigger a purchase that would otherwise not have been made, 
thereby enlarging total revenues. However, direct mailings may also have negative long-
run effects.  
In a recent survey amongst practitioners in direct marketing, long-term effects 
of direct mailings and direct mail induced irritation were suggested as two important 
research avenues (Verhoef et al. 2003). Elliott and Speck (1998) show that excessive 
direct mailing clutter can lead to a negative attitude, such as irritation, reducing the 
effectiveness of the mailings (see also Naik and Piersma (2002)). Also, Campbell et al. 
(2001) present an example of a company that recognized the cannibalization that 
occurred between essentially redundant mailings. The consequences of this are even 
more serious, due to the fact that target selection results in the best customers receiving 
the largest number of mailings. If this results in irritation, the company is harming the 
relationship with its best customers. Thus, although decreasing marginal returns, or 
saturation, to marketing activities are commonplace, even supersaturation could occur 
(Leeflang et al. 2000, p. 68). That is, the marginal returns to excessive direct mailings 
might in fact be negative. Indeed, a recent study by Simester et al. (2007) has shown that 
a higher mailing frequency can result in a loss in total revenues, and that this only 
occurred for the company’s best customers who already received many mailings. 
Of course, besides the influence of past mailings on today’s behavior, past 
purchase behavior is also highly relevant to explain response to direct mailings. Indeed, it 
is well known that past behavior is a very good predictor of future behavior (Bult and 
Wansbeek 1995; Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby 1996). This is supported by the 
frequent application of the Recency, Frequency and Monetary Value (RFM) framework 
in marketing response models. In sum, to better understand and exploit consumer 
response behavior to direct mailings, dynamics should be taken into consideration. 
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2.2.2 Competitive effects 
There are studies that incorporate dynamics by acknowledging the importance of the 
total number and timing of mailings over a long-term horizon, but none of these 
account for competitive activity. Thus, so far, the direct marketing literature has focused 
on messages sent by the focal firm, while interference is equally likely to result from 
messages received from competing firms (Unnava and Sirdeshmukh 1994; Yoo and 
Mandhachitara 2003). 
Most researchers would agree that competitive effects are highly relevant to 
include in models, but often the lack of data has prevented extensive research in this 
area. A company has easy access to information on its own sales, but it is much harder to 
gain insight into competitor activity or into individuals’ choice and consideration sets. 
This problem has frequently been acknowledged and brought up as a limitation or 
further research suggestion (Gönül and Shi 1998; Naik, Mantrala and Sawyer 1998).  
Although much research has been devoted to the study of competitive 
interference on memory and brand evaluations (D’Souza and Rao 1995; Keller 1991), 
little is known about its effects on consumer behavior in general, and on responses to 
direct mailings in particular. Some studies present little pieces of information, which at 
the least emphasize the importance of thorough research on competitive interactions in 
the direct mailing field. For example, Dwyer (1997) concludes that people typically 
divide their purchases across a number of competing organizations. For a comprehensive 
picture of direct mail competition this is highly relevant, as many people likely receive 
mailings from multiple organizations. Furthermore, it is generally believed that own and 
cross effects, that is, the effects of a company’s own actions versus its competitors’, differ 
and are thus both of importance. 
Several studies have shown that competitive interference can severely 
undermine the effectiveness of marketing actions (Unnava and Sirdeshmukh 1994). 
Therefore, one would generally expect negative competitive effects. An explanation can 
be found in the advertising clutter theory, where high advertising frequencies may lead 
to irritation and market shrinkage. The potentially negative impact of additional 
mailings, established by Simester et al. (2007) for a single firm, could be intensified by 
competitive interference. On the other hand, there may be situations where positive 
competitive externalities exist. Examples are new products, where competitive 
advertising may increase awareness thereby enhancing total sales (Prins and Verhoef 
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2007) and new attribute promotion, where competitive advertising may help remember 
old attributes thereby better distinguishing the new ones (Jewell and Unnava 2003). 
In sum, to understand one’s own effectiveness in direct mailing, one needs to 
know what competitors do and have done. 
 
2.3 The model 
In this section we present our dynamic model of individual response behavior to direct 
mailings of competing companies. We model response behavior as a function of both 
promotion history and purchase history, implemented using Recency, Frequency and 
Monetary variables. Purchase history refers to what the individual has done in the past 
and promotion history refers to what the direct mailing organizations have done in the 
past (Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 2004). 
The key elements of our model originate from the following assumptions. Each 
time an individual receives a direct mail, he decides whether he will respond or not and, 
if so, with what amount. We consider the prototypical individual who, upon receiving a 
direct mailing, instantly makes the response decision (see also Colombo and Jiang 
(1999)). The decision made is thus a response/non-response decision to a particular 
mailing, and not a choice between companies. In addition, our model does not explicitly 
model forward looking behavior or a budget restriction. Note that we assume that two 
mailings do not arrive at exactly the same time. As always, individuals are likely to vary in 
their response behavior. We accommodate for this by incorporating heterogeneity, that 
is, individual-specific parameters, thereby better capturing the true but unknown 
underlying decision processes. 
Each individual receives a different number of mailings over time. We model 
individual i’s response decision at mailing event iT,...,1 W  using a Tobit-2 specification 
(Amemiya 1985, p. 385). Thus, we assume that the individual jointly decides whether to 
respond or not and, if so, with what amount. Although modeling both response and 
amount may seem like a logical step, in the direct mailing literature the focus is mostly 
on modeling response incidence only (recent exceptions can be found in Gönül and Ter 
Hofstede (2006) and Simester et al. (2007)). 
We expect that the response decision today is influenced by all mailing events in 
the past, although it is likely that the effect is larger the more recent is the event, as 
people tend to forget past events over time (Zielske 1959). In other words, the effect of 
an event is diminishing over time. We distinguish between own effects and cross effects, 
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as, for example, past mailings from the company that has sent today’s mailing may affect 
today’s decision differently than mailings from other companies. 
 Let WiR  be a binary variable to indicate whether individual i responds at mailing 
event W or not. Furthermore, WiA  indicates the natural logarithm of the amount 
individual i spends at mailing event W  conditional on the decision to respond. Let *WiR  
be the latent variable related to WiR  and
*
WiA  the censored variable related to WiA , where 
‘ censored’ means partially observed and partially latent. Note that we take the natural 
logarithm of the amount to ensure positive amount predictions. In our model we 
include as explanatory variables representing the purchase history the RFM variables 
response rate ( owniWresprate and 
other
iWresprate ), average natural logarithm of donation 
( owniWamav and 
other
iWamav ), and exponentially weighted responses and amounts to measure 
their recency ( owniWresprec , 
other
iWresprec , 
own
iWamrec  and 
other
iWamrec ). To represent the 
promotion history we include the variables mailing frequency ( owniWmailings and 
other
iWmailings ), also based on the RFM structure. In addition, we include some quadratic 
terms to account for nonlinearities. Our Tobit-2 model then reads as: 
 
          
otherwise        0
0 if         1 *®¯­ ! WW ii RR  (2.1) 
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with C = {own, other} and where WHRi  and WHAi  represent unobserved factors that 
influence the response decision and amount, respectively. Furthermore, 
( WHRi , WHAi )~N(0, H6 ) with the usual restriction that 11,H6  = 1 for identification of the 
response equation. The subscripts R and A indicate that the parameters are equation-
specific. Previous studies suggest that decisions on whether or not to donate may be 
influenced differently by the same variables than decisions on how much to donate. For 
example, it has been found that past amounts have little explanatory power in the 
response equation, but are highly relevant in the amount equation (Donkers et al. 2006; 
Piersma and Jonker 2004).  
To define our explanatory variables we introduce some additional notation. Let 
Wit denote the calendar time of mailing event W  for individual i. Then isiis ttt {' WW  is 
the number of time periods elapsed between event s and W. Hence, for W > s, Wist'  is a 
measure of the recency of event s at the time mailing W  is received. Also, we introduce 
the dummy cisWmail , c{own, other}, to indicate that the mailing individual i received at 
mailing event s was sent by the same vs. a competing company as the mailing at event W. 
To account for the effects of forgetting we apply a multivariate finite duration 
adjustment of the geometric lag, or Koyck, model with unequally spaced observations, 
similar to Ansari, Mela and Neslin (2008). Thus, we discount each mailing event s by its 
recency Wist' , placing higher weights on more recent events. We estimate the decay 
parameters O in the explanatory variables, allowing them to be different for mailings, 
responses and amounts, indicated by the lower case subscripts m, r and a. They are not 
equation-specific and are the same for own and competitive variables, as these represent 
forgetting behavior. In Table 2.1 we present how our explanatory variables are 
constructed. 
As an example, to construct the variable ciWresprec , c{own, other}, we sum over 
all events before event W  to which individual i actually responded ( isR = 1) to obtain the 
discounted number of past responses for either the mailing company itself ( ownisWmail  = 1) 
or the competition ( otherisWmail  = 1). We consider this a recency measure because, 
conditional on the individual’s general response tendency, this term is small if the last 
response was long ago, as the variable diminishes over time through the decay parameter 
when no new response is added. Furthermore, if the last response was very recent, this 
term is large.  
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Table 2.1: Explanatory variables 
Variable Equation 
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Note: λm, λr and λa will be estimated alongside all other parameters 
 
2.3.1 Unobserved heterogeneity 
We specify individual-specific random effects for model intercepts, mailing and past 
behavior variables, so that individual-specific inference can be made. All random effects 
may be correlated both within and across equations. We use Bayesian estimation 
methods, where we model unobserved heterogeneity with a multivariate normal 
distribution. We apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to estimate 
the model. To obtain draws from the posterior distributions for the model parameters, 
we use the Gibbs sampling technique of Geman and Geman (1984). Furthermore, we 
make use of data augmentation (Tanner and Wong 1987) for the latent variables in the 
model. We specify weakly informative priors for the model parameters. Finally, when a 
full conditional posterior distribution is of unknown form, we use the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm (Chib and Greenberg 1995). For further sampling details, such as 
prior and full conditional distributions, see Appendix 2.A.  
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2.3.2 Endogeneity of mailings 
Direct marketers often use target selection techniques to decide to which subjects they 
will send a direct mailing. They do not just send mailings randomly or to everyone, but 
they estimate the likelihood that each prospect will respond, and select prospects with 
high response probabilities. The idea behind target selection techniques is that past 
behavior predicts future behavior, so that people who have frequently responded in the 
past will have a high probability to be selected again in the future. Or, the good 
customers receive more mailings. Thus, the mailing decision of a company depends on 
the responsiveness of a customer, making the direct mailings he receives endogenous. As 
Donkers et al. (2006) show, ignoring the endogeneity of mailings results in biased 
parameter estimates. We apply the methodology developed by Manchanda, Rossi and 
Chintagunta (2004) to overcome this issue. This involves simultaneously estimating 
both our Tobit-2 model for the response decision and the mailing strategy models for all 
companies. We implement a probit model for a company’s weekly mailing decision as a 
function of the individual-specific parameters. Furthermore, we include week dummies 
in the mail decision model to control for common events (for example a Christmas 
mailing). See Appendix 2.A for more estimation details.  
 
2.4 Dynamic and competitive effects for charities 
We apply our model to donating behavior to charities, as direct mailing forms an 
important part of charitable fundraising activity.  Indeed, one of the main sectors 
sending direct mail to consumers is the charity sector (Francis and Holland 1999). 
Furthermore, as people often receive many mailings of various charities in a short period 
of time, this is also a setting where competition is highly relevant. Finally, in a recent 
review on charitable literature, Andreoni (2006) explicitly indicates that both the 
dynamic and the competitive aspects of fundraising and charitable giving are important 
unexplored areas. 
Although charitable direct mail and consumer marketing are similar in many 
aspects (Diamond and Gooding-Williams 2002), there are also differences in the 
decision process associated with the different types of mailings (Bendapudi, Singh and 
Bendapudi 1996). In this section we form expectations about the dynamic competitive 
effects among charitable direct mailings based on the literature on charitable giving and 
on research in marketing and psychology. We introduce a number of different 
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theoretical drivers of charitable giving and describe their potential implications for our 
model parameters.  
We start with a discussion of the effects of past mailings on the donating 
decision. Charitable direct mail has much in common with other types of direct mail 
and we can draw on the general direct mailing literature for many issues. Certain aspects 
of charitable giving are however rather specific to this context. The main difference 
between charitable direct mail and ‘ for profit’ direct mail (the kind that tries to sell 
something) is that with charitable mailings there are no obvious immediate personal 
benefits of responding for the recipient (Rothschild 1979). Instead, their sense of 
obligation is called upon. As individuals do not like being confronted with an appeal 
(Diamond and Noble 2001), their tendency to get irritated by high charitable mail 
frequencies may be much stronger than with regular direct mail. While with regular mail 
they simply lose interest and stop reading, resulting in the diminishing marginal returns 
that are typical for the boredom effect, excessive charitable direct mail could cause so 
much irritation that response and donations in fact decrease. People might develop 
defensive strategies against charitable direct mailings (Diamond and Noble 2001). 
Indeed, Francis and Holland (1999) show that consumers have much stronger feelings 
about charitable direct mail than other types of direct mail and that charitable direct 
mail results in more irritation.  
 The negative effect of a charity’s direct mailings will be intensified even further 
by the competition. Potential donators feel overwhelmed by so many solicitations from 
so many charities (Abdy and Barclay 2001; Sargeant and Kähler 1999). Advertising 
clutter theory then suggests that a negative attitude is formed against an entire medium 
or sector (Elliott and Speck 1998), in our case charitable direct mail. Andreoni (2006) 
refers to this as “donor fatigue”. Besides the general effectiveness-reducing effect of 
competitive mailings, they will thus increase irritation by adding to the total mailing 
volume. Therefore, the effects of irritation suggest that both own and competitive 
mailings will have a negative effect on the donating decision. 
At the same time, each charitable direct mail could trigger a donation that 
otherwise would not have been made, thereby enlarging revenues. So, at least the 
charity’s own mailings have a positive effect on response (which of course is what 
charitable organizations hope and generally assume, judging by their high mailing 
frequencies).  
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Bearing in mind that there are no obvious benefits to making a donation, one 
may wonder how the persuasion process of a charitable direct mail works. Because 
charitable direct mailings appeal to the sense of obligation and moral standards, 
individuals may feel guilty if they do not make a donation. In fact, guilt has been well 
established as an important driver of charitable donating (see Andreoni (1990) and 
Sargeant (1999) for example). Assuming that people remember past (mailing) events, 
one could imagine that each letter creates some feeling of guilt of not donating, building 
up total feelings of guilt. Furthermore, the larger the guilt feeling, the higher is the 
inclination to donate. This notion of guilt as a driver of charitable giving implies that 
charitable mailings have a positive effect on response. This holds both for own and 
competitive mailings. A mailing of one charity might increase guilt enough for the 
household to donate to a subsequent solicitation of another charity. Hence, positive 
externalities could exist.  
 Summarizing, it is unclear a priori which effect past charitable direct mailings 
have on the response to today’s solicitation. Both the effect of the charity’s own mailings 
and of the competition can go both ways.  
Next, we discuss the effects of past donating behavior on the donating decision. 
Above we described how charitable direct mailings may cause feelings of guilt. Indeed it 
has been frequently noted that not donating can make someone feel guilty (Bendapudi, 
Singh and Bendapudi 1996; Bennett 2003). Furthermore, guilt can act as a behavioral 
motivation, in the sense that individuals who feel guilty will try to alleviate their guilt by 
engaging in compliant and altruistic behavior (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 1996; 
Burnett and Lunsford 1994; Huhmann and Brotherton 1997). We propose that, as 
people remember past events, total feelings of guilt build up over time, only to be 
relieved when a donation is made. The act of giving reduces guilt. As an indication that 
there is indeed a dynamic component to guilt, Dahl, Honea and Manchanda (2003) 
remark that individuals with guilt feelings concerning charity try to compensate by 
promising to make a donation in the future. Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi (1996) 
state that the donation decision depends on a cost-benefit analysis. Applied to this 
context, benefits consist of guilt relief and costs include financial costs (money donated), 
physical costs (effort of donating) and opportunity costs (the fact that contributions to 
charity cannot be spent on something else). This implies that an individual will only 
donate if guilt exceeds a certain threshold. Thus, if an individual donated recently, his 
guilt and thus his inclination to donate again today will be low (see also Diamond and 
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Noble (2001)). Recency of the last donation therefore has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of responding.  
The idea of the guilt relief is closely related to image management and the 
concept of licensing (Khan and Dhar 2006; Monin and Miller 2001). In this context, 
licensing means that a prior decision that activates a positive self-image, subsequently 
licenses a more selfish decision. Thus, an individual that has recently donated feels 
justified not to donate for a while, based on moral credentials. This notion of licensing 
/guilt relief applies to both own and competitive mailings, as we assume that people 
develop feelings of guilt towards charity in general, as opposed to specific organizations. 
On the other hand, if an individual has not donated to a charity for a very long 
time, there is a good chance he has defected in the sense that he stopped being a donator 
to the charity. This would imply that the recency of response to a charity’s own mailings 
in fact has a positive effect on the likelihood of responding. Overall, there could be an 
inverse-U shaped effect of recency on current donating behavior, with very recent and 
distant last donations having a negative effect relative to intermediate values of recency. 
Next, we discuss the effects of attitudes on the donating decision, as it is 
generally agreed that consumer attitudes influence consumer behavior (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). We distinguish two dimensions: (1) the attitude towards charitable 
organizations and donating in general and (2) charity-specific attitudes, measuring the 
attitude towards one charity relative to the others.  
In the charitable giving literature it is well established that certain people have a 
more favorable attitude towards charities than others and generally donate more than 
others. They are more generous. Generosity is a character trait that tends to be stable 
over time, implying that past response rates and average amounts positively affect the 
donating decision today.  This holds for a charity’s own past donations, but also for 
donations to the competition. Frequent and large past donations to both own and 
competitive mailings indicate a generous individual who will also donate generously 
today. 
Next, attitude towards a specific charity is an important driver of the donations 
to that charity (Diamond and Gooding-Williams 2002) so that past response rate and 
donations again have a positive effect on the donation to the same charity today. The 
difference with the generosity driver lies in the competitive effects. We propose that an 
individual with a relatively positive attitude towards a certain charity will have a 
relatively negative attitude towards competitive charities. Thus, competition among 
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charities implies that high response rates and amounts at the competition have a 
negative effect on the donating decision. 
Finally we argue that there are important behavioral patterns underlying 
donating behavior. Whereas attitudes drive the total amount of money donated, 
behavioral patterns determine how that money is donated. If an individual has a certain 
amount to spend on charity in a given time period, say a year, he can make for example 
one large donation, a few moderate ones or many even smaller ones. Define a giving 
pattern as a way in which people can donate a fixed total amount in response to a given 
number of mailings. A giving pattern can then be characterized by either the frequency 
of donation or the average donation. A low frequency implies a high average amount per 
donation and vice versa. We expect each individual to have his own giving pattern that is 
stable across charities and time. Some people like to give a little bit very often, while 
others prefer to make a large donation occasionally, resulting in a continuum of possible 
giving patterns. The existence of giving patterns then suggests that the past response rate 
has a positive effect on today’s response decision but a negative effect on today’s amount, 
and vice versa for past average amount. As giving patterns are not charity-specific, these 
relationships are also expected to hold for response rates and average amount donated to 
other charities. 
The implications that giving patterns, guilt buildup, and the other drivers of 
donating behavior have on the signs of the effects of our model variables are summarized 
in Table 2.2. For some variables we have multiple drivers affecting their influence, 
making it hard to identify the precise role of each driver. For most variables, however, we 
are able to determine the most important driver underlying their influence, based on the 
sign of their influence. The final column in Table 2.2 already preludes our empirical 
findings, indicating which drivers appear to dominate.  
 
2.5 Data  
For this research we have a unique dataset at our disposal. It consists of the databases of 
three large charity organizations in the Netherlands that are active in the health sector 
and that are keen on gaining insight into their competitive interactions. These charities 
are three of the largest charities in the health sector, representing almost 50% of the total 
revenues from direct mail. In their databases, the charities track their donators by 
recording who gave what and when.  
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of the individuals per year 
 Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3 
 mean std. error mean std. error mean std. error 
# mailings  3.83 1.41 3.87 2.69 3.25 1.67 
# responses  0.73 0.86 0.46 0.80 0.54 0.73 
total donation (€) 8.48 15.08 5.36 15.03 5.75 10.18 
 
This means we have revealed preference data, that is, we have individual records of 
actual response behavior to competing organizations, which enable investigation of 
donating to multiple charities and hence competitive interactions between different 
charities. The relevant information that is generally available for each individual in the 
database of a particular charity organization includes the following: 
 name of the respondent 
 complete address of the respondent 
 for each soliciting mailing that has been sent: 
 date of the mailing 
 amount donated (if the individual responded) 
Using the name and address data, we connect the three databases so that we can track 
for each individual when he received a mailing from one of the three charities and his 
exact response behavior towards these competing organizations.  
We have five years of data at our disposal on donations to the three health 
charities. As they requested to remain anonymous we call them charity 1, 2 and 3. The 
observation period is January 2002 - December 2006. From the millions of individuals 
in the database we randomly select 5000 individuals. In this sample, 3985 individuals 
receive mailings from one charity during our observation period, 978 of two charities, 
and 37 of three charities. Furthermore, 1466 individuals receive mailings from charity 1, 
3881 from charity 2 and 705 from charity 3.  
For each individual in our sample we use an individual start-up period. This is 
one year after the first date each charity (that mails him during the data period) has sent 
a mailing. This enables us to compute reasonable initial values of the explanatory 
variables. The remainder of the data is used as the estimation sample. See Table 2.3 for 
some descriptives of the full sample. The overall response rate is 0.142, so people on 
average respond to about one out of seven mailings, although this varies somewhat 
across charities. This may seem high for direct mailings but personal communication 
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with the relevant fund managers confirmed this is actually a reasonable response rate for 
mailings to donators on the house list. Excluding start-up, people receive around five 
mailings a year from these three charities (which is much less than the sum of the means 
across charities in Table 2.3, as not all individuals receive mailings from all charities).  
 
2.6 Empirical results  
To investigate the effects of mailing actions and the competitive interactions between 
charity 1, 2 and 3, we estimate the model parameters. We apply MCMC techniques to 
obtain draws from the posterior distributions of the parameters.  
 
2.6.1 Estimation results 
Using the Gibbs sampling technique of Geman and Geman (1984) we estimate our 
model, where we use 40000 iterations as burn-in. After the chain has converged, we 
retain every tenth iteration of the next 40000 iterations to obtain an approximately 
random sample from the posterior distribution. Our posterior results are based on the 
resulting 4000 draws.  In Table 2.4 we present the posterior means of the effects of our 
variables in both the response and the amount equation, where posterior standard 
deviations are in parentheses. Below we will discuss the results and the implications for 
the drivers of charitable giving. 
 
Drivers of charitable giving 
The effect of mailings on response to a mailing of the same charity is significantly 
negative (-0.211). Thus, each extra mailing a charity sends to an individual negatively 
affects the probability that this individual will respond to future mailings, suggesting 
irritation. Also, the effect of the square of mailings is significantly negative (-0.132), 
implying that high mailing frequencies irritate more. Hence, we find evidence that 
irritation plays a role for own mailings. 
For competitive mailings, the main effect is significantly positive (0.100), 
confirming that guilt buildup drives response. However, the squared effect is 
significantly negative (-0.073) so that small numbers of competitive mailings have a 
positive effect by inducing guilt but larger numbers have a negative effect, suggesting 
irritation caused by too many mailings. Thus, it seems that a little competition among 
charities can be reinforcing, but too much may be detrimental.  
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 Table 2.4: Posterior means and standard deviations of variable effects 
Explanatory 
variables  
Response 
equation 
Amount 
equation Decay 
Constant E0 -1.359** (0.020) 1.177** (0.024)    
E1own -0.211** (0.038) -0.113 ** (0.041) Om 0.001a (2.62e-4) Mailings E1other 0.100** (0.058) 0.050 (0.040)    
E2own -0.132 ** (0.026) -0.016 (0.026)    Mailings2  E2other -0.073 * (0.041) -0.028 (0.033)    
Response E3own 0.484** (0.050) 0.043 (0.071) Or 0.247a (0.013) 
rate  E3other 0.047 (0.074) -0.031  (0.048)    
Response E4own 0.352 ** (0.061) -0.491** (0.067)    
recency E4other 0.118** (0.048) -0.290 ** (0.051)    
Response E5own -0.004  (0.025) 0.031 (0.019)    
recency2 E5other 0.033  (0.022) 0.011  (0.019)    
Average  E6own 0.133** (0.021) 0.433** (0.025) Oa 0.262a (0.011) 
amount  E6other 0.039* (0.019) 0.034* (0.016)    
Amount E7own -0.138** (0.024) 0.197** (0.024)    
recency E7other -0.019 (0.024) 0.136** (0.025)    
*, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
a: Testing for significance is not relevant as implementation of the logit transformation 
automatically leads to exclusion of 0. 
 
 Regarding the amount donated, we find that own mailings have a negative 
effect (-0.113), implying irritation, but mailings mainly affect the response decision. 
This seems plausible, as for example irritation would cause people to ignore charitable 
mailings entirely (cf. Diamond and Noble (2001)), instead of making a smaller 
donation.  
 For recency of response, we find a significantly positive main effect on response 
incidence (0.352), implying defection. If an individual last donated long ago, he has a 
low response probability, suggesting he has stopped being a donator to the charity. We 
also find a significantly positive main effect of recency of other responses (0.118), which 
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we did not anticipate. If an individual’s last donation to other charities was long ago, he 
has a low response probability, indicating he has stopped being a donator altogether, for 
example because he has died. Surprisingly, we find that the licensing/guilt relief effect 
mainly manifests itself through the effect of recency on amount, both from own (-
0.491) and other responses (-0.290). An individual that has donated recently appears to 
feel licensed to donate a smaller amount to the current mailing, instead of not donating 
at all. 
 Next, we describe the effects of response rate and average amount, which 
concern multiple drivers. Separately, the giving patterns imply positive effects of 
response on response ( 3RE , say RR) and amount on amount ( 6AE , say AA) and negative 
effects of response on amount ( 3AE , say RA) and amount on response ( 6RE , say AR). 
However, since generosity and competition are also affecting these relationships, 
establishing the existence of giving patterns is not that straightforward. To determine 
whether giving patterns indeed exist, we note that, after allowing for generosity and 
competition effects, it must still hold that RR>RA and AR<AA. Still, we cannot directly 
compare these effects since they concern different equations with different scales. A 
trivial comparison is obtained when RR and AA are both positive and RA and AR are 
both negative. In case all effects are positive, the two conditions can be integrated into 
(RAAR)/(AARR)<1, which is insensitive to scaling effects, so it can be used for  
testing. For other cases, we cannot derive a condition to test exactly, due to sign changes 
in the equations. Now, for own effects, 71.6% of the draws satisfy one of the two 
conditions where the effect of giving patterns can be verified. All these draws display the 
hypothesized pattern, demonstrating the presence of giving patterns with fairly high 
confidence. For other effects, we can only verify the implied patterns for 25.9% of the 
draws, resulting in unreliable inference. However, the fact that 82.3% of these draws 
display the hypothesized pattern suggests that giving patterns are stable across charities 
and thus also hold for competitive donations.  
 Now, besides giving patterns, attitude effects can play a role. As we find a 
significantly positive effect of both own and other amount on response (0.133 and 
0.039), which would be negative if giving patterns were the only driving force, some 
attitude effects are present. Based on this alone, we cannot distinguish whether the 
positive effect is charity-specific or caused by general generosity. However, general 
generosity would imply equal own and other effects. Since own effects are clearly larger 
than other effects, we conclude that results are caused (at least partly) by charity-specific 
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attitudes, or, we find evidence for the competition driver. Finally, note that particularly 
the own effect of amount on amount (0.433) is quite substantial, which is plausible as 
donation sizes tend to be rather stable over time. 
 
Decay parameters 
Next, we consider the decay parameters for mailings, responses and amounts (see right-
hand side panel of Table 2.4). Through the decay parameter the effect of, for example, a 
mailing decreases over time. Although the decay parameter for mailings Om may seem 
very small at first sight (0.001), we have to keep in mind that these estimates are per 
year. Thus, if we consider for example the weekly and monthly decay rates for mailings 
we find that they are still 0.87 and 0.54, respectively. Hence, a mailing is half forgotten 
after a month. An alternative interpretation is that ten mailings only feel like five 
mailings a month later. Nonetheless, after a year a direct mailing is almost completely 
forgotten and its effect is negligible. Past response behavior is much more persistent than 
past mailings however, as after a year both a past response and a past amount are still in 
people’s memory for around a fourth, according to the model parameters (0.247 and 
0.262). Or, after a year, the effect of a response or amount has decreased to about one 
fourth of the instantaneous effect. 
 
Heterogeneity  
Up till now we have discussed the effects at the posterior means of the parameter values. 
However, there is heterogeneity across individuals. In Table 2.5 we present the posterior 
mean of the variance in the random effects for the various model variables, indicating 
the variation in effects across individuals. As the random effects may be highly dispersed, 
the story may be quite different for some individuals than for others. For example, the 
competitive effect of response on response is not significant at the population level at a 
posterior mean of 0.047, but the 95% credible interval for the random effects that 
excludes 2.5% of the lowest and 2.5% of the highest individual parameter estimates, 
ranges from -0.21 to 0.39. Thus, on the one hand, the competitive response rate has a 
substantial negative effect on response probability, suggesting loyalty towards the 
competition for some individuals. On the other hand, the competitive response rate 
increases the response probability to future mailings for other individuals, for example 
reflecting that general generosity dominates for these individuals. 
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Table 2.5: Variance across individuals 
  Response Amount 
Constant     0.155    0.171  
Mailings own   0.061    0.072  
  other   0.017    0.015  
Mailings2 own   0.024    0.018  
  other   0.008    0.006  
Response own   0.729    1.112  
  other   0.237   0.403  
Response recency own   0.353    0.553 
  other   0.044    0.067  
Response recency2 own   0.054    0.016  
  other   0.011    0.003  
Amount own   0.146    0.475  
  other   0.013   0.016  
Amount recency own   0.059    0.065  
  other   0.011    0.014 
  
Endogeneity  
As explained above, we have corrected for potential endogeneity bias by estimating a 
model for each charity’s mailing strategy alongside our Tobit-2 model for the donating 
decision (cf. Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta (2004)). We modeled a charity’s 
weekly mailing decision as a function of the individual-specific parameters and week 
dummies. The parameter estimates can be found in Appendix 2.B. The results show that 
the charities target individuals with high response propensities, as is also frequently 
described in the direct marketing literature. Furthermore, charities do not take donated 
amounts into account in their mailing decisions, which is confirmed by our discussions 
with several fund managers. As for the week dummies, we find that charity 3 sends its 
mailings in very specific weeks, while the other two spread out their campaigns over 
multiple weeks. All charities send relatively large mailing volumes towards the end of the 
year, which is the only distinctive common mailing moment in our data. 
 To investigate the impact of the endogeneity bias correction on the estimation 
results, we have estimated the model without this correction as well. The estimation 
results can be found in Appendix 2.C. We find substantial differences: without the 
correction fewer variables are significant and at the same time other effects are highly 
overestimated. For example, the impact of recent responses is much stronger without 
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the endogeneity correction. As we find clear evidence for target selection by the 
charities, the results of the model with the correction should be favored. 
 
2.6.2 Revenue implications of an extra mailing 
Even though the separate posterior mean effects are quite clear-cut and straightforward 
to interpret, the explanatory variables are all interrelated and non-linear in the decay 
parameters and therefore their overall effect on response to a mailing is not immediately 
apparent. For example, a higher number of mailings in the past tends to lower today’s 
response probability to the same charity. At the same time a higher number of past 
mailings implies a higher number of past responses (Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 
2004), which in turn increases the probability of response to a mailing today. In short, 
each mailing triggers a process, which affects subsequent mailing events. Furthermore, as 
we allow for heterogeneity in the parameters in our model, there may be certain patterns 
in response behavior that cannot be identified based on these population-averaged 
estimates alone. Thus, to get a clear view of all dynamic effects, we compute impulse 
response functions (IRF’s), which track the consequences of one extra mailing, the 
impulse, for response and amount on subsequent mailing events. 
Averaging the responses to impulses on different moments in time would result 
in an approximation of the effect of an extra mailing. However, choosing the impulse 
dates randomly would not be realistic, as not every point in time is a plausible candidate 
for sending an extra mailing. For example, charities would never (intentionally) send 
two direct mailings on one day, nor on consecutive days. Thus, to stay as close to the 
actual mailing strategies as possible, we opt for the following solution. Instead of adding 
an extra mailing on various days and averaging results, we remove an existing mailing 
and simulate the difference in response propensity and donated amount on subsequent 
events. This way, it is as if the mailing sequence minus the removed mailing forms the 
baseline, and the removed mailing the impulse. We follow this procedure for all existing 
mailings within a certain period, resulting in estimates for the effect of an extra mailing, 
with the mailing strategy corresponding to the actual strategies used by the charities. 
We divide our five year time span in two parts for each individual, an individual 
start-up period, as described above, and an impulse period that varies over individuals in 
line with the varying start-up period. The impulse period ends two years before the end 
of our observation period, to ensure a two year simulation period for each impulse. 
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Figure 2.1: IRF for amount donated to charity 2 
 
Now, we compute donator-specific IRF’s by simulating response behavior for each draw 
of the individual parameter estimates1. This simulated behavior is then averaged over 
1000 draws of the individual parameter estimates and over 25 draws from the error 
distribution to obtain average response probabilities and amounts donated. Now, an 
extra direct mailing has an immediate effect, which is the response to the mailing itself, 
but it also sets a process in motion that indirectly affects all subsequent mailing events.  
 Figure 2.1 presents the (kernel-smoothed) average IRF for the donated amount 
per individual to charity 2, as an example. We do not show the immediate effect, that is, 
the response to the impulse mailing itself. Due to the relative magnitude of this effect 
compared to subsequent effects, this would make the graph rather uninformative. The 
solid line represents the effect of an impulse of a mailing of charity 2 according to its 
mailing strategy on the average individual amount donated to charity 2 over time. In 
addition, the effects of extra mailings of the competing charities on the average 
individual donation to charity 2 are represented by the two dashed lines. 
 We find that the own effect is larger than competitive effects, but competitive 
interactions do exist. An extra mailing of a competing charity positively affects the 
amount donated to charity 2, possibly due to guilt creation. The effect of an impulse of 
charity 1 is much larger than that of charity 3, and both effects diminish over time.  
 
                                                 
1 As some parameter values led to explosive behavior of the responses over time, we restricted the 
amount donated per mailing to twice the maximum amount donated by the individual during 
our data period. 
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Table 2.6: Immediate, indirect and net effects of an extra mailing on revenues in Euros 
      Immediate 
effect Indirect effects Net effect 
   Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3   
Charity 1 
2365.35 
(63.46) 
 
** -586.42
(306.80)
-24.79
* 
 
%
793.92
(411.71)
33.56
* 
 
%
43.80
(88.69)
1.85 
 
 
%
1778.93 
(342.51) 
75.21 
** 
 
% 
Charity 2 
2931.14 
(73.63) 
 
** 135.57
(272.07)
4.63
 
 
%
-155.58
(566.04)
-5.31
 
 
%
33.30
(63.59)
1.14
 
 
%
2775.56 
(603.73) 
94.69 
** 
 
% 
Charity 3 
711.26 
(41.00) 
 
** 15.71
(58.60)
2.21
 
 
%
171.32
(219.28)
24.09
 
 
%
-163.05
(118.39)
-22.92
 
 
%
548.21 
(132.23) 
77.08 
** 
 
% 
          *, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
 
We define the indirect effects as the sum of effects across all individuals over 
two years after, and not including, the impulse, where we apply an annual discount rate 
of 10%. Thus, an extra mailing has an indirect own effect, which is the total effect on 
subsequent mailing events of the same charity, and indirect cross effects, representing 
the total effect on subsequent mailing events of the other charities. Although we did not 
depict it for reasons of clarity, an extra mailing also clearly has an immediate effect, 
which we defined as the response to the impulse mailing itself. By definition, there are 
no immediate cross effects.  
In Table 2.6 we present the immediate and indirect effects of an extra mailing 
by each of the three charities on the revenues in Euros. That is, the numbers represent 
the extra donated amount across all individuals over two years, generated by an extra 
mailing in accordance with actual mailing strategies, compared to the situation without 
the extra mailing. Furthermore, we present the net effect of an extra mailing, computed 
as the sum of the immediate effect and the indirect own effects for all charities. Standard 
errors based on variation in expected effects in our sample of draws of individual 
parameter estimates are in parentheses. The indirect and net effects are also presented as 
percentages of the immediate effect.  
 Table 2.6 should be read as follows. The rows represent the charity sending the 
“impulse” mailing, and the columns the charities for which we compute the effects. 
41
Dynamic and competitive effects of direct mailings: A charitable giving application 
 
 33 
Thus, if charity 1 sends an extra mailing to the donators in our sample according to its 
mailing strategy, this results in an immediate gain of €2365.35, for example. As a 
benchmark, we note that the average total yearly revenues in our sample of 5000 
individuals is €12280.47 for charity 1, €19646.34 for charity 2 and €3224.47 for charity 
3. Thus, an extra mailing will result in around 15-22% of the total yearly revenues. 
Although this may seem high for US standards, charities in the Netherlands have a 
much lower mailing frequency. As people receive on average three to four mailings a year 
from these charities (see Table 2.3), revenue increases of this size could be expected and 
are in line with decreasing marginal returns.  
For all charities we find significant positive immediate effects, the donations to 
the extra mailing. However, a direct mailing also has a cannibalization effect, the 
indirect own effect. People donate less to subsequent mailings of the same charity, since 
they have already donated to the extra mailing. Indeed, all charities have a negative 
indirect own effect with up to a quarter of the revenues cancelled out within two years, 
although standard errors are quite high. The cross effects reflect competitive 
interactions. We find that these competitive effects vary in size, possibly due to 
differences in database compositions and mailing strategies, but that they are 
consistently positive. Finally, note that the effect sizes across charities correspond 
roughly to the size of each of the charities. 
As shown by Figure 2.1, the effects of a mailing on charities’ future revenues 
vary over time, with most of the indirect effects not differing significantly from zero. We 
investigate these effects in more detail by breaking down the indirect revenues into four 
periods of six months in Table 2.7. Some clear patterns arise from these results. First, for 
all three charities we find that their mailings result in a strong initial decline in response 
behavior in the first six months after the extra mailing followed by an improvement; the 
negative effect dies out or even becomes positive in the long run. However, only the 
negative effects in the first six months are significant. The cannibalization effect is thus 
strong in the short run and decreases over time. Next, concerning the competitive 
effects, we find that competitive mailings have a positive effect in the short run, that is 
quite substantial in some cases and for charity 1 on charity 2 also significant. All cross-
effects die out in the long run. Thus, charities tend to be short-run complements, in that 
they positively affect and support one another, and this effect diminishes over time. This 
is supported by the fact that the sum of all cross effects in the first half year is 
significantly different from zero. 
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able 2.7: Indirect effects of an extra m
ailing on revenues in Euros over tim
e 
 
C
harity 1 
C
harity 2 
C
harity 3 
 
1
st half 
year 
2
nd half 
year 
3
rd half 
year 
4
th half 
year 
1
st half 
year 
2
nd half 
year 
3
rd half 
year 
4
th half 
year 
1
st half 
year 
2
nd half 
year 
3
rd half 
year 
4
th half 
year 
C
harity 
1 
-673.93** 
(100.10) 
-15.62 
(83.66) 
59.25 
(80.11)
43.88 
(63.34) 
307.05**
(127.14)
193.93* 
(107.91)
159.46 
(105.92)
133.47 
(91.13) 
19.66 
(32.27) 
10.34 
(27.96) 
9.42 
(20.78) 
4.39 
(18.66)
C
harity 
2 
78.23 
(91.65) 
25.18 
(75.63) 
28.10 
(66.19)
4.06 
(55.22) 
-803.90** 
(167.28)
220.06 
(156.91)
242.09 
(155.10)
186.18 
(126.85)
11.81 
(19.43) 
9.03 
(19.25) 
8.38 
(16.78) 
4.08 
(12.33)
C
harity 
3 
2.95 
(17.39) 
5.32 
(15.19) 
5.27 
(17.24)
2.16 
(11.67) 
52.83 
(59.75) 
51.55 
(71.82) 
41.95 
(56.00) 
24.99 
(36.40) 
-163.87** 
(42.54) 
-7.93 
(39.36) 
-1.40 
(28.35) 
10.14 
(26.13)
*, **: Zero not contained in 95%
, 99%
 H
ighest Posterior D
ensity region, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Net effect of an extra mailing on revenues in Euros 
 Two competitorsa One competitor No competition 
Charity 1 
1778.93 
(342.51) 
1809.47 
(350.18) 
1.72% 
2353.45 
(771.97) 
32.30% 
Charity 2 
2775.56 
(603.73) 
2731.23 
(565.66) 
-1.60% 
1743.50 
(656.65) 
-37.18% 
Charity 3 
548.21 
(132.23) 
475.42 
(122.87) 
-13.28% 
536.01 
(248.16) 
-2.23% 
                     a: Effects with two competitors taken from Table 2.6 
 
 Since not all charities are included, the data do not cover all competition. To 
shed some light on the potential bias this may cause, we estimate the model without 
competitive effects and also a model for each combination of two charities, instead of all 
three. The parameter estimates can be found in Appendices 2.D and 2.E. To design a 
mailing strategy the charities should consider the net effect of a mailing, which is the 
sum of the immediate effect and the own indirect effect. In this way long-term effects 
are taken into account. In Table 2.8 we summarize the net effect of a mailing for all 
three charities for 1) the full model, 2) the model with only the largest competitor 
(defined as the competitor with the highest yearly revenues) and 3) the model with no 
competition. We also report standard errors and the percentage changes of these 
models’ results relative to the full model results. 
 The predictions of the model with one competitor are relatively close to the 
model with all competitors. As long as competition is accounted for, the results appear 
fairly robust with respect to the number of competitors included in the model. 
However, we find that ignoring competitive effects generally results in large deviations 
from the full model results. The bias varies from an underestimation of 37% to an 
overestimation 32%, likely resulting in faulty decisions. Although these differences are 
not statistically significant, economically they are. For charity 3 the effects are much 
smaller, which can be explained by the fact that this charity does not have as much 
interaction with the competition as the other two. However, when competition is 
strong, ignoring it changes results drastically. Thus, accounting for competitive effects 
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improves the quality of the marketing activities undertaken and could well be worth the 
trouble of data collection.  
Charities interact regularly (more than in other industries) and discuss when 
the various mailing campaigns will take place, so that they know each other’s strategy at 
an aggregate level. Also, the charities in the application cooperated in a joint research 
project to gain more insights in the effects of their mailings, which resulted in this 
research. Commercial organizations could collect data on how many mailings 
individuals receive and from which companies and on donating / purchasing behavior 
through a survey. Another option is to purchase data from marketing research 
companies. Examples are GfK, which collects data on direct marketing activities from 
multiple companies via the DirectMail panel, and TNS, which maintains a diary-based 
panel on all sorts of mail, the Royal Mail Consumer Panel (see also Francis and Holland 
(1999)).  
 
2.7 Discussion and conclusion 
We have proposed a model to establish the existence of, and to describe, dynamic and 
competitive effects of direct mailings, and we applied the model to a unique dataset 
concerning three charities in the health sector. By combining the databases of these 
charities, we could retrieve which mailings were received by which households on which 
day. This way we were able to empirically study dynamic competitive interactions 
between multiple direct mailing organizations, and this has not yet been done before.  
The estimated model parameters in our charitable giving application indicate 
that substantial dynamic and competitive effects exist. This result is quite interesting, as 
the relevant literature on direct mailings has largely overlooked these effects. Not only 
have long-run effects been ignored for a long time, but also only a single firm has been 
considered in general, neglecting potential competitive interaction effects. 
Our parameter estimates indicate that past events (mailings, responses, 
amounts spent) are indeed still relevant at present. Although the exact numbers 
probably depend on the context, it seems plausible that these effects also exist for other 
types of mailings, such as catalogs and all kinds of promotional offers. Thus, for 
accurately describing direct mailing response behavior, the static context cannot be 
justified. Furthermore, for strategic purposes, a firm has to take into consideration that 
each mailing decision will affect response behavior well into the future. Even though the 
mailing itself is fairly quickly forgotten, the response that the mailing is aimed to trigger 
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is not. In our context of charitable giving, direct mailings are short-run substitutes, in 
that an extra mailing cannibalizes the revenues of subsequent mailings. Over time, this 
effect dies out. 
We also find that competitive interactions indeed exist. Particularly in the short 
run, competitive charitable direct mailings are complements, so that competition is 
reinforcing. Possibly due to lack of necessary data, these competitive effects have not 
been shown before. As the effects can be quite substantial, however, it may be worth 
putting substantial effort into data collection.  
Since charitable mailings differ in various respects from regular direct mailings, 
we used our model to shed light on the practical relevance of a number of theoretical 
drivers of donating behavior. Our main findings substantiate the idea of direct mailing 
irritation. Sending too many requests can be detrimental for a charity’s revenues. 
However, small numbers of competitive mailings seem to be reinforcing, suggesting that 
these increase guilt and consequently the inclination to donate. The effects of recency 
imply that some licensing takes place. People who recently donated feel licensed to 
donate smaller amounts. And finally, people give according to certain giving patterns, 
that is, some people give a substantial donation occasionally, while others frequently give 
small amounts. These giving patterns appear to be stable across time and charities.  
As a limitation of this study, we note that our data have not been collected with 
the purpose of theory testing. Our results are clearly indicative of the relevance of the 
various drivers, but more detailed experiments would have to be carried out to 
disentangle their influences. 
In addition, we mention that the model is not particularly suited to develop 
optimal mailing strategies, as this requires extensive numerical simulation procedures. 
With the insights on the relevant competitive interactions, one might consider using 
more stylized models of individual response behavior to develop optimal mailing 
strategies (Naik, Raman and Winer 2005; Simester, Sun and Tsitsiklis 2006). 
A final limitation is that our data still does not cover all competition. This 
restriction is somewhat alleviated by our robustness checks, where we find that focusing 
only on the largest competitor does not substantially alter results. However, we focus on 
the health sector and leave out other categories. Across categories, results may indeed be 
quite different.  
 The model can be refined in various ways. The first seeks to relieve the lack of 
full competitive activity. In principle, an extension to more than three competitors is 
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easy, although this would put a heavy burden on data collection. Hence, an interesting 
issue for further research would be to include an ‘ other competitor’ category, without 
having to be very specific. 
Finally, our model can be used to simulate the effects of too many or too little 
mailings on own and on competitor’s revenues. It would be challenging to see if a 
natural experiment would lead to comparable outcomes. In Part II of this thesis, we 
present the results of a field experiment, where we vary the number of charitable direct 
mailings that individuals receive.  
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2.A Bayesian estimation of direct mailing response model parameters 
We have N individuals with iT  mailing event observations in iW  weeks for individual i,  
i = 1,..,N. Define for mailing event W Tiii ARy ),( *** WWW  and TAiRii ),(= WWW HHH  and let O = 
T
arm ),,( OOO  contain all decay parameters. Let )(OWiX  denote the (1 u k)-matrix of k 
mean-centered explanatory variables, where O in parentheses indicates the dependence 
on the decay parameters. Then )(OiX  is the ( iT u k) matrix that stacks )(OWiX  for the 
iT  mailing events of individual i. For 
*
iy  and iH  similar definitions hold. 
In our non-linear random-coefficients Tobit-2 model specification in  
(2.1)-(2.4), we have  ),0(~ HWH 6Ni  with       , ),(~ EEE 6Ni  
and TTAi
T
Rii ),( EEE   of size (2ku1). The vector RiE  contains all parameters  
in the response equation, excluding the decay parameters, that is, 
Tother
iR
own
iR
other
iR
own
iR
other
iR
own
iRiRRi ),,...,,,,,( 7722110 EEEEEEEE  . 
To correct for target selection and the resulting endogeneity of the mailings 
received, we simultaneously estimate our Tobit-2 model for the response decision and 
the mailing strategy models for all three firms. We assume that a firm makes a mailing 
decision every week w for each individual i. Let ijwm  be a dummy variable indicating 
whether firm j sends a mailing to individual i in week w, w = 1,…, iW . Then im  denotes 
the ( iW  u 3) matrix of mail dummies for all firms for all weeks of individual i. The 
mailing strategy model is a probit model for a firm’s weekly mailing decision as a 
function of the individual response parameters and week-dummies. Let iZ1  be the ( iW  
u 2k) matrix that stacks iW  times the vector TiE . Furthermore, let iZ2  be a ( iW  u 52) 
matrix containing an intercept and 51 week-dummies. Then we add the following to 
our model in (2.1)-(2.4): 
 
 ],|0[],|1[ 21
*
21 iiijwiiijw ZZmPZZmP !   (2.5) 
 iiii ZZm [GG  2211*  with [i ~ N(0, I) (2.6) 
 
Here, 1G  is a (2k u 3) matrix containing for all three funds the parameters for the 
individual response parameters and 2G  a (52 u 3) matrix containing the constant and 
the parameters for the week-dummies. 
To obtain draws from the posterior distributions for the model parameters, we 
use the Gibbs sampling technique of Geman and Geman (1984). Furthermore, we make 
use of data augmentation (Tanner and Wong 1987) for the latent variables in the 
model. The latent variables *iy , iE  and *im  i are sampled alongside the model 
»¼º«¬ª »¼º«¬ª 6 2 
A
2
RA
  
         1    
       1
AAAAR VUV
UVVV VH
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parameters E , E6 , O , H6 , 1G  and 2G . We specify a flat prior for E and independent 
weakly informative priors for the other model parameters, details of which will be 
discussed below. Finally, when a full conditional posterior distribution is of unknown 
form we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Chib and Greenberg 1995). In the 
remainder of this appendix we describe for each parameter and each latent variable the 
full conditional distribution we use to obtain posterior results.  
 
Sampling of *iy  
To sample the elements of *iy , we use a data augmentation step and simulate  
the latent variables for each mailing event as follows. When a purchase is  
made, we set *WiA  equal to WiA  and draw 
*
WiR  from the conditional normal distribution 
             , truncated from below at zero. When no 
purchase is made, we start with drawing *WiR  from the conditional normal distribution 
( )1,)( RiiXN EOW , truncated from above at zero. We then draw *WiA  from its conditional 
normal distribution  22* )1(),)(()( ARiiiAAii XRXN VUEOUVEO WWW  . 
 
Sampling of *im  
To sample *im , we use a data augmentation step by simulating the latent variables as 
follows. We draw *im  from the normal distribution ),+( 2211 IZZN ii GG , with each 
element truncated from below at zero when a mailing is sent, or truncated from above at 
zero when no mailing is sent. 
 
Sampling of Ei 
As RiE  and AiE  are correlated, it is convenient to sample them simultaneously. For this 
purpose we define 2=)( IZi OW   )(OWiX  with I2 the 2-dimensional identity matrix and 
 the Kronecker product. Let )(OiZ  be the (2 iT  u 2k) matrix that stacks the )(OWiZ  
matrices for the iT  mailing events of individual i. Then iiii Zy HEO  )(*  with 
),0(~ HH 6iTi IN . In addition we have ii KEE +=  with ),0(~ EK 6Ni . Finally, we have 
iiii ZZm [GG  2211*  with ),0(~ INi[  and iZ1 = ι  TiE .  
 Combining the three sources of information on iE  we obtain,  
                with 
            and                         and a draw is 
made from this distribution. 
 
¦ 66 
 
 i
i
W
t
ititiT
T
i ZmyIZU
1
22
*
1
1*1 )())(( GGEO EH
)1,)(( 2)(
*
UUEO V
EOWWW  
A
Aiii XA
RiiXN
6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Sampling of  6H  
Since 11,H6  is restricted to 1 for identification purposes, sampling of H6   is not 
straightforward. We follow the approach of McCulloch, Polson and Rossi (2000) and 
use the reparametrization              where S and J are both scalars in our two-
dimensional case. This implies WHRi ~N(0,1) and WHAi | WHRi  , J, S~N( JH WRi , S). Now, 
consider WHAi = iRi ZJH W +  and note that S is the variance of the error term in this 
model. Given conjugate priors S ~ IG2(N, C) and ),(~ 1BN JJ , the full conditional 
posteriors are:  
 
                   and 
            
with        . 
 
We take J = 0, B1 = 1/10, N = 3 and C = (1  B1)(N  1), in line with McCulloch, 
Polson and Rossi (2000) and draw S and J  from the full conditional posterior 
distributions. 
 
Sampling of O 
To ensure that the effect of an event is diminishing over time the decay parameters must 
be in the interval (0, 1). To achieve this, we specify the decay parameter vector as 
        . Thus, we apply the logit transformation to the vector O to obtain a vector 
M and generate draws for M  to ensure that the elements of O are in the interval (0, 1). 
We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Chib and Greenberg 1995) to make 
independent draws for the separate elements in M and specify a univariate N(0, 1) prior 
distribution for each element iM , j = 1,…,J with J the number of elements of M (see also 
Ansari, Mela and Neslin (2008)). The full conditional posterior distribution for iM , j = 
1,…,J is then proportional to the likelihood times the prior and thus to 
 
 
 
We draw each element in M  sequentially using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm with a normal candidate-generating density centered on the previous draw. 
To obtain reasonable acceptance rates, the variance is adjusted depending on the 
acceptance rate (Train 2003, p. 306). 
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Sampling of E 
To sample E  we consider the part of the model that depends on E  which we can write 
as ii KEE +=    with ),0(~ EK 6Ni . Given a conjugate prior ),(~ 1EEE BN ,  E  is drawn 
from       with      . We take E = 0, EB = 
1/100, and draw E from the full conditional posterior distribution. 
 
Sampling of  6E  
To sample E6  we again consider the regression model ii KEE +=  with ),0(~ EK 6Ni . 
It follows that the full conditional posterior distribution of E6  is an inverted Wishart 
with scale parameter                  and N+ 2N  degrees of freedom, where 
the N  terms stem from the conjugate prior we impose to improve convergence of the 
Gibbs sampler, as recommended by Hobert and Casella (1996). We set 1N  = 1/10 and 
2N  = 32 to induce only a marginal influence of the prior on the posterior distribution 
and draw E6  from its full conditional posterior distribution. 
 
Sampling of G1 and G2 
To sample 1G  and 2G  we consider the regression model iiii ZZm [GG ++= 2211*  with i[  
~N(0,I). Let ),(= 21 iii ZZZ  of size ( iW u (2k + 52)) and TTT ),( 21 GGG   of size ((2k + 52) 
u 3). Given a conjugate prior    , G is distributed as   
with                 . We take G = 0, GB  = 1/10, and draw G  from the full 
conditional posterior distribution. 
   kTiN
i
i I21
1
NEEEE ¦ 
 
)),+(( EEEEE EE ABAN i66-1 11 )(  6 EEE BNA
  1 GG BZZA iTi
),(~ 1GGG BN   GGG G ABmZAN iTi ,* 
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2.B Estimation results of mailing strategy models 
The tables below present the parameter estimates for the mailing strategy models. Table 
2.9 presents the estimates of the parameters belonging to the parameters from the 
response equation of the Tobit-2 model, and Table 2.10 presents the estimates of the 
parameters belonging to the parameters from the amount equation of the Tobit-2 
model. Table 2.11 presents the estimates for the constants and the week dummies in the 
mailing strategy models. 
 
Table 2.9: Parameter estimates mailing strategy models - response equation variables 
 Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3 
E0 0.608** (0.197) 0.561** (0.170) 0.698** (0.240) 
E1own 0.389 (0.288) 0.021 (0.223) -0.068 (0.313) 
E1other -0.039 (0.305) -0.038 (0.254) -0.075 (0.366) 
E2own 0.101 (0.303) 0.004 (0.283) -0.081 (0.365) 
E2other 0.265 (0.301) 0.040 (0.256) 0.077 (0.338) 
E3own 0.035 (0.261) -0.129 (0.214) 0.276 (0.302) 
E3other -0.210 (0.276) 0.231 (0.252) -0.459 (0.330) 
E4own 0.098 (0.254) -0.105 (0.223) 0.128 (0.256) 
E4other -0.126 (0.318) 0.094 (0.253) -0.455 (0.298) 
E5own 0.135 (0.280) 0.055 (0.278) -0.007 (0.307) 
E5other -0.022 (0.294) -0.095 (0.285) 0.179 (0.329) 
E6own -0.127 (0.256) -0.549** (0.200) -0.025 (0.287) 
E6other -0.099 (0.284) 0.082 (0.236) -0.068 (0.336) 
E7own 0.065 (0.292) 0.068 (0.255) -0.071 (0.309) 
E7other -0.267 (0.281) 0.198 (0.267) -0.167 (0.331) 
           **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
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Table 2.10: Parameter estimates mailing strategy models - amount equation variables 
 Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3 
E0 -0.230 (0.197) -0.145 (0.172) -0.203 (0.220) 
E1own 0.155 (0.291) -0.032 (0.283) -0.023 (0.333) 
E1other 0.160 (0.301) -0.048 (0.268) 0.149 (0.342) 
E2own -0.072 (0.309) -0.020 (0.272) -0.055 (0.333) 
E2other 0.176 (0.310) -0.034 (0.267) -0.019 (0.322) 
E3own -0.156 (0.292) -0.141 (0.255) 0.047 (0.356) 
E3other 0.056 (0.350) 0.002 (0.291) -0.045 (0.384) 
E4own 0.061 (0.222) 0.046 (0.185) -0.123 (0.247) 
E4other -0.008 (0.295) 0.040 (0.260) 0.050 (0.343) 
E5own 0.011 (0.300) 0.058 (0.284) -0.074 (0.317) 
E5other 0.058 (0.315) 0.023 (0.282) 0.019 (0.324) 
E6own -0.207 (0.257) 0.202 (0.185) -0.024 (0.274) 
E6other -0.199 (0.290) -0.094 (0.251) -0.268 (0.327) 
E7own -0.267 (0.266) -0.233 (0.255) 0.235 (0.324) 
E7other -0.209 (0.303) -0.114 (0.268) -0.031 (0.334) 
 
Table 2.11: Parameter estimates mailing strategy models - constant and week dummies 
 Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3 
constant -0.544 * (0.254) -0.633** (0.233) -0.244 (0.263) 
week 1 -0.815 ** (0.101) -1.209** (0.070) -1.607** (0.141) 
week 2 -1.029 ** (0.124) 0.178** (0.030) -1.620** (0.146) 
week 3 0.173 ** (0.049) 0.471** (0.027) -1.610** (0.145) 
week 4 1.876 ** (0.038) -0.359** (0.036) -1.624** (0.144) 
week 5 1.149 ** (0.040) -0.855** (0.050) -1.620** (0.148) 
week 6 -0.194 ** (0.058) 1.083** (0.026) -1.627** (0.148) 
week 7 0.396 ** (0.043) 0.297** (0.027) -1.630** (0.144) 
week 8 1.041 ** (0.039) 0.029 (0.030) -1.614** (0.141) 
week 9 0.737 ** (0.041) -0.309** (0.034) -1.612** (0.144) 
week 10 -0.675 ** (0.083) 0.021 (0.030) -1.626** (0.142) 
week 11 -0.984 ** (0.109) 0.181** (0.028) -0.328** (0.058) 
week 12 -0.118 * (0.054) 0.330** (0.028) 1.113** (0.044) 
week 13 -0.349 ** (0.063) 0.309** (0.028) -0.613** (0.065) 
week 14 -0.465 ** (0.069) 0.234** (0.028) -1.669** (0.136) 
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week 15 1.100 ** (0.039) 0.501** (0.026) -1.667** (0.139) 
week 16 1.170 ** (0.039) -0.295** (0.033) -1.567** (0.131) 
week 17 0.950 ** (0.039) 0.935** (0.025) -1.468** (0.113) 
week 18 -0.108  (0.054) 0.597** (0.026) -0.433** (0.057) 
week 19 -1.188 ** (0.146) -0.147** (0.032) 0.277** (0.048) 
week 20 0.628 ** (0.042) -1.010** (0.054) -1.157** (0.091) 
week 21 0.407 ** (0.044) -0.494** (0.037) -1.677** (0.137) 
week 22 -0.187 ** (0.056) 0.100** (0.029) -1.617** (0.136) 
week 23 0.205 ** (0.046) 0.697** (0.026) -0.238** (0.054) 
week 24 -0.556 ** (0.075) 0.323** (0.027) -0.158** (0.052) 
week 25 -1.041 ** (0.121) 0.369** (0.027) -0.960** (0.076) 
week 26 -0.253 ** (0.059) -0.034 (0.030) 0.925** (0.044) 
week 27 -0.518 ** (0.069) 0.324** (0.027) -0.796** (0.072) 
week 28 0.430 ** (0.043) -0.278** (0.033) -1.687** (0.143) 
week 29 -0.240 ** (0.058) 0.690** (0.026) -1.188** (0.092) 
week 30 -0.660 ** (0.079) -0.611** (0.039) -1.106** (0.088) 
week 31 -0.421 ** (0.064) 0.193** (0.028) -0.624** (0.064) 
week 32 -0.709 ** (0.082) 0.376** (0.027) 0.100* (0.050) 
week 33 0.210 ** (0.046) -0.443** (0.037) 0.034 (0.051) 
week 34 0.776 ** (0.040) -0.520** (0.037) -0.732** (0.072) 
week 35 0.853 ** (0.039) -0.014 (0.030) -0.496** (0.062) 
week 36 0.231 ** (0.046) -0.361** (0.034) 0.008 (0.053) 
week 37 0.097 * (0.049) -0.314** (0.034) -1.429** (0.119) 
week 38 1.149 ** (0.039) 0.150** (0.028) -0.394** (0.060) 
week 39 0.475 ** (0.044) 0.771** (0.025) -1.551** (0.137) 
week 40 -0.643 ** (0.080) -0.099** (0.031) -1.014** (0.090) 
week 41 -0.537 ** (0.077) 0.523** (0.027) -0.947** (0.083) 
week 42 1.077 ** (0.039) -0.213** (0.032) -1.135** (0.097) 
week 43 -0.161 ** (0.056) -0.492** (0.038) 1.305** (0.045) 
week 44 0.032  (0.051) 0.344** (0.028) 0.164** (0.051) 
week 45 0.961 ** (0.040) 0.338** (0.028) -1.597** (0.145) 
week 46 0.526 ** (0.042) 0.783** (0.026) -1.603** (0.139) 
week 47 1.757 ** (0.037) 0.150** (0.029) -1.588** (0.144) 
week 48 0.705 ** (0.041) 0.952** (0.026) -1.403** (0.123) 
week 49 0.745 ** (0.041) 0.485** (0.027) -1.503** (0.135) 
week 50 0.116 * (0.052) -0.130** (0.032) -0.035 (0.053) 
week 51 -1.068 ** (0.132) -1.667** (0.127) 0.464** (0.049) 
           *, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
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2.C Estimation results without correction for endogeneity 
Table 2.12 presents the parameter estimates for the model without the correction for 
potential endogeneity bias. 
 
Table 2.12: Parameter estimates without endogeneity correction 
Explanatory 
variables  
Response 
equation 
Amount 
equation Decay 
Constant E0 -1.257** (0.014) 1.229 ** (0.020)    
E1own -0.266** (0.048) -0.142 ** (0.033) Om (3.56e-4)a (1.65e-4)Mailings E1other 0.065 (0.052) -0.010 (0.029)    
E2own -0.050  (0.034) -0.002 (0.021)    Mailings2  E2other -0.032  (0.028) 0.003 (0.016)    
E3own 0.443** (0.042) -0.053 (0.049) Or 0.276a (0.015) Response  E3other 0.122 (0.082) -0.188 ** (0.048)   
Response  E4own 0.554 ** (0.055) -0.388** (0.048)   
recency E4other 0.252** (0.037) -0.221 ** (0.032)   
Response  E5own -0.005  (0.016) 0.025* (0.010)   
recency2 E5other -0.008  (0.015) -0.001  (0.011)   
E6own 0.228** (0.018) 0.494** (0.022) Oa 0.274a (0.014) Amount  E6other 0.008 (0.016) 0.030** (0.012)    
Amount  E7own -0.248** (0.027) 0.164** (0.021)    
recency E7other -0.024 (0.023) 0.147** (0.016)    
*, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
a: Testing for significance is not relevant as implementation of the logit transformation 
automatically leads to exclusion of 0. 
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2.D Estimation results with two charities 
Table 2.13 presents the parameter estimates for the models with respectively charity 1 
and 2, charity 1 and 3, and charity 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2.13: Parameter estimates with two charities 
Explanatory 
variables  
Response 
equation 
Amount 
equation Decay 
Constant E0 
-1.392
-1.036
-1.517
**
**
**
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.025)
1.163 
1.346
1.042 
**
**
**
(0.023)
(0.029)
(0.031)
   
Mailings E1own 
-0.231
-0.193
-0.240
**
**
**
(0.050)
(0.065)
(0.033)
-0.093 
-0.062
-0.121
* 
 
**
(0.048)
(0.054)
(0.053)
Om 
0.001a 
0.002a 
0.001a 
(2.46e-4) 
(0.001) 
(1.69e-4) 
 E1other 
0.153
-0.021
0.053
**
 
 
(0.040)
(0.087)
(0.077)
-0.067
0.025
-0.006
 
(0.042)
(0.095)
(0.051)
   
Mailings2 E2own 
-0.141
-0.150
-0.151
**
**
**
(0.037)
(0.050)
(0.026)
-0.047
-0.059
-0.028
 
(0.031)
(0.039)
(0.031)
   
  E2other 
-0.084 
0.017
0.081
**
 
**
(0.032)
(0.098)
(0.040)
0.050
-0.037
0.012
* 
 
 
(0.024)
(0.068)
(0.033)
   
Response E3own 
0.300
0.080
0.455
**
 
**
(0.042)
(0.064)
(0.048)
-0.064
-0.088
0.026
 
(0.041)
(0.058)
(0.044)
Or 
0.225a 
0.373a 
0.247a 
(0.010) 
(0.014) 
(0.010) 
  E3other 
0.107
-0.051
-0.059
**
 
 
(0.050)
(0.151)
(0.070)
-0.067
0.017
-0.017
 
(0.059)
(0.089)
(0.099)
   
Response 
recency E4own 
0.369
0.313
0.298 
**
**
**
(0.064)
(0.077)
(0.072)
-0.509
-0.528
-0.348
**
**
**
(0.055)
(0.056)
(0.060)
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  E4other 
0.197
0.033
-0.132
**
 
**
(0.048)
(0.076)
(0.041)
-0.331 
-0.043
0.165
**
 
**
(0.076)
(0.078)
(0.055)
   
Response 
recency2 E5own 
0.002 
-0.045
0.025
 
(0.030)
(0.031)
(0.026)
0.027
-0.004
0.003
 
(0.020)
(0.019)
(0.025)
   
  E5other 
0.045
-0.004
-0.019 
* 
 
 
(0.022)
(0.069)
(0.041)
0.014 
-0.126
-0.036
 
(0.026)
(0.094)
(0.034)
   
Amount E6own 
0.095
0.129
0.099
**
**
**
(0.021)
(0.031)
(0.024)
0.354
0.483
0.541
**
**
**
(0.021)
(0.027)
(0.030)
Oa 
0.241a 
0.412a 
0.258a 
(0.009) 
(0.019) 
(0.011) 
  E6other 
0.048
0.046
-0.005
* 
 
 
(0.022)
(0.060)
(0.036)
0.044
-0.019
0.060
**
 
 
(0.019)
(0.053)
(0.048)
 
 
 
Amount 
recency E7own 
-0.135
-0.014
-0.070
**
 
 
(0.038)
(0.040)
(0.043)
0.225
0.277
0.191
**
**
**
(0.025)
(0.024)
(0.040)
 
 
 
  E7other 
-0.064
-0.107
-0.038
 
(0.043)
(0.081)
(0.086)
0.174
-0.079
0.025
**
 
 
(0.028)
(0.088)
(0.037)
 
 
 
*, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
a: Testing for significance is not relevant as implementation of the logit transformation 
automatically leads to exclusion of 0. 
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2.E Estimation results with one charity (no competitive effects) 
Table 2.14 presents the parameter estimates for the models with respectively charity 1, 
charity 2, and charity 3. 
 
Table 2.14: Parameter estimates without competitive effects 
Explanatory 
variables  
Response 
equation 
Amount 
equation Decay 
Constant E0 
-1.000
-1.605
-0.970
**
**
**
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.046)
1.364
0.928
1.125
**
**
**
(0.032)
(0.039)
(0.043)
   
Mailings E1own 
-0.177
-0.175
-0.220
**
**
**
(0.064)
(0.048)
(0.079)
-0.035
-0.119
-0.118
 
* 
* 
(0.051)
(0.055)
(0.074)
Om 
0.007a 
0.005a 
0.022a 
(0.003) 
(0.002) 
(0.009) 
Mailings2 E2own 
-0.149
-0.138
0.013
**
**
 
(0.042)
(0.032)
(0.044)
-0.050
-0.050
-0.040
 
(0.036)
(0.033)
(0.054)
   
Response E3own 
0.059
0.393
0.141
 
**
(0.068)
(0.064)
(0.107)
-0.047
0.032
-0.066
 
(0.061)
(0.084)
(0.096)
Or 
0.564a 
0.344a 
0.484a 
(0.026) 
(0.017) 
(0.037) 
Response 
recency E4own 
0.354
0.249
0.242
**
**
**
(0.049)
(0.078)
(0.060)
-0.450
-0.419
-0.081
**
**
 
(0.052)
(0.070)
(0.076)
   
 
Response 
recency2 
 
E5own 
-0.044
0.022
0.060
**
 
 
(0.017)
(0.022)
(0.037)
-0.026
-0.004
-0.026
* 
 
 
(0.012)
(0.019)
(0.036)
   
Amount E6own 
0.072
0.024
-0.022
**
 
 
(0.026)
(0.028)
(0.039)
0.406
0.400
0.511
**
**
**
(0.031)
(0.036)
(0.063)
Oa 
0.596a 
0.336a 
0.489a 
(0.028) 
(0.022) 
(0.051) 
Amount 
recency 
E7own 
-0.001
-0.012
0.126
 
 
* 
(0.020)
(0.041)
(0.046)
0.265
0.270
0.185
**
**
**
(0.022)
(0.031)
(0.043)
 
 
 
*, **: Zero not contained in 95%, 99% Highest Posterior Density region, respectively. 
a: Testing for significance is not relevant as implementation of the logit transformation 
automatically leads to exclusion of 0.
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Chapter 3 
3 A Dynamic Model of Guilt as a Driver for 
Charity Donations 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Many studies have investigated motivations to comply with a charitable donation 
request. Extant literature on charitable giving has focused primarily on why people give 
to charity in a static context, that is, why people respond to a single donation request. In 
reality, many people make multiple donations each year, but at the same time most of 
them do not respond to all the requests they receive. In fact, in many situations 
consumers make multiple consecutive decisions that can affect each other, instead of 
one isolated decision (Khan and Dhar 2006). As people tend to (partially) remember 
past events and anticipate future events, dynamics play an important role in the 
donating process (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
 In this chapter we investigate donating behavior over time across multiple 
charities, where our prime focus is on guilt. Examples of other pervasive motivations 
that have been identified in studies on altruism and charitable donating are empathy 
and sympathy, a warm glow feeling, prestige, social pressure and reciprocity (Andreoni 
1990; Bennett 2003; Falk 2007; Guy and Patton 1989; Haggberg 1992; Sargeant 1999). 
However, none of these drivers have been studied in a dynamic context. One of the 
reasons for the lack of research on donation dynamics may be that most of the identified 
motivations do not readily fit into a dynamic framework. We believe though that guilt 
can be viewed as a longitudinal concept, and hence this is the focus of this chapter.   
 A well-known classification of guilt types is that of reactive, anticipatory and 
existential guilt, see Huhmann and Brotherton (1997). Reactive guilt occurs as a 
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response to a transgression. Anticipatory guilt results when an individual foresees a 
potential transgression. Existential guilt arises as a result of a discrepancy between an 
individual’s own well-being and that of others. Current feelings of guilt can thus be 
experienced as a reaction to past behavior and also future guilt can be anticipated. 
Moreover, guilt can be a consequence and a driver of behavior. 
Until now, charitable giving studies, as we will discuss below, only consider the 
guilt invoked by a single appeal and also only at the time of the appeal. Furthermore, 
guilt appeals are generally considered as either anticipatory or existential. Studies thus 
ignore the consequences of currently not donating, a violation of norms that incurs guilt 
feelings, for an individual’s potential response to future appeals, thereby ignoring the 
reactive guilt dimension. In the present chapter we explicitly address the dynamic 
aspects of feelings of guilt.   
We propose to consider an individual’s stock of guilt that represents the total 
accumulated feelings of guilt at a certain point in time. We assume people have a single 
stock of guilt and we propose that the stock of guilt grows over time as a result of moral 
obligation and also due to for example receiving direct mailings. Making a donation 
reduces the stock of guilt, but comes at certain costs. In contrast to studies on one-shot 
donation decisions, our dynamic framework of guilt buildup and relief thus accounts for 
all three dimensions of guilt resulting from charitable direct mailings, including reactive 
guilt. We put forward a structural model to describe how guilt affects individual charity 
donations.  
 When fitting our structural model to our unique dataset, which covers many 
individuals who receive direct mailings from and donate to five of the largest 
Netherlands-based charities, we need to account for the fact that charities use target 
selection rules. To be more precise, charities send out more mailings to their better 
donators, and this is known to the individuals. Hence, when individuals decide to 
respond to a direct mailing, they are aware that their current decision affects the amount 
of mailings they will receive in the future. We incorporate this awareness in our model 
by allowing individuals to anticipate the consequences of (not) donating on both their 
future level of guilt and the charities’ mailing frequency. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the 
relevant theory. Next, we introduce our model of guilt accumulation and relief over 
time, in part driven by direct mailings and by donations in response to these mailings. 
We also account for other but unobserved changes in guilt feelings. We infer individual 
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donating behavior by solving the corresponding stochastic dynamic programming 
model. Then, we discuss the unique dataset and we present our estimation results and 
some fit statistics, which show that our model fits the data quite well. Our structural 
model permits an analysis of mailing strategies that maximize charity revenues or 
donator welfare, which will be presented next. These policy experiments show that 
charities’ mailing strategies can be improved to the benefit of either the beneficiaries or 
the donators of the charities. We conclude with a discussion of our main results and 
some limitations. 
 
3.2 Theoretical considerations 
Many of the commonly studied drivers for charitable giving have always been studied in 
the context of a single donation decision. When expanding towards a dynamic view on 
charitable giving, only few drivers will generate strong predictions. One of the most 
interesting candidates for a theory of dynamic giving to charitable organizations is guilt, 
as the literature provides some clear indications that there is a dynamic component to 
guilt2. Obviously, the general agreement that individuals can anticipate the guilt they 
would feel after a contemplated transgression already alludes to the dynamics of guilt. 
Moreover, Dahl, Honea and Manchanda (2003) remark that individuals with feelings of 
guilt try to compensate by promising to make a donation in the future. Finally, O’Keefe 
and Figgé (1997) establish that people feel guilty after rejecting an initial request, which 
affects their decision on a subsequent request. 
 
3.2.1 Guilt 
Guilt is a fairly broad concept that has been defined in many ways. For example, 
Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994) define it as “an individual’s unpleasant 
emotional state associated with possible objections against his or her actions, inaction, 
circumstances or intentions”. Particularly relevant for this study is the concept of 
consumer guilt, defined as “a negative emotion which results from a consumer decision 
that violates one’s values and norms” by Burnett and Lunsford (1994).  
                                                 
2 Another motivation that would also fit a dynamic context is prestige. People may strive to 
maintain a certain level of prestige over time. However, since our dataset concerns Dutch 
charities and prestige is not very relevant as a motivation in the Netherlands, we do not go into 
this motivation. 
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Although guilt is considered a negative emotion (Richins 1997), it generally 
serves a positive social function (Ausubel 1955; Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton 
1994). A considerable stream of literature has shown that guilt can act as a behavioral 
motivation, in the sense that individuals who feel guilty will try to alleviate their guilt by 
engaging in compliant and altruistic behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton 
1994; Burnett and Lunsford 1994; Regan 1971; Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 2007). 
People are motivated to relieve the aversive guilt feelings by taking some compensatory 
action, such as donating to charity, which is generally recognized as a form of altruistic 
or prosocial behavior (Basil, Ridgway and Basil 2008). Indeed, guilt has been well 
established as an important driver of charitable donating (Andreoni 1990; Sargeant 
1999). 
As people are imperfect, they do not live up to their moral standards all the time 
(Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 2007). In everyday life, people will thus typically build 
up guilt until they perform an action that alleviates their feelings of guilt. So, the longer 
an individual violates his moral standards, the more guilt he will experience.  
A frequently applied classification of guilt types is that of reactive, anticipatory 
and existential guilt (see, for example, Huhmann and Brotherton (1997)). Reactive guilt 
(e.g. Rawlings 1970) is guilt that occurs as a response to a transgression, so after a 
violation of norms. Anticipatory guilt (e.g. Rawlings 1970; Lindsey 2005) results when 
an individual contemplates a potential violation of norms. And finally, existential guilt 
(Izard 1977) arises as a result of a discrepancy between an individual’s own well-being 
and that of others. In the dynamic context of this chapter, we consider an individual’s 
stock of guilt that represents the total feelings of guilt at a certain point in time, 
comprising all three types of guilt. In addition, all three types of guilt are relevant when 
studying the consequences of charitable direct mailings and the responses they elicit. 
Several studies have found that the beneficiary of the altruistic behavior 
motivated by feelings of guilt need not be the original victim of the transgression 
(Darlington and Macker 1966; Regan 1971). That is, in order to relieve guilt substitutes 
are acceptable. This suggests that for example feelings of guilt from buying a nice watch 
or ignoring a request for help from a friend could be alleviated by making a donation to 
charity. Therefore, we assume people have a single stock of guilt representing total guilt 
feelings. As people remember their past activities – both actions and inactions – total 
feelings of guilt will accumulate over time. 
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We propose that this total accumulated stock of guilt drives the decision to 
make a donation. Obviously, guilt motivates charitable donations as people believe 
altruistic behavior will reduce their guilt (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 1996; Dahl, 
Honea and Manchanda 2003; Rawlings 1970). Indeed, Lindsey (2005) has empirically 
established that altruistic behavior actually does reduce guilt. In this study, individuals 
who took steps into the bone marrow donation process felt significantly less guilty 
afterwards than individuals who took no action.  
 
3.2.2 Guilt and charitable giving 
Although feelings of guilt may occur primarily in close relationships, they can also 
extend to distant or even non-existent relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell and 
Heatherton 1994; Dahl, Honea and Manchanda 2003; 2005). Hence, people can and 
do in fact feel guilty towards charitable causes, and charities frequently use guilt appeals 
in their attempt to motivate people to donate (Huhmann and Brotherton 1997). 
 Extant literature on charitable guilt appeals has generally considered them as 
either anticipatory or existential in nature (for example, by Basil, Ridgway and Basil 
(2008) and Huhmann and Brotherton (1997)), as opposed to reactive. A donation 
solicitation will tactfully point out how much better off the reader is than the 
beneficiary of the charity (existential), or make him imagine how guilty he would feel if 
he decided not to donate (anticipatory). This classification as anticipatory or existential 
stems from the static focus of the studies involved: they only consider the guilt invoked 
by a single guilt appeal at the time of the appeal and ignore the consequences of not 
donating to that appeal on the response to future appeals. However, the full effect of 
guilt on donating behavior cannot be uncovered through studying a single-shot, stand-
alone guilt appeal (Hibbert et al. 2007). 
In contrast to studies on one-shot donation decisions, our dynamic framework 
of guilt buildup and relief accounts for all three dimensions of guilt resulting from 
charitable direct mailings. That reactive guilt indeed plays a role in responding to 
requests is shown by O’Keefe and Figgé (1997), who establish that rejecting a request 
increases feelings of guilt. In line with this, it has been frequently noted that not 
donating can make someone feel guilty (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 1996; 
Bennett 2003; Burnett and Lunsford 1994; Dahl, Honea and Manchanda 2003). 
Hence, a dynamic model of guilt should also account for reactive guilt. 
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 Now, assuming that people remember past events, both good and bad, one 
could imagine that each charitable direct mailing an individual receives creates some 
feeling of guilt, increasing the stock of guilt. Instead of focusing on the guilt induced by 
the specific content of a guilt appeal, which tends to be the standard approach in the 
static context, we take the view that each direct mailing induces a fixed amount of guilt, 
although this may differ across charities. For example, people may experience more guilt 
towards international aid charities than towards health charities.  
The notion that each direct mailing increases guilt is substantiated by the 
concept of norm salience. Charitable requests can serve to activate the social 
responsibility norm, which is a generally accepted social norm (Krebs 1970). This norm 
entails that charitable behavior is acknowledged as a universal human value (Bendapudi, 
Singh and Bendapudi 1996). Charitable requests increase awareness of the suffering of 
others (Regan 1971). This awareness heightens the salience of the social responsibility 
norm and moral obligation to do good (Rawlings 1970), thereby increasing feelings of 
guilt.  
All in all, an individual’s stock of guilt builds up over time, increasing even more 
when explicit donation solicitations are received. Then, when a certain threshold is 
reached beyond which guilt can no longer be tolerated (Hibbert et al. 2007; Izard 1977; 
Lascu 1991), the individual will make a donation to attenuate his guilt. The size of this 
donation will depend on the total amount of guilt, that is, the higher guilt, the higher is 
the donation. Indeed, in an experiment on the relationship between guilt and altruism, 
Regan (1971) found that higher guilt resulted in higher donations. This is also 
supported by the notion that people want to help proportional to their guilt 
(Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton 1994). Hence, we assume that the reduction in 
guilt increases with the size of the donation. 
Obviously, making a donation comes at certain costs. According to Bendapudi, 
Singh and Bendapudi (1996) these costs include financial costs (money donated) and 
physical costs (effort of donating). We will distinguish between fixed costs of donating, 
for example the energy of making a transfer, and variable costs, that is, the amount of 
money donated itself (see also Shapiro (1973)). The donation decision then depends on 
a cost-benefit analysis (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 1996), trading off the benefits 
of guilt relief against the costs of donating.  
 The buildup and relief of guilt through receiving direct mailings and 
responding to them is in line with the idea of self-concept maintenance. Failing to 
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adhere to moral standards will result in feelings of guilt, and severe transgressions will 
ultimately result in a negative self-concept (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2007). People are 
willing to suffer some guilt if the benefits of transgressing are large enough. Thus, if 
there is something to gain, they will engage in behavior that goes against the moral 
standard to the extent that their positive self-concept is still maintained. This suggests 
that people will go against the social responsibility norm by not donating, as long as they 
do not feel too guilty. At higher levels of guilt they are willing to make a donation in 
order to avoid degradation of their self-concept. 
In addition, it has been shown that a prior decision that activates a positive self-
concept, subsequently licenses a more selfish decision (Khan and Dhar 2006; Monin 
and Miller 2001). Thus, an individual who has recently donated feels justified not to 
donate for a while, based on moral credentials.  
Summarizing, we consider an individual’s stock of guilt that can be reduced by 
making a donation. As long as no donation is made the stock of guilt will typically grow 
as a result of a general sense of moral obligation. Receiving charitable direct mailings will 
make the guilt grow even more. Making a donation reduces the stock of guilt, but comes 
at certain costs. In total, our theoretical considerations imply that the higher the stock of 
guilt, the higher will be the propensity to respond. When the stock of guilt reaches a 
certain high level, this drives the individual to make a donation, thereby reducing the 
stock of guilt.  
 
3.3 The model 
In this section we describe our stochastic dynamic programming model of individual 
response behavior towards charitable direct mailings. The model enables us to study 
how guilt affects charitable donating and to predict individual donating behavior over 
time.  
 
3.3.1 Utility specification 
We assume that the stock of guilt forms the motivation to make a donation in response 
to a direct mailing. Individuals have a preference for low levels of guilt, which thus 
translate into high utility values. The individual’s objective is to maximize his lifetime 
utility, which equals the utility today plus the discounted future utility. Thus, 
individuals are motivated to donate as it results in a reduction in guilt and a 
corresponding increase in utility. As our model (and data) concerns responses to direct 
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mailings only, no donation can be made unless an actual mailing has been received. This 
is in line with Andreoni (2006), who notes that individuals generally only donate when 
they are asked. 
An individual i enters a time period t with a certain stock of guilt itG , which 
during this period evolves into his end-of-period stock of guilt 1+,tiG . Now, in each time 
period t it holds that the higher an individual i’s end-of-period stock of guilt 1+,tiG , the 
lower is his instantaneous utility itU  in that period. If one or more mailings are received 
in this time period, the individual has the opportunity to attenuate his guilt. Making a 
donation will reduce the end-of-period stock of guilt, thus increasing the individual 
utility, which will be discussed below. Making a donation, however, also comes at certain 
costs, thereby reducing the individual’s utility.  
The fixed cost of donating, represented by fc, explains why individuals do not 
donate one Euro every day, for example. We assume that each donation incurs the same 
fixed cost. The variable costs of donating refer to the amount of money donated. We fix 
its impact on total costs and hence on utility to one, so that utility will be measured in 
Euro equivalents. Hence, large donations are more costly than small donations. Of 
course, when an individual makes donations to multiple funds in one period, these all 
come with their associated fixed and variable costs and hence they all reduce utility.  
In sum, the donation decision depends on a cost-benefit analysis, where the 
benefits consist of guilt relief. The individual’s instantaneous utility in time period t is 
therefore given by: 
 
 ittiit CGU  1,             (3.1) 
with 
 ¦ !¦ 
  
J
j
ijt
J
j
ijtit DIfcDC
11
]0[             (3.2) 
Here: 
itG  represents the guilt that has been built up until period t and is 
restricted to be nonnegative. 
itC  summarizes the variable and fixed costs of donating. 
ijtD  represents the donation made by individual i to fund j in period t. It 
can only be positive if a mailing is received and will therefore be 0 by 
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definition if an individual i does not receive a mailing of fund j in time 
period t (cf. Andreoni (2006)). The vector ),...,(= 1 iJttiit DDD . 
]0>[ ijtDI  indicates whether individual i made a donation to fund j in period t. 
J   is the number of funds in the model. 
 
3.3.2 Guilt dynamics 
During a period t, the stock of guilt changes due to a number of sources. First, as a result 
of everyday life events, there will be shocks in guilt that are unrelated to the direct 
mailings and donations we observe. For example, helping an old lady cross the street may 
decrease the stock of guilt, while buying an expensive watch may increase it. Thus, a (to 
the econometrician unobserved) shock in guilt itM  is experienced by the individual. We 
opt for an additive i.i.d. logistic error term with positive mean M, reflecting that on 
average guilt increases over time, and variance V2. Thus, we assume that each period 
there are certain individual shocks in guilt that the econometrician does not observe but 
the individual does. The individual will react optimally to the total feelings of guilt, 
which are stochastic to the econometrician.  
Next, the individual potentially receives a number of direct mailings, 
represented by the vector ),...,(= 1 iJttiit mmm , with ijtm  a dummy indicating whether 
individual i received a mailing from charity j in period t. These mailings increase guilt 
even further, as the individual is then confronted with a direct appeal which makes his 
obligation more salient and makes him more aware of his own relative well-being. This 
increase in guilt jG  is fund-specific, indicating that some funds might have a higher 
propensity to make someone feel guilty than others. For example, one would expect that 
ignoring a mailing of an international aid fund acting for children in need would on 
average increase the stock of guilt more than ignoring a mailing of a fund for research for 
some disease. 
 If the individual received one or more mailings during this time period t, he will 
decide whether to donate or not at the end of the period. If he makes a donation, this 
will reduce his stock of guilt, where we assume this reduction to be concave in the 
donation size. Higher donations reduce guilt more, but there are decreasing returns to 
scale, so that higher donations are less efficient. This implies that a certain optimal 
donation exists for each level of guilt and hence explains why individuals donate a 
certain amount and not more or less. Furthermore, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) state 
that different charities may provide different amounts of moral satisfaction. Hence, 
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charities may differ in their effectiveness in reducing guilt and the same donation can 
thus result in different guilt reductions across different charities. Therefore, if an 
individual makes donations to multiple funds in one time period, these donations are 
combined in one weighted total donation    . The fund-specific weights 
jJ  represent the propensity to reduce guilt of the different funds.  
Thus, based on the total guilt feelings during the period, which are exactly 
known to the individual but unobserved to the econometrician, he decides on the 
optimal donation itD  to reduce his guilt, resulting in an end of period stock of guilt 
1+,tiG . In sum, the dynamics in the stock of guilt are given by3: 
 
  221
1
1, itit
J
j
ijtjititti DtotDtotmGG EEGM ¦    with ),(~
2VMM LOGit  (3.3) 
Here: 
ijtm  indicates whether individual i received a mailing from fund j in period 
t.  
itDtot  is the overall donation to charity, where each fund has its own 
effectiveness jJ  for transforming a monetary donation into a guilt 
reduction. 
 
Summarizing, the utility maximizing individual faces a trade-off when deciding 
whether and how much to donate. Making a donation reduces his guilt, but comes at 
certain costs. If no donation is made, he saves himself the monetary value and fixed cost 
of the donation but his stock of guilt stays high. The model assumptions imply that a 
donation is made when the stock of guilt reaches a sufficiently high level and the 
donation will be higher, the higher the level of guilt. 
 
3.3.3 Endogeneity of mail probabilities 
Charities generally apply some form of target selection to select the individuals from 
their list of addresses to send a mailing. This means that the probability that an 
individual receives a mailing from a charity depends on his past donating behavior. For 
example, a charity assigns a high mail probability to an individual that has had a high 
                                                 
3 Note that, as the stock of guilt cannot be negative, this equation only holds if the result is 
nonnegative. Otherwise, Gi,t+1 is set to zero. 
¦  Jj ijtjit DDtot 1J
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response rate in the past. The result is that individuals with high response rates receive 
more mailings and the mail probabilities are endogenous. 
 We assume that the probability that individual i will receive a mailing from 
charity j in period t+1, 1+,tijp , depends on whether or not he has responded to the last 
mail he received. Mailing probabilities do not change between mailing moments but are 
only updated after the (non-)response to a mailing is observed by the charity. Thus, for 
each charity j we distinguish two possibilities: a non-response mail probability NRjp , 
which is the probability charity j mails an individual that did not respond to their last 
mail in a certain period, and a response mail probability Rjp , the probability charity j 
mails an individual that did respond to their last mail in a certain period. Since charities 
usually strive to target their best donators, we expect that Rjp >
NR
jp . 
 Thus, the individual mailing probabilities change over time as a result of their 
dependence on the donating decisions over time. The dynamics of the individual 
mailing probability of charity j are given by: 
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 Assuming rational expectations, an individual will be able to anticipate the 
impact of his donating decision on the future probability of receiving a mailing. Thus, 
an individual knows how his donation today affects his future mailing probability and 
takes this into account when deciding on his donation. For example, he may decide not 
to donate to avoid receiving a large amount of mailings in the future that will increase 
his guilt. On the other hand, if he expects he has to wait a while for the next donation 
opportunity he may be more prone to donate today so that his guilt doesn’t get out of 
hand. Hence, he plans his donations optimally. 
 
3.3.4 A dynamic programming approach 
The individual’s objective is to maximize his current discounted lifetime utility, which 
equals the utility in the current period plus the discounted expected future utility over 
an infinite time horizon. Thus, the objective function is: 
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where O is the discount factor. The individual maximizes his lifetime utility by deciding 
whether and how much to donate in each period. Thus, the decision variable is itD , the 
vector with donations made by individual i in period t. As can be inferred from 
equations (3.1)-(3.3), this decision depends on his current guilt itG  and the mailings he 
receives this period itm , which also contribute to his guilt. Furthermore, as his decision 
today affects his future stock of guilt and thus his future utility through the mailing 
probabilities itp  (see equation (3.4)), his decision also depends on itp . Together these 
variables contain the information that characterizes the state of the individual, on which 
he bases his decision. Hence, the stochastic dynamic optimization model contains one 
decision variable and three state variables, which are: 
 
itm   the vector that indicates from which funds individual i actually 
received a mailing in period t.  
itp  the vector of mailing probabilities for individual i in period t, that is  
),...,(= 1 iJttiit ppp . For all j, ijtp  can take on two values, 
NR
jp  and 
R
jp .  
itG  the guilt of individual i at the start of period t, which is stochastic and 
unobserved by us (so this is a latent state variable). 
 
 Each period, the individual decides on the optimal donations, based on the 
state he finds himself in. Although theoretically any donated amount is possible, it seems 
plausible to assume that people only donate certain focal amounts. After all, in practice 
people generally choose a round number and would not make a donation of, for 
example, €13.84. Many theoretically possible donations would never be observed in 
practice. Therefore, we assume the donating decision amounts to choosing from a 
discrete set of donations, represented by D. We introduce the Cartesian product 
 
 ^ `iJttiti
iJttitiit
mmm
mmmm
JJ dddddd DDD
DDDD

 uuu 
...|),...,,(
...
21
21
2121
 (3.6) 
 
where we define 
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Now, in each period t individual i will choose itD  itmD , implying that donations can 
only be made to charities that send a direct mailing in this period. 
 Now, to solve the dynamic optimization problem through dynamic 
programming we consider the Bellman equation for optimality (3.8), where we omit the 
subscript i for notational convenience.  
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This equation says that at each point in time the value function today must equal the 
utility of the optimal decision today plus the expected future utility of this decision. We 
solve the recursion through a value function iteration process to obtain the steady state 
point. This results in the value function and the policy function, that is, the optimized 
value of the problem and the optimal donations for each point in the state space.  
 Given that each donation incurs fixed costs, which we expect to be quite high, it 
will generally be optimal to make at most one donation4. To simplify solving the 
problem and reduce the computational burden, we therefore assume that, if an 
individual receives mailings of multiple charities in one period, he will specialize and 
donate to the optimal charity, that is, the charity that results in the highest value (cf. 
Andreoni and Payne (2003)). We will elaborate on this assumption in the data section. 
Finally, we discretize guilt through a uniform grid, so that all model variables are 
discrete.  
 
3.3.5 Model estimation 
We start by estimating the mailing probabilities given that an individual did or did not 
respond to the last mailing for each charity j, NRjp  and 
R
jp . For this, we implement a 
probit model for the mailing strategy of each charity, as follows: 
                                                 
4 As making a donation to a charity affects the future mailing probability of that charity, 
theoretically there could be cases where an individual is willing to invest extra in fixed costs to 
influence multiple future mailing probabilities.  
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mail                   (3.10) 
where ijtW  indicates the last period before t that individual i received a mailing from 
charity j. Then, NRjp  and 
R
jp  are computed as 
 
  jNRjp 1T)  and  jjRjp 21 TT )                 (3.11) 
with ) the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We consider these 
probabilities as given and assume donors know these probabilities and thus anticipate 
how their behavior affects the charities’ mailing probabilities over time.  
 Now, the sequence of states over time forms a Markov Decision Process. Given 
a policy function and the distribution of itM , we can compute the transition matrix to go 
from one point in the state space to another. In solving the DP problem, we assumed 
people behave optimally, in that they make the optimal donation decision. In reality, 
however, people may accidentally make a suboptimal decision. As people are imperfect, 
there may not be a one-to-one relationship between the stock of guilt and donations 
(Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek 2007). To accommodate for this possibility we allow for 
deviations from optimal behavior. 
 Let D denote any possible donating decision of individual i in period t. Then,  
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denotes the value of making this decision, given optimal behavior in the future. So, for 
the optimal donating decision *itD  it holds that: 
 
 ^ )`,,,(maxarg* itititit
D
it pmGDVD
itmD
  (3.13) 
 
Also, note that: 
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 ),,(),,,( ** ititititititititit pmGVpmGDV   (3.14)
  
as can be inferred from equation (3.8). Now, we allow for deviations from optimal 
behavior by introducing an error term and assume that for the actual donating decision 
Dit it holds that: 
 
 ^ `Dititititit
D
it pmGDVD
itm
H 

),,,( maxarg
D
 with  21,0~ ZH EVDit  (3.15) 
 
Note that this error term is not accounted for in solving the DP problem, that is, people 
will not anticipate they will make such errors when they solve their problem. The error 
term purely represents and accidental mistake when deciding on the donated amount, 
and not a shock in utility that people can anticipate. The probability that individual i 
makes donating decision D  in period t now equals: 
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
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D
Z
Z
),,,(
),,,(
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 We compute the likelihood of the data given a parameter vector as follows. We 
start by solving the DP problem and computing the transition matrices from one state 
to another given all feasible decisions. From the logit probabilities in (3.16), the 
probability distribution of mail states and the transition matrices, we compute the 
stationary distribution over guilt and mail probability states, },{ itit pG . Then, for each 
individual we compute the likelihood of observing the iT  mail and donation 
observations over time, say iy , given the parameters. To solve for the initial conditions 
problem (see Heckman (1981)), we use a start-up period to fix the first period mail 
probabilities 1ip . For the distribution of guilt we use the stationary distribution of guilt, 
properly conditioned on 1ip . 
 As various studies suggest there may be individual differences in proneness to 
guilt (e.g. Basil, Ridgway and Basil 2008) and responsiveness to guilt (e.g. Lascu 1991), 
we allow for heterogeneity in the model parameters. We introduce this heterogeneity by 
imposing a latent class structure with two segments. Let );( ci
c
i yL [  be the likelihood of 
observing iy , the mail and donation observations over iT  periods for individual i, for 
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latent class c given the model parameters for this class, summarized in c[ . Furthermore, 
let p be the probability of segment 1, which we compute as the average over all 
individuals i of  
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Then, we compute the total likelihood of the data across all n individuals given the 
parameters as: 
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We estimate the dynamic programming model through a (numerical) Maximum 
Likelihood routine. In the next section, we describe the unique data we use to estimate 
the model. 
 
3.4 Data 
To estimate the model we have access to the databases of five large charity organizations 
in the Netherlands, allowing us to create a unique dataset of direct mailings and 
donations at the individual level. The charities are active in three different sectors, that 
is, two charities in the health sector, two charities in the international aid sector and one 
charity in the social welfare sector.  
 Obviously, not every individual in our dataset is a donator to all five charities. 
Privacy regulations in the Netherlands allow charities to store only addresses of 
individuals that have donated at least once to their organization in the past5. Hence, 
they can only send mailings to individuals that are their own donators. The charities 
that an individual donates to, and that are thus, so to say, active, are represented by the 
vector iF .  As iF  hardly varies over time, we can consider it the type of an individual. It 
represents from which funds an individual could receive mailings each period. Thus, the 
                                                 
5 In fact, charities can also buy new addresses to send acquisition mailings, but are obliged to 
delete these addresses if the individuals do not respond. If they do respond they are added to the 
mailing list. Thus, in our data we only have individuals from the mailing lists. 
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state variable itm  is restricted by iF . For example, if iF = {1 0 0 0 0}, meaning that only 
fund 1 is active with this individual, he can only receive mailings from fund 1. The 
feasible mail states are then ‘ no mailing’ and ‘ a mailing from fund 1’, that is {0 0 0 0 0, 1 
0 0 0 0}. These restrictions greatly reduce the state space. For each possible F type, we 
solve the dynamic programming problem separately (see Appendix 3.A for details on 
how we solve the dynamic programming problem). 
Our dataset covers mailings and donations during three years, from January 
2004 until December 2006. Our model applies only to active donators. For example, an 
individual that never donates and always throws out all charitable direct mailings 
immediately will not experience guilt as we have conceptualized it. Also, an individual 
that has informed a charity that he no longer wishes to receive direct mailings will not 
anticipate receiving such mailings in the future, the latter being what our model would 
predict. Finally, an individual that receives an acquisition mailing at the very end of the 
three year data period would, unrealistically, anticipate mailings from the start, 
according to our model. Therefore, we restrict our attention to all individuals that 
receive at least one mailing a year from all charities they donate to, that is, all charities in 
iF . Furthermore, an individual has to make at least one donation each year. These 
restrictions ensure that we only consider active individuals, leaving out individuals that 
have stopped donating entirely, for example because they have died, or that no longer 
receive mailings from a charity, for example because they requested this.  
Because each donation incurs fixed costs we assumed that, if an individual 
receives mailings of multiple charities in one period, he will specialize and donate to the 
optimal charity, that is, the charity that results in the highest value. In order for this 
model assumption to be realistic, we choose our time period such that it is plausible that 
people only make one donation in that time period. As multiple donations only occur in 
0.1% of all individual-week combinations in the data of these five charities, we decided 
to aggregate the data to the week level. Individuals that do donate multiple times a week 
over the period of 2004 to 2006 are left out of consideration, as our model does not 
apply to them. 
From the resulting dataset, that contains 18670 individuals, we randomly select 
5000 individuals for estimating the dynamic programming model. We use the full 
sample for estimating the mailing strategy models. For each individual we can track 
exactly when they received direct mailings from any of the charities, and, if they 
responded to a mailing, how much they donated.  
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Table 3.1: Data available per charity 
 # individuals # observations weekly mailing rate 
Charity 1 1330 138320 0.110 
Charity 2 13701 1424904 0.100 
Charity 3 2795 290680 0.078 
Charity 4 8593 893672 0.110 
Charity 5 1831 190424 0.073 
 
To ensure that the state space is properly initialized and that all individuals are 
equally represented we use the first year of data for initialization. This leaves 104 week 
observations per individual for estimation. Since not all individuals receive mailings 
from all charities the numbers of observations available for estimating the mailing 
strategy models differ across charities, see Table 3.1. Table 3.1 also presents the average 
weekly mailing rate per charity.  
 For estimating the dynamic programming model, weeks in which individuals 
do not receive a mailing are not informative about their behavior, as they can not take 
action. Only the weeks in which an individual receives at least one direct mailing make a 
relevant contribution to the likelihood; the likelihood of his donating actions. Thus, for 
the dynamic programming model, the randomly selected 5000 individuals constitute an 
unbalanced panel with iT  observations each. On average, we have 15 observations per 
individual, resulting in 76040 observations in total. In 0.6% of the individual week 
observations multiple charities send a mailing6. In fact, the maximum number of 
mailings received in one week is 3. During our two year estimation period, individuals 
receive 16 mailings on average, with a maximum of 61. Individuals make an average of 6 
donations, which implies a response rate of 38.2%. Given that we are considering active 
donators this is quite reasonable for the Dutch situation. 
 Table 3.2 presents some descriptive statistics per year, averaged over the full 
sample of 5000 individuals. Charity 2 is the largest charity with the most donators, and 
it has by far the highest response rate. We see that the largest charities receive somewhat 
smaller donations. As individuals can receive mailings of multiple charities, the numbers 
of donators across charities add to more than 5000.  
                                                 
6 In a small number of instances multiple mailings of the same charities were received. As 
personal communication with the charities’ fund managers convinced us that this is not their 
intention we considered these mailings as one and the same. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics across charities per individual per year 
 # donators 
# mailings 
per year 
# donations 
per year 
response 
rate 
average 
donation 
Charity 1 336 0.77 0.19 0.25 €17.32 
Charity 2 3690 7.84 4.33 0.55 €10.32 
Charity 3 744 1.21 0.31 0.25 €15.84 
Charity 4 2275 5.24 0.99 0.19 €12.60 
Charity 5 488 0.74 0.22 0.30 €18.27 
Total 5000 7.90 3.02 0.38 €11.48 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for individuals with different numbers of active charities 
# active charities # individuals 
# mailings 
per year 
# donations 
per year 
1 charity 3121 5.96 3.06 
2 charities 1352 9.66 2.79 
3 charities 413 13.91 3.25 
4 charities 101 17.82 3.74 
5 charities 13 22.08 5.12 
 
 As explained before, charities can only send mailings to individuals on their 
mailing lists due to privacy regulations. In Table 3.3 we present the distribution of the 
number of charities in iF . Furthermore, we present the average number of mailings and 
donations per year for individuals with different numbers of active charities. We find 
that 62% are only on one mailing list and thus only receive mailings from this charity. 
Furthermore, 8% of the individuals receive mailings from three funds, and only 0.3% 
receive mailings from all five funds. Regarding the number of mailings these individuals 
receive, we see that the more charities are active, the more mailings they receive, which is 
what we would expect. However, we also see that the number of donations does not 
grow proportionally. Hence, the response rate tends to decrease as the number of active 
charities increases. 
 
3.4.1 Discrete state and decision variables 
To be able to solve the dynamic programming problem and compute the likelihood 
through a Markov Chain procedure we need our state and decision variables to be 
discrete. Two of our state variables, mailing probabilities itp  and received mailings itm , 
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are already discrete. Our state variable guilt itG  and our decision variable donated 
amount itD  will have to be discretized. For guilt itG , we choose a uniform grid with 101 
grid points that ranges from 0 to 100 and from 0 to 150 for latent class 1 and 2, 
respectively. With these grids the stationary distribution was reasonable7 at the final 
parameter estimates. 
As explained in the model section, we assume the donating decision amounts to 
choosing from a discrete set of donations, represented by D, as individuals generally 
donate certain focal amounts. To construct the set D we analyze the amounts that are 
donated in the data. In total the individuals in our sample donate 141 different 
amounts. We consider the eight amounts that are donated most frequently, and that we 
believe the model will still be able to distinguish between. For example, although €3.00, 
€2.00 and €2.50 are all donated frequently, we only include €2.508 in our grid. The 
amounts in D cover 65.2% of the donations exactly. All other donations are 
transformed into the amount in D that is closest.  
 The distribution of the (transformed) donations in the data over the focal 
amounts in D is in Table 3.4. We also present the average of the donations in the 
original data that have been transformed to each amount in D. For example, the average 
of all donations that have been transformed to €5.00 (that is, all original donations 
between €3.75 and €6.25) is €4.87, which is very close. No severe skewness problems 
arise. The only exception is the focal amount of €100.00, which contains all donations 
higher than €75.00 and is thus not bounded from above. However, the high average of 
the original data (€157.08) is caused by a small number of outliers, with a maximum 
donation of €1000.00. In fact, both the mode and the median are equal to €100.00. 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of our empirical application. We discuss the 
estimation results for both the mailing strategy models and the dynamic programming 
model.  
 
                                                 
7 That is, the overall stationary distribution contained a probability mass smaller than 1.e-04 for 
the highest gridpoint. 
8 This may seem a strange amount to donate, but is actually very common in the Netherlands, 
since the Dutch guilder, that was used until the introduction of the Euro in 2002, had a 
denomination of fl. 2.50. 
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Table 3.4: Distribution of donations 
amount average in original data frequency relative frequency 
€2.50 €2.45 3284 10.88% 
€5.00 €4.87 7521 24.94% 
€7.50 €7.46 5944 19.69% 
€10.00 €10.30 5512 18.26% 
€15.00 €14.96 4437 14.70% 
€25.00 €25.62 2599 8.61% 
€50.00 €50.10 709 2.35% 
€100.00 €157.08 178 0.59% 
total  30184 100.00% 
 
Table 3.5: Estimation results for the mailing strategy models 
 Constant Last response 
Charity 1 -1.237***  (0.005) 0.049*** (0.010) 
Charity 2 -1.296***  (0.002) 0.030*** (0.003) 
Charity 3 -1.431***  (0.004) 0.044*** (0.008) 
Charity 4 -1.225***  (0.002) 0.006*  (0.005) 
Charity 5 -1.461***  (0.005) 0.020**  (0.009) 
   *,**,***: significantly different from zero at respectively 10%, 5%, 1%. 
 
3.5.1 Parameter estimates of the mailing strategy models 
We estimate a probit model for the mailing strategy of each charity, with the response to 
the last mailing as explanatory variable, see equations (3.9) and (3.10). To ensure proper 
initialization of this variable and equal representation of all individuals we use the first 
year of data as the initialization period and start estimation on January 1st 2005. For an 
overview of the number of individuals and observations for each charity, see Table 3.1. 
The estimation results for all five charities are in Table 3.5. 
 We find that the response to the last mailing has a significant effect on the 
current mailing probability for all charities, although for charity 4 this is only marginally 
significant. Thus, charity 4 seems to target the least, which is confirmed by personal 
communication with the fund managers. Recently, this charity has started to regularly 
send direct mailings to the greater part of their database. 
 Using these parameter estimates we can compute the weekly mailing 
probabilities for each charity, given the response to the last mailing, see equation (3.11).  
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Table 3.6: Weekly mailing probabilities 
 Mailing probability 
last non-response  
Mailing probability 
last response  
Charity 1 10.81% 11.75% 
Charity 2 9.75% 10.29% 
Charity 3 7.62% 8.26% 
Charity 4 11.02% 11.14% 
Charity 5 7.21% 7.48% 
 
The results are in Table 3.6. We consider these mailing probabilities as given. Assuming 
rational expectations, donators will then know these probabilities and thus will realize 
how their behavior affects the charities’ mailing probabilities. Next, we solve and 
estimate the dynamic programming model, where the mailing probabilities change over 
time as a result of their dependence on the donating decisions over time. Furthermore, 
in their expectation of future utility, individuals take into account how their decision 
today affects their future mailing probabilities. 
 
3.5.2 Parameter estimates of the dynamic programming model 
In order to identify the parameters in the dynamic programming model we set one of 
the guilt reduction effectiveness parameters J29 equal to 1. This is necessary since all guilt 
reduction effectiveness parameters are multiplied by the linear guilt reduction parameter 
E1 (as can be inferred from equation (3)). Besides this normalization, we fix the discount 
factor O at 0.975 to reduce computational burden. Estimating the dynamic 
programming model through Maximum Likelihood estimation results in the parameter 
estimates in Table 3.7. 
 We find a large segment of 76.6% and a smaller segment of 23.4%. Compared 
to segment 2, the large segment 1 has higher fixed costs and a lower linear guilt 
reduction parameter. Also, the charity-specific guilt reduction effectiveness parameters 
are much lower (except of course for the base charity 2, which we fixed at 1). This 
implies that the majority of the individuals donate not very often, but when they do 
donate their donations tend to be relatively high. After all, as their guilt reduction per 
donated Euro is lower, they have to make larger donations to achieve the same guilt 
reduction as individuals in segment 2.  
                                                 
9 We chose charity 2 as the base charity because it is the largest. 
81
A dynamic model of guilt as a driver for charity donations 
 
 73 
Table 3.7: Estimation results for the dynamic programming model 
 Segment 1 
0.766 
Segment 2 
0.234 
Fixed cost fc 140.508*** (1.759) 43.576*** (0.107) 
Guilt reduction linear E1 3.815*** (0.075) 6.066*** (0.051) 
Guilt reduction quadratic E2 0.000 (0.000) 0.056*** (0.004) 
Weekly guilt M 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Standard deviation V 2.873*** (0.051) 3.123*** (0.012) 
Direct mailing guilt     
      Charity 1 G1 2.222*** (0.129) 1.466*** (0.069) 
      Charity 2 G2 7.613*** (0.121) 8.337*** (0.017) 
      Charity 3 G3 0.323*** (0.154) 0.000 (0.000) 
      Charity 4 G4 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
      Charity 5 G5 3.207*** (0.202) 0.513*** (0.032) 
Guilt reduction effectiveness     
      Charity 1 J1 0.609*** (0.011) 0.850*** (0.008) 
      Charity 2 J2 1.000 (---) 1.000 (---) 
      Charity 3 J3 0.679*** (0.012) 0.856*** (0.007) 
      Charity 4 J4 0.681*** (0.007) 0.854*** (0.007) 
      Charity 5 J5 0.643*** (0.015) 0.848*** (0.214) 
(1/standard deviation logit) Z 0.056*** (0.000) 9.799*** (0.878) 
              *,**,***: significantly different from zero at respectively 10%, 5%, 1%. 
 
Furthermore, since they donate less often than individuals in segment 2 because of their 
higher fixed costs, their guilt will be higher when they do donate, resulting in even 
higher donations. Individuals in segment 2 donate more regularly, but they donate lower 
amounts. 
 Since both costs and utility are in a Euro metric, guilt is as well, implying that 
donating one Euro to charity 2 relieves 3.82 Euros worth of guilt for individuals in 
segment 1 and 6.07 Euros worth of guilt for individuals in segment 2. This seems low 
compared to the fixed costs of €140.51 and €43.58, respectively. However, as a guilt 
reduction persists in the future, it should be evaluated in terms of the net present value 
of these guilt reduction amounts.  Disregarding, for simplicity, future opportunities to 
decrease guilt, the discount rate of 0.025 implies that the smallest possible donation of 
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€2.50 could potentially reduce the stock of guilt with 381.50 Euros worth of guilt in 
segment 1 and 606.60 Euros worth of guilt in segment 2. In solving the dynamic 
programming model, individuals will account for these large future benefits of donating 
today, but they also realize that there will be future opportunities to reduce guilt. 
 The quadratic guilt reduction parameter is not significant for segment 1. 
However, because guilt cannot be negative and is thus bounded from below at zero, the 
reduction of guilt is still concave in the size of the donation. The estimated location 
parameter M is not significantly different from zero in either segment. Nonetheless, the 
random increase Mit, which follows a censored logistic distribution with mean M and 
standard deviation V, is positive on average. Again, this is caused by the fact that guilt 
cannot become negative, so that the effective realizations of Mit are censored from below. 
 Guilt induced by direct mailings varies over charities. A direct mailing of 
charity 2 causes most guilt, in both segment 1 and 2. In segment 1, charity 1 and 5 also 
cause quite some guilt. Mailings of these charities affect guilt in segment 2 as well, but 
not as much as in segment 1, especially compared to mailings of charity 2. Charity 3 only 
causes a little guilt in segment 1, and charity 4 fails to induce guilt in either segment. As 
charity 3 is the only social welfare charity, its lack of guilt induction may be caused by 
guilt attribution. Potential donators may feel that the beneficiaries of this charity 
brought their fate upon themselves and therefore feel less guilty. Regarding charity 4, a 
similar story may apply, as it concerns a type of disease that most people feel is a 
consequence of an individual’s behavior and lifestyle. 
 The guilt reduction effectiveness parameters also differ somewhat over 
charities. The effectiveness parameter for charity 2 J2, which we fixed at 1, is by far the 
largest in both segments. Combined with the high direct mailing guilt induction of this 
charity, this agrees with the fact that charity 2 has the highest response rate of the five 
charities (see Table 3.2).  Finally, we find that Z, representing the inverse of the 
standard deviation of the error term DitH in equation (3.15), differs substantially across 
segments. To aid interpretation, we compute the R2 implied by these parameter 
estimates. That is, we assess the portion of the variance in the value function explained 
by the model without the error DitH . Note that the variance in the value function also 
includes unobserved variation through the other stochastic component in the model, 
the random guilt increase itM . This stochastic component, however, only concerns the 
distribution of donated amounts, assuming the optimal charity is chosen. We find an R2 
of 0.65 and 1.00 in segment 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, in segment 2 the behavior 
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predicted by the solution of the DP problem and the predicted behavior allowing 
deviations from optimality are equal. That is, in segment 2 itM  is sufficient to fit the 
distribution of donated amounts and an individual in segment 2 is predicted to always 
choose the charity that results in the highest value. With an R2 is 0.65, the behavior 
predicted by the solution of the DP problem and the behavior subject to deviations from 
optimality are also quite similar. Thus, although we do include an error term in the 
model to allow for deviations of optimal behavior, it is of little consequence in practice. 
 
3.5.3 Model fit 
To assess the fit of the model we compare the distribution of donated amounts 
conditional on receiving a mailing predicted by the model with the actual distribution in 
the data. To compute the actual distribution per segment, we use the posterior means of 
the classification probabilities for each segment as weights. From the donation 
distributions, we also compute the expected donated amount in a random week, 
conditional on receiving a charitable direct mailing. Table 3.8 presents the results for 
both latent segments separately and for the total sample. Overall, the model fit is quite 
good. The model predicts a slightly higher response to mailings than the actual response 
rate and the expected donated amounts conditional on receiving a mailing are somewhat 
overestimated. On the other hand, the model predicts a relatively low frequency of the 
highest possible donation of €100.00. 
 Next, we assess how well the model fits differences between charities. Table 3.9 
presents the actual and fitted distribution of weekly donated amounts per charity, 
conditional on receipt of a mailing from that charity. We find that the model picks up 
differences between charities remarkably well. For example, the non-response rate of 
charity 2, which is much lower than that of the other four charities, is indeed predicted 
to be much lower. Also, the dip in the data for €7.50 donations, which is present for all 
charities except charity 2, manifests itself in the fitted distributions for these charities. 
The big jumps between amounts in the data are smoothed out somewhat by the model, 
as becomes clear from Figure 3.1, which presents the actual and fitted distribution for 
charity 1. 
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Table 3.8: Actual and fitted distribution of donated amounts conditional on receipt of a 
mailing 
     Segment 1     Segment 2     Total 
 actual model actual model actual model 
€0.00 65.40 62.56 46.41 44.86 60.31 58.41 
€2.50 0.06 0.46 15.92 16.17 4.32 4.15 
€5.00 1.45 3.32 32.90 27.93 9.89 9.09 
€7.50 9.48 7.04 3.28 7.34 7.82 7.11 
€10.00 9.45 9.03 1.26 2.46 7.25 7.49 
€15.00 7.91 9.44 0.17 1.06 5.84 7.47 
€25.00 4.65 6.37 0.06 0.18 3.42 4.92 
€50.00 1.27 1.67 0.01 0.01 0.93 1.28 
€100.00 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.08 
      
Expected amount 
given a mailing 5.03 5.56 2.46 2.80 4.34 4.91 
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Figure 3.1: Actual and fitted distribution of donated amounts to charity 1 conditional 
on receipt of a mailing from charity 1 
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Figure 3.2: Actual and fitted distribution of number of non-responses between two 
consecutive responses 
  
 In Figure 3.2, we provide some evidence on how well the model fits choice 
dynamics. We compare the simulated and actual distributions of the number of non-
responses to direct mailings between two consecutive responses. We compute the actual 
distribution by taking the number of non-responses for each individual between their 
first and second response. As we excluded donators with less than one donation per year, 
every individual in the sample makes at least two donations during our data period. 
 We see that the model somewhat overestimates the frequency of very small 
inter-response numbers of non-responses. For example, the model predicts that 32.0% 
of the responses are followed by another response vs. 28.1% in the data. For one non-
response between two responses the model predicts 28.8% vs. 23.0% in the data. Apart 
from that, the actual and fitted distributions correspond quite well. Furthermore, both 
the modal and median number of non-responses between two consecutive responses of 
respectively zero and one in the data are correctly predicted by the model. 
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3.6 Policy experiments 
Our structural model can be used to conduct a multitude of possible policy experiments. 
In this section, we study the impact of variations in the charities’ mailing strategies.  
 A charitable organization has two types of stakeholders, that is, the donators 
and the beneficiaries. The organization acts as an intermediary to transfer funds from 
the donators to the beneficiaries. In our structural model we model the behavior of the 
donators, and consider the mailing strategy of the charity from the donator’s point of 
view as given. We can now analyze the impact of a change in the mailing strategies on 
both charity revenues and donator welfare. Hence, our model permits an analysis of 
optimal mailing strategies from the beneficiaries’ point of view, by maximizing revenues, 
and from the donators’ point of view, by maximizing utility. In Tables 3.10 and 3.11, we 
present the results of a number of different mailing strategies. 
 In Table 3.10, we present the expected weekly revenues for various mailing 
strategies. We compute the expected weekly revenues using the stationary distribution 
and take into account the costs of a mailing (both printing and postal costs) and the 
costs of collecting a donation made through a transfer form. We set these costs at €0.50 
and €0.17 respectively, after consulting the fund managers of the involved charities. 
Thus, we find that the total expected weekly revenues per donator for our five charities 
at their current mailing strategies are €0.55210, the largest part of which goes to charity 2. 
 Next, we analyzed how these revenues change for a number of other strategies. 
For example, instead of a low and high mailing probability for individuals that did not 
and individuals that did respond to the last mailing, charities could choose not to target 
and simply mail every individual in their database with a certain probability, regardless 
of their past behavior. We chose to use the average weekly mailing rate in the total 
sample for each charity, see Table 3.1. It appears that this strategy would result in 
slightly higher total weekly revenues of €0.553, although revenues do not increase for all 
charities, and the difference is only marginal.  
 Another option is to switch the high and low mailing probabilities. We study 
what would be the effect of targeting those that did not respond to the last mail. This 
results in even higher total weekly revenues of €0.555.   
                                                 
10 The actual weekly revenues per donator after subtracting mailing and collecting costs are 
€0.549. As we established before, the model fits donating behavior quite accurately. 
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harity 1 
C
harity 2 
C
harity 3 
C
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harity 5 
Expected w
eekly revenues 
 
p
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p
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p
N
R
 
p
R 
p
N
R 
p
R 
p
N
R
 
p
R 
p
N
R
 
p
R 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
T
otal
current 
0.108 
0.117 
0.098 
0.103
0.076 
0.083 
0.110
0.111
0.072
0.075
0.021
0.363 
0.028 
0.116 
0.025
0.552
flat 
0.110 
0.110 
0.100 
0.100
0.078 
0.078 
0.110
0.110
0.073
0.073
0.021
0.367 
0.027 
0.114 
0.025
0.553
sw
itched 
0.117 
0.108 
0.103 
0.098
0.083 
0.076 
0.111
0.110
0.075
0.072
0.022
0.370 
0.027 
0.112 
0.025
0.555
alw
ays 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000
1.000 
1.000 
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.048
1.705 
0.062 
0.254 
0.085
2.154
optim
ized* 1.000 
0.408 
1.000 
1.000
0.086 
1.000 
0.063
0.121
1.000
1.000
0.106
1.993 
0.020 
0.062 
0.125
2.306
*: O
ptim
ization criterion = total revenues 
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An explanation for this result could be that people that did not donate the last time now 
have higher guilt and are therefore more eager to donate. Again, the difference in 
revenues with the current strategy is very small, but it does indicate that there could be 
something to gain from a different strategy.  
 Another simple strategy would be to mail everyone all the time. This improves 
the weekly revenues tremendously. The total revenues almost quadruple, and revenues 
are between two and almost five times as high for individual charities. Although this 
may seem appealing at first sight, we should note that our model does not account for 
irritation. When individuals would receive a mailing from each charity each week our 
guilt buildup concept may not be the only driver anymore. Instead of inducing guilt, the 
extra mailing could induce irritation and cause people to stop donating all together. 
 The final line in Table 3.10 presents the mailing strategy that maximizes total 
weekly revenues, and is thus optimal from the beneficiaries’ point of view. We find that 
indeed the total revenues are even higher than for all charities to send a mailing to every 
individual every week. However, to achieve this result, charity 3 and 4 have to sacrifice 
some revenues compared to the current strategy. Hence, although the total revenues are 
maximized, not all individual charities gain from this strategy. For all charities except 
charity 4 it appears optimal to mail at least part of the sample every week. As mailings of 
charity 4 induce no guilt whatsoever (see Table 3.7 for the parameter estimates of the 
dynamic programming model), it seems plausible that mailing all individuals all the time 
may cost more than it yields for charity 4. Charity 2 and 5, that induce much guilt 
relatively, should mail all individuals every week, regardless of whether they responded 
to the last mail or not. Charity 1, that also induces quite some guilt – even more than 
charity 5 – but has a lower overall guilt reduction effectiveness, should only mail 
individuals that did not respond to the last mail every week. The explanation might be 
that individuals that just responded have a relatively low level of guilt, so that their 
inclination to respond again is already quite low. As charity 1 has the lowest guilt 
reduction effectiveness, individuals that do respond will not pick this charity if multiple 
mailings are received, and it therefore does not make much sense for charity 1 to mail all 
these individuals every week. For charity 3, we observe the opposite – and rather 
counterintuitive – pattern. Each week, they should mail all individuals that responded 
to the last mail, and only part of the individuals that did not respond. Obviously, 
because of the complicated interrelations between all parameters it is hardly possible to 
uncover the precise underlying reasoning behind the optimal strategy. 
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Table 3.11: Expected weekly utility for various mailing strategies 
 Charity 1 Charity 2 Charity 3 Charity 4 Charity 5 
 pNR pR pNR pR pNR pR pNR pR pNR pR 
Expected 
weekly 
utility 
current 0.108 0.117 0.098 0.103 0.076 0.083 0.110 0.111 0.072 0.075 -634.596 
flat 0.110 0.110 0.100 0.100 0.078 0.078 0.110 0.110 0.073 0.073 -634.514 
switched 0.117 0.108 0.103 0.098 0.083 0.076 0.111 0.110 0.075 0.072 -633.826 
always 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1369.464 
optimized* 0.094 0.997 0.056 0.083 0.296 0.374 0.999 1.000 0.065 0.106 -584.487 
*: Optimization criterion = total revenues 
 
  Next, we discuss Table 3.11, which presents the expected weekly utility for 
various mailing strategies. We find that the expected weekly utility, which we compute 
via the stationary distribution, is -634.596 for the current mailing strategy. Just as above, 
the flat mailing strategy and the switched mailing strategy result in a slight improvement 
(-634.511 and -633.824, respectively). Thus, charities would benefit both beneficiaries 
and donators with either of these strategies. However, the strategy to mail all individuals 
every week decreases utility substantially, as lots of direct mailings induce lots of guilt. 
Thus, although this strategy yields a high return and may be desirable from the 
beneficiaries’ point of view, from the donators’ point of view it is not. The difference 
between the current strategy and this strategy indicates that charities seem to account 
for the donators’ utility, at least to a certain extent. 
 The final line in Table 3.11 presents the mailing strategy that maximizes the 
expected weekly utility, and is thus optimal from the donators’ point of view. We find 
that mainly charities that do not induce much guilt should increase their mailing 
frequencies compared to the current strategy. In that way, individuals have many 
opportunities to attenuate their guilt, while their guilt is hardly increased by all these 
requests. Note that this optimal strategy from the donators’ point of view does not 
correspond at all to the optimal strategy from the beneficiaries’ point of view. In fact, the 
total weekly revenues of the strategy that maximizes utility are €0.366 and the weekly 
utility of the strategy that maximizes revenues is -1392.553. Both are much worse than 
the results of the current strategy, indicating that the charities seem to take account of 
both stakeholders. 
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 Table 3.12: Signs of marginal derivates of expected weekly utility and revenues 
 Utility 
Total 
revenues 
Charity 1 
revenues 
Charity 2 
revenues
Charity 3 
revenues
Charity 4 
revenues 
Charity 5 
revenues 
NRp1/ww  – + + – – – – 
Rp1/ww  + + + + + + + 
NRp2/ww  – + – + – – – 
Rp2/ww  – + + + + + + 
NRp3/ww  + + – – + – – 
Rp3/ww  + + – – + – – 
NRp4/ww  + + – – – + – 
Rp4/ww  + + – – – + – 
NRp5/ww  + + – – – – + 
Rp5/ww  + + – – – – + 
 
 Next, we study the impact of the individual charities on the expected utility and 
revenues, by computing the marginal derivatives of these criteria with respect to the 
charities’ mailing probabilities in the current mailing strategy. In Table 3.12 we present 
the signs of the marginal derivatives. A number of clear patterns can be observed. To 
increase the expected weekly utility, we find that most charities can increase both their 
mailing probability for individuals that did not respond to their last mailing and the 
mailing probability for individuals that did respond to their last mailing, pNR and pR. An 
increase in mailing frequencies of charity 2, which induces the most guilt by far, has a 
negative effect on utility, while for charity 1 results are mixed. Although these results 
concern marginal derivatives of the separate charities, the directions mostly agree with 
the simultaneously optimal strategy. 
 Regarding the expected total revenues, we find that all charities have positive 
marginal derivatives. Thus, for all charities separately, sending more direct mailings 
results in higher total revenues. However, although an increase in mailing frequency 
leads to an increase in total revenues, most competitive interactions are negative. That is, 
when a charity increases its mailing frequencies it increases its own revenues, but it 
decreases revenues for the other charities. Exceptions are the mailing probabilities to 
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those that did respond to the last mail of charity 1 and 2, the two charities with the 
highest guilt induction. Increasing these probabilities increases revenues for all charities. 
 
3.7 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we studied how guilt affects charitable donating to multiple charities 
over time. We put forward a stochastic dynamic programming model, which we 
estimated using a unique dataset containing all direct mailings from and donations to 
five of the largest Netherlands-based charities during three years. We introduced 
heterogeneity in the parameters by imposing a latent class structure with two segments. 
As charities apply target selection techniques, the probability that an individual receives 
a mailing from a charity depends on his past donating behavior. To capture this 
endogeneity, we assumed that the individual mailing probability depends on the last 
response decision. To obtain each charity’s mailing probability given response or non-
response to the last mailing, we therefore first estimated a probit model for the mailing 
strategy of each of the charities.  
As expected, we found that charities do indeed target the better donators, 
evidenced by significant and positive effects of response to the last mailing on future 
mailing probabilities for all charities. Taking the estimated mailing probabilities as given 
and assuming rational expectations, the subsequently obtained parameter estimates for 
the dynamic programming model indicate that there is a large segment of individuals 
who donate not very often but with large amounts, and that there is a smaller segment of 
individuals who donate more frequently with smaller amounts. Furthermore, some 
charities seem to induce more guilt than others, and also some charities are more 
effective in reducing guilt than others. We show that our model of guilt build-up and 
relief fits actual behavior quite accurately. The predicted distributions of donated 
amounts and of the number of non-responses between two consecutive responses closely 
follow the patterns in the data. Differences between charities are also picked up 
remarkably well. 
 Although our data set is unique because it combines individual-level data from 
multiple organizations, it of course does not cover all charities. We therefore ran a 
robustness check by re-estimating the model with only four of the five charities, and no 
substantial differences were noted. We are thus fairly confident with the main findings. 
 Our structural model enabled us to do some policy experiments. We showed 
that the mailing strategies can be improved to the benefit of either the beneficiaries or 
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the donators of the charities. To increase total revenues, charities which induce guilt 
should increase their mailing frequencies, because individuals will then donate more 
often to reduce their high guilt levels. To increase donators’ welfare, the charities that do 
not induce guilt should increase their mailing frequencies, as this would result in more 
opportunities to attenuate guilt without increasing it. As the results of the current 
mailing strategies of the charities are somewhere between the results of the optimal 
strategies from both viewpoints, they seem to be taking both types of stakeholders into 
account. 
 Since the stock of guilt is unobserved and thus a latent variable, one may 
wonder whether it is actually guilt that is captured by the model and whether guilt is the 
only motivating factor for donating to charity. We argued that most pervasive 
motivations of charitable giving do not fit readily into a dynamic framework. The 
motivations that only affect individual responses statically, so without a dynamic 
component, will be captured by the logistic error term in our model (see equation (3.3)). 
An alternative and more dynamic driver could be the management of one’s self-image, 
where people feel better about themselves when they donate and their self-image thus 
increases when they make a donation. It might, however, well be that this feeling of 
feeling good about yourself is not only instantaneous, but that it slowly decreases over 
time, similar to the increases in guilt in our model. Thus, a model of self-image 
management would come down to a mirror image of the guilt model, where a high level 
of guilt corresponds to a low self-image. The implications of a self-image management 
theory for donating behavior would therefore be very similar to those of guilt. In fact, 
our model could be easily reinterpreted in this context. The same holds for the warm 
glow concept that has prevailed in the economics literature on donating. So far it has 
only been conceptualized in a static context, but the extension of a warm glow feeling to 
a dynamic context would intuitively follow the self-image management theory outlined 
above, as warm glow is the feeling one gets of doing good. Whether donating behavior is 
driven by guilt, warm glow or self-image management is a question that cannot be 
answered based on objective data of donating behavior itself. Future research could go 
deeper into the underlying motivational process, for example through survey research. 
Most importantly, a dynamic model of donating behavior would result in predictions 
and implications similar, if not equal, to our model of guilt build-up and relief. 
 Our study is not without limitations. We want to note, however, that our main 
limitations are all caused by restricted computing power and time, and are not 
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insurmountable weaknesses of the model. If computing time was unlimited, all 
limitations below could be easily addressed. 
 One limitation is that we let the charities’ mailing strategies depend only on the 
response to the last mailing, which we did for mere convenience as the state space thus 
became reasonably feasible. In reality, charities may use other variables to describe past 
behavior, such as response rates or average past amount donated. However, our personal 
consultation with the charities’ managers confirmed that recency variables, such as our 
response to the last mailing, are the most important target variables. 
 A second limitation is that we only allowed for two latent segments. We did 
not test whether this is the optimal number of segments. Perhaps estimating the model 
with more than two segments would result in an even better model fit. However, as 
estimating the current model was already extremely time-consuming, we decided to 
leave this extension for further research. 
 A third limitation is our assumption that people make at most one donation a 
week. If they receive mailings of multiple charities, they focus on the charity which yields 
the highest value. Because of the large fixed costs of making a donation, in general it 
would be optimal to select one charity. However, because of the effect of donating on 
future mailing probabilities, theoretically an individual could be willing to have more 
fixed costs. As allowing for this possibility would increase computation time, and also 
because multiple donations in one week were virtually nonexistent in our data set, we 
chose to keep it as simple as possible. 
 A final limitation is that our model does not account for irritation caused by 
direct mailings. At very high mailing frequencies, the guilt build-up concept as we 
described it might not apply anymore and other drivers may interact. Instead of 
inducing guilt, extra mailings could induce irritation and perhaps cause people to reduce 
donations or even stop donating entirely. To account for irritation we would have to 
include a disutility of mailings, for example by including the number of direct mailings 
received in the past year. This would mean that an extra state variable would have to be 
added to the state space, increasing computation time tremendously. Further research 
should examine the role of irritation, and whether the optimal policies would change 
due to irritation. We want to note, however, that Chapter 5 of this thesis shows that 
although direct mailings do cause irritation, this irritation is not translated into a change 
in donating behavior. 
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3.A The solution of the dynamic programming problem 
In this appendix we describe the details of how we solve the dynamic programming 
(DP) problem faced by individuals in our model, where we omit the subscript i for 
notational convenience. In order to construct the value function, which is a function of 
the state space, we need to compute the value for each possible point in the state space. 
First, to aid computation, we split the random shock tM  into a deterministic part M  and 
a stochastic part tH ~ LOG(0,V2) and we define the new state variable ttt GG H ~ , so 
that we have from (3.1) and (3.3): 
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where tDtot  and tC  are as defined before. Then, we redefine the state space as ^ `ttt pmG ,,~  and construct the Bellman equation: 
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1
*
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We discretize the state variable guilt tG
~ through a uniform grid, and assume that people 
only donate certain focal amounts, so that all model variables are discrete. Furthermore, 
people can only donate to charities that send a mailing and we assume that, if an 
individual receives mailings of multiple charities in one period, he will specialize and 
donate to the optimal charity, that is, the charity that results in the highest value. We 
solve the recursion in the Bellman equation (3.22) through a value function iteration 
process to obtain a steady state point, by proceeding as follows.  
 Since both the mailing probability state variable tp  and the mailing state 
variable tm  are restricted by the active charities vector F and these restrictions greatly 
reduce the state space, we solve the dynamic programming model separately for each 
possible F type. For example, if F = {1 0 0 0 0}, meaning that only charity 1 is active with 
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this individual, he can only receive mailings from charity 1. The feasible mail states are 
then ‘ no mailing’ and ‘ a mailing from charity 1’, that is {0 0 0 0 0, 1 0 0 0 0}. Then, 
although the number of grid points for the guilt state variable is unchanged, the number 
of state points for both tp  and tm  is greatly reduced, and we only have to compute the 
value function for the feasible state points. Thus, for each possible F type, we do the 
following. 
 
We initiate the value at time t+1, ),,~(* 1 tttt pmGV   at a certain value for all points in the 
state space11. Next, we compute ),,~(* tttt pmGV  given this ),,
~(* 1 tttt pmGV  through the 
following steps: 
x For all possible mailing probability states tp :  
 For all possible mailing states tm : we compute the value ),,
~(* tttt pmGV  and the 
optimal donation for all possible guilt states tG
~ . For this, we distinguish three 
cases: 
1) No mail is received in period t, so tm ={0 0 0 0 0}.  
In this case no donation can be made and the optimal donation is 
automatically zero. Furthermore, as no mail is received, the mailing 
probability state does not change (see equation (3.4)), so that the state for 
the next period 1+tp  equals that of the current period tp . We compute the 
mail combination probability distribution for the next period, that is, the 
probabilities of receiving every possible combination of mailings 1+tm . For 
example, if F = {1 1 0 0 0} and }2.0,1.0{=},{= 1+,21+,11+ ttt ppp , then the 
probability of receiving no mailing, only a mailing of charity 1, only a 
mailing of charity 2, or mailings of both charities in period t+1 are 
respectively 0.72, 0.08, 0.18 and 0.02. For each possible guilt state tG
~  we 
compute the utility in period t tU  according to equation (3.21). 
Subsequently, we compute the expectation in the Bellman equation (3.22)   ttttttttttt pmDpmmGDGVE ,,(,),,,(~ 111* 1   by integrating out 1+tH to obtain 
1
~
tG  through equation (3.20) and integrating out the future mail states 
1+tm  through the computed mail probability distribution. Note that we do 
not have to integrate out the future mail probability states 1+tp , since these 
are completely determined by the state and decision in period t and are 
                                                 
11 During likelihood computation we use the previously obtained value function as the 
initialization for a new set of parameters, in order to save computation time. 
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thus not stochastic. Next, we compute ),,~(* tttt pmGV  according to this 
equation, where we interpolate the expectation. 
2) Only a single mailing is received in period t, so tm ={1 0 0 0 0}, for example. 
In this case a donation can be made to the charity sending the mailing. 
Hence, for all possible donations D (including no donation, so €0.00) we 
compute the new mailing probability state 1+tp  through equation (3.4). 
Next, we compute the new mail combination probability distribution, so 
the probability distribution of 1+tm . For each possible guilt state tG
~  we 
compute the expectation in the Bellman equation as in 1) given the 
donation D and compute the value for this decision, say ),,~,( tttt pmGDV . 
Now, for each guilt level we choose the optimal donation as  
 
  ^ )`,,~,(maxarg* tttt
D
t pmGDVD    (3.23) 
and the value function as  
 
  ),,~,(),,~( ** ttttttttt pmGDVpmGV   (3.24) 
3) Multiple mailings are received in period t, so tm ={1 1 1 0 0}, for example. 
In this case we assume that people donate only to the charity that results in 
the highest value. We observe that the only difference between receiving 
one mailing and receiving multiple mailings comes from the extra guilt 
from the mailings. Thus, instead of computing all values for all donations 
to all charities we derive the value function with multiple mailings from the 
value function with single mailings from 2) by shifting the value functions 
with a single mailing by the difference in guilt, which reduces computation 
time tremendously.  
 Thus, for each charity that sends a mailing we compute the new 
mailing probability state 1+tp  for all possible donations D (including no 
donation), should this charity be chosen. Then we derive the value from 
the value for this 1+tp  and tm =only a mailing from this charity, which has 
been computed in 2). We compute the difference in guilt through the G 
parameters to determine at which guilt levels we need to read the value 
function and interpolate the value function. We also take the optimal 
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donations that go with these values. Should we interpolate the value 
function and the two grid points deliver two different donations, we 
compute the value and the optimal donation for these separate guilt levels 
and choose the highest value and the accompanying donation. 
 After deriving the value from every single charity, we choose for each 
guilt level the highest value and accompanying donation, including the 
charity that it is donated to, resulting in the value function and optimal 
donation for mail states with multiple mailings. 
 
Together, these computations result in the value function for the entire state space 
),,~(* tttt pmGV . We compute the stopping criterion for the recursion as the sum of the 
absolute values of the difference between ),,~(* tttt pmGV and ),,
~(* 1 tttt pmGV  in all points in 
the state space. We replace ),,~(* 1 tttt pmGV   by ),,
~(* tttt pmGV  and iterate until 
convergence. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Donating to Charity: 
Insights from a Natural Field Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The non-profit sector continues to grow. In 2006, charities in the US raised a combined 
$295 billion, an increase of 4.2% compared to 2005 (Giving USA 2007). To keep 
donors contributing, charities make use of all sorts of fundraising tools and activities, the 
most popular being direct mail (Sargeant and Kähler 1999). As charities depend for a 
large part on their revenues from direct mail it is important to know the precise effects 
of charitable direct mailings. 
The number of direct mailings charities send is unabatedly on the rise. 
Potential donors are deluged by huge amounts of mailings of many different charities, all 
soliciting their donations (Abdy and Barclay 2001; Andreoni 2006). When multiple 
organizations send multiple mailings, interference is likely to occur (Greyser 1973). 
Interference of direct mailings may affect charitable giving along two dimensions: 1) 
along the time dimension, affecting future donations and 2) along the competitive 
dimension, affecting donations to other charities (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
 Existing literature on donating to charities has mainly focused on donation 
behavior in response to a single mailing, see Karlan and List (2007) and Landry et al. 
(2006) for some recent examples. Although these studies provide important new 
insights, they do not study the impact of the focal mailing on donations to other 
mailings, neither from other charities nor future mailings from the same charity. 
Consequently, little is known about the impact of a mailing on other mailings.  
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 At the same time, insights into the competitive interactions between charitable 
mailings across multiple charities are a necessary ingredient for a proper focusing of 
future theoretical developments on charitable giving. Some of the important questions 
that are yet unanswered include: Are different charities perfect substitutes as one would 
implicitly infer from Andreoni’s theory of warm glow giving (Andreoni 1990)? Does the 
warm glow feeling cool down over time? Is there a preference for variety? Our analysis 
on the competitive effects of mailings from different charities over time aims to shed 
some light on these issues. 
In general, competitive charitable direct mailings will reduce each other’s 
effectiveness by increasing irritation and by drawing from a limited pool of financial 
resources. However, the competitive impact of mailings of multiple charities might vary 
over time. In particular, when they are received (almost) simultaneously, negative 
interactions can occur. Over time, competitive charitable direct mailings may also have 
synergetic effects, possibly due to increased awareness of those who need help or through 
an increased sense of guilt (see Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis). As charities, more than 
other types of companies, interact regularly and discuss when the various mailing 
campaigns will take place, they could exploit knowledge on direct mailing effects by 
mutually tuning their mailing strategies. 
 In sum, the precise effects of competitive direct mailings of multiple charities 
over time are important to understand but they are under researched. Indeed, in a recent 
review on charitable literature, Andreoni (2006) explicitly indicates that both the 
dynamic and the competitive aspects of fundraising and charitable giving are important 
unexplored areas. The main reason why attention for this topic has been scarce appears 
to be the lack of relevant data.  
But even with access to individual-level data of direct mailings from and 
donations to multiple charities over time, an additional issue arises to complicate 
matters, that is, the endogeneity of the mailings. Instead of randomly selecting 
individuals from their list of addresses to send a mailing, charities generally apply target 
selection. They aim to select those targets that are most likely to respond or those that 
are expected to give a large amount of money. Commonly used target selection 
techniques rely on the fact that past behavior predicts future behavior, so that the best 
donators – based on past behavior – receive the most direct mails in the future. As a 
consequence of these behavior-driven target selection rules, charitable direct mailings are 
endogenous. When modeling the relationship between charitable direct mailings and 
103
Donating to charity: Insights from a natural field experiment 
 
 95 
donating behavior based on the responses to these endogenously selected mailings, the 
parameter estimates will be biased (see Donkers et al. (2006)) and the precise effects of 
mail pressure are hard to establish.12 
 In this chapter we solve the endogeneity issue by designing a natural field 
experiment13. We make use of a unique opportunity provided by our cooperation with 
five of the largest Netherlands-based charities to induce exogenous variation in the 
mailings that individuals receive of multiple charities. We then collect information on 
the actual donations made in response to the experimental mailings, as well as the 
responses to subsequent mailings sent out by the charities. This allows us to study the 
competitive effects of charitable direct mailings in both the short run and the long run.  
To put our study in context we first briefly discuss findings from the literature 
on competitive interference of direct mailings, of which charitable solicitation letters are 
a subset, and we review previous field experiments on charitable giving. Next, we 
describe our experimental design and data, followed by our empirical results. We 
conclude with a discussion of the main results and their implications for theory 
development on charitable giving.  
 
4.2 Competitive interference of direct mailings 
Until recently, the literature on direct mailings did not pay much attention to the 
impact of a mailing over time. Generally the focus was on a static context, ignoring 
potential long-term effects of direct mailing activities. However, as people tend to 
remember past events, a direct mailing organization, such as a charity, should bear in 
mind that the decision to mail an individual today affects the response to tomorrow’s 
mailings (Campbell et al. 2001; Piersma and Jonker 2004). The most prominent effect 
for the charity itself is that the current mailing competes with its own future mailings 
and cannibalization occurs (Campbell et al. 2001). Thus, a current mailing can reduce 
response to a subsequent mailing. 
 One obvious reason for cannibalization between successive mailings is that an 
individual cannot spend an unlimited amount of money on donations, so donations in 
                                                 
12 One could try to correct for the endogeneity of the mailings building on the ideas of Donkers 
et al. (2006). With multiple charities, however, this requires a model for the simultaneous 
mailing strategies of all charities, which is very complicated as the charities’ mailings are not 
independent.  
13 See Harrison and List (2004) for a classification of different types of field experiments. 
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response to a mailing limit the available financial resources for subsequent requests. In 
addition, excessive direct mail clutter could result in irritation, reducing the mailings’ 
effectiveness (Elliott and Speck 1998). This effect can be even stronger for charitable 
direct mail as opposed to regular direct mail, as there are no obvious immediate personal 
benefits of responding for the recipient (Rothschild 1979). Indeed, Francis and Holland 
(1999) show that consumers have much stronger feelings about charitable direct mail 
than about other types of direct mail. Also, charitable direct mail results in more 
irritation.  
 Recently, there have been some studies that do account for dynamic effects of 
direct mailings (Elsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier 2004; Gönül and Shi 1998; Gönül 
and Ter Hofstede 2006; Simester et al. 2007; Simester, Sun and Tsitsiklis 2006). These 
studies, however, focus on a single company and thus ignore competitive activity, 
thereby neglecting potential competitive interference. At the same time, several studies 
on advertising have shown that competitive interference can severely reduce the 
effectiveness of marketing actions (Danaher, Bonfrer and Dhar 2008; Unnava and 
Sirdeshmukh 1994; Yoo and Mandhachitara 2003). On the other hand, there may be 
situations where positive competitive externalities exist. For new products, for example, 
competitive advertising may increase awareness thereby enhancing total sales (Prins and 
Verhoef 2007). 
 These studies all highlight the potential relevance of competitive interference of 
charitable direct mailings. Still, there are also vast differences between buying a product 
from a catalog and donating money to a charity (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 
1996; Chapter 2 of this thesis), warranting further study of charitable solicitations. 
 
4.3 Field experiments on charitable giving 
Charitable donating has been studied extensively for a long time, from a psychological, 
sociological and economic perspective. Many different issues and aspects have been 
scrutinized, both through laboratory experiments (Eckel, Grossman and Johnston 2005; 
Konow 2006; List and Rondeau 2003) and using naturally-occurring data (Andreoni 
2006; Frey and Meier 2004a; Chapter 2 of this thesis). Only recently, however, 
researchers have started to conduct field experiments on charitable giving.  
 Field experiments have been called a bridge between lab and naturally-
occurring data (List 2007). Unlike lab experiments (see Bardsley (2005) for comments 
on the artificiality of the lab), they provide the right amount of realism, since the field 
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experiment takes place in a natural environment and subjects are not aware that they are 
being studied (List and Reiley 2008). Nevertheless, the researcher is in control of the 
relevant manipulations and can apply randomization where appropriate. This ensures 
that effects are not spurious and that causal relationships can be established. The latter 
relationships are difficult to examine when using only naturally-occurring data, due to 
selection bias and other endogeneity issues.  
 Various studies have addressed the field experiment methodology in general 
and the application to charitable giving in particular. A comprehensive discussion on 
different types of field experiments can be found in Harrison and List (2004). List 
(2007) provides an extensive review of the merits of field experiments and the 
application of field experiments to various research areas, among which are charitable 
donations. Levitt and List (2007) examine which factors determine the potential 
differences between individual behavior in a lab and in the real world in studies on social 
preferences. A comparison of donating behavior in laboratory experiments and in the 
field demonstrates that the two can diverge considerably, although they are positively 
correlated (Benz and Meier 2006).  
 The number of papers on charitable donations that use the field experiment 
methodology is growing rapidly, now that academics have come to recognize its high 
potential as a research tool. Most studies focus on the effectiveness of various 
fundraising mechanisms. Examples are the use of seed money, where potential donors 
are informed of a certain initial amount already available for the campaign (List and 
Lucking-Reiley 2002), and matching, where potential donors are promised their 
donation will be matched according to a certain ratio (Karlan and List 2007; Meier 
2007; Meier and Frey 2004). Other studies make explicit comparisons between different 
fundraising mechanisms (Landry et al. 2006; Rondeau and List 2008). Eckel and 
Grossman (2006) compare differences in response to requests that are subsidized 
through matching vs. a rebate, in a setting where both mechanisms are equivalent in 
purely economic terms. 
 A second stream of research using a field experiment explores the underlying 
motivations for contributing to charity. Falk (2007) investigates the reciprocity 
motivation. In a direct mail campaign, some potential donors receive no gift, some a 
small gift and others a large gift. Subsequently, the differences in response are analyzed.  
Frey and Meier (2004b) and Shang and Croson (2008) study the effect of social pressure 
on response rate and amount donated, respectively. 
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 A number of related studies examine how content and contextual factors of 
solicitations affect donating behavior. For example, Smith and Berger (1996) report 
results on framing and suggested anchors, Bekkers and Crutzen (2007) study the use of 
colored pictures on direct mail envelopes, and Liu and Aaker (2008) present results on 
asking for volunteering time instead of money.  
 Most of the studies described above focus on a single single-shot fundraising 
campaign, ignoring potential competitive effects both across charities and over time. 
Indeed, most fundraising literature deals with capital campaigns aimed at obtaining a 
given amount of money to implement a large, fixed-cost project, as opposed to 
continuing campaigns, where donations are used to cover the costs of the ongoing 
business of the charity. As most research on capital campaigns does not apply to the 
continuing campaign situation, this suggests an important avenue for research on 
fundraising (Andreoni 1998). For continuing campaigns the need to study dynamic 
effects, and in particular the degree of cannibalization, seems much more obvious and 
pressing.  
 The few exceptions that do consider long-run effects study potential 
cannibalization of an increase in revenues due to a certain type of request (Falk 2007; 
Meier 2007; Shang and Croson 2008). For example, Meier (2007) investigates whether 
subsidizing donations through a matching mechanism affects future donating decisions 
and finds that matching has a negative net effect on the future participation rate. No 
field experiment, however, addresses the long-run effects of the request by itself. That is, 
no field experiment has yet been designed to test whether an extra request has indeed a 
positive effect on overall contributions in the long run, or that this effect is nullified or 
even negative as a result of cannibalization. 
 As mentioned before, the field experiment literature on charitable donating has 
mostly studied single shot campaigns, ignoring the consequences of the mailings on 
other, competing campaigns. Not only do these studies neglect effects on future 
campaigns by the same organization, they also disregard campaigns by other 
organizations. Nonetheless, as potential donors are being deluged by mailings, 
competitive interference can greatly reduce the effectiveness of a charity’s campaigns and 
is hence an important issue. For example, an individual might simply have no financial 
resources left to donate if a mailing was preceded by many other successful requests.14 
                                                 
14 Obviously we do not expect an individual to donate his very last penny before he stops 
donating, but his mental account for charitable donations might run empty (Thaler 1985). 
107
Donating to charity: Insights from a natural field experiment 
 
 99 
 Summarizing, little is known about the competitive interactions between 
donations towards multiple charities over time in the context of continuing campaigns. 
In this study we attempt to fill the current gap in the literature by conducting a field 
experiment to analyze the competitive effects of charitable direct mailings over time. In 
the next section, we present our experimental design. 
 
4.4 Design of the natural field experiment 
To study the effects of competitive charitable direct mailings we design a natural field 
experiment, meaning that the individuals are not aware of the fact that they participate 
in a field experiment. For this experiment we obtained the cooperation of five charitable 
organizations that have agreed to send experimental mailings according to a mailing 
schedule designed by us. To be able to uncover the effect of competitive mailings we will 
vary the number of direct mailings in one week. We select individuals from the joint 
data set obtained after merging the databases of the five charities.15 Privacy regulations 
form a boundary condition, in that charities are only allowed to store addresses of 
individuals who have donated at least once to their organization in the past. Hence, we 
only select previous donators of a charity to receive experimental mailings of that charity 
(see Karlan and List (2007) for a similar sampling frame).  
The charities to which an individual donates vary across individuals. That is, 
individuals can be donator to one, two, three, four or five of the charities we consider 
and every charity combination is possible. An individual that is donator to two charities 
can at most receive experimental mailings from these two charities. For example, an 
individual that is donator to charity A and B, and hence is only on the mailing list of 
charity A and B, can only receive experimental mailings of charity A and B and not of 
charity C, as he is not active with charity C.  
 Different experimental treatment conditions are created by varying the number 
of experimental mailings subjects will receive. Each charity sends at most one 
experimental mailing to each individual in addition to the regular mailing campaigns 
that are scheduled throughout the year. The experimental mailings are extra mailings 
compared to the charities’ regular mailing strategies and the charities agreed not to 
                                                 
15 The databases were merged by a commercial firm that specializes in database and list 
management. 
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adjust their mailing strategies in response to the experimental mailings.16 Note that for 
the execution of the experiment we selected a week in which no regular mailings were 
planned by the five charities. Consequently, subjects will not receive multiple mailings 
of the same charity organization within that week. Competitive mail pressure thus only 
results from multiple mailings from other, non-participating organizations and the 
experimental mailings. In Table 4.1 we depict the experimental design that is aimed at 
creating the necessary exogenous variation in direct mailings. It provides the proposed 
distribution of subjects over the various experimental treatments.  
 As individuals that are donator to n of the five participating charities can only 
receive a maximum of n experimental mailings, not all cells in Table 4.1 are filled. For 
the treatments with experimental mailings, we allocate 600 individuals to each feasible 
experimental cell. For example, from the individuals with three active charities, 600 
receive one experimental mailing, 600 receive two experimental mailings and 600 receive 
three experimental mailings. In total, this results in 21000 mailings being sent to 9000 
subjects. Of course, there are various possible charity combinations for a particular 
number of charities. We choose to distribute the subjects uniformly across the different 
charity combinations, so that each of the five charities sends out 4200 experimental 
mailings.  
For the control group we select 12000 subjects, consisting of 2400 subjects 
from each ‘ number of active charities’ condition. Within each condition of the number 
of active charities, subjects are again distributed uniformly across different charity 
combinations. This way we match the experimental group as good as possible. To clarify, 
consider the following example. With five charities A, B, C, D and E, one can be 
donator to four charities in five different ways, that is, A-B-C-D, A-B-C-E, A-B-D-E, A-
C-D-E and B-C-D-E. We select 2400/5 = 480 individuals from each of these five 
combinations.  
All subjects are selected randomly from the relevant populations. This ensures 
that given the number of active charities, there are no systematic differences across 
treatment in terms of past behavior, traits and demographics. The only differences are in 
the mailings they received, and this is the key variable of interest. 
 
                                                 
16 This holds at least for the period we study, being the five months following the experiment. 
The charities might have updated their target selection rules at a later stage. 
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Table 4.1: Distribution of subjects over treatment conditions according to experimental 
design 
  Number of active charities Total 
  1 2 3 4 5 Subjects Mailings 
Treatment 0 mailings 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 12000 0 
 1 mailing 600 600 600 600 600 3000 3000 
 2 mailings - 600 600 600 600 2400 4800 
 3 mailings - - 600 600 600 1800 5400 
 4 mailings - - - 600 600 1200 4800 
 5 mailings - - - - 600 600 3000 
  21000 21000 
 
4.5 Data 
For this study we have access to the databases of five large charity organizations in the 
Netherlands. This allows us to create a unique dataset of direct mailings and donations 
at the individual level. The charities are active in three different sectors, that is, two 
charities in the health sector, two charities in the international aid sector and one 
charity in the social welfare sector. Our dataset covers mailings and donations during 
more than three and a half years, from January 2004 until August 2007. 
 
4.5.1 Sample 
We restrict our attention to a sub-sample of the population that meets the following 
criteria. First, we only consider individuals who have been active in the past eighteen 
months, where by active we mean they have donated at least once. Consultation with 
the involved charities has resulted in this definition, which they use as well when 
performing analyses and selections on their databases.  
 Next, we eliminate individuals who have had an automatic transfer or 
membership of at least one of the charities in the past eighteen months. The reason for 
this is that these individuals form a separate type of donators, and in particular the 
dynamic component of their behavior might be very different.17 Furthermore, these 
individuals are highly valuable to the charities and we were requested not to bother 
them with additional experimental mailings.  
                                                 
17 Donating through an automatic transfer is a completely different dimension of charitable 
giving that raises many more interesting questions. We leave these for future research. 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of individuals across different numbers of active charities 
Number of active charities Number of individuals 
1 341845 
2 72625 
3 22922 
4 8611 
5 2278 
 
 Next, charities keep track of individual mailing restrictions. Donators can 
communicate to the charities that they want to receive a maximum of two mailings a 
year, for example. Individuals with such restrictions are left out of consideration for 
obvious reasons. And finally, the commercial party that merged the databases also 
provided us with a list of deceases and general advertising mail blocks. This data cleaning 
procedure results in 448281 potential experimental subjects, all of which are donator to 
at least one and at most all five charities. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of these 
individuals across the number of active charities. 
 
4.5.2 Implementation of the experimental design 
From the sample in Table 4.2 we select our experimental subjects. Clearly, we are 
confronted with some upper bounds with regards to the numbers of potential 
experimental subjects. For example, the original design dictates a total of 5400 subjects 
that are donator to all five charities (see Table 4.1), while in practice we find that only 
2278 of those subjects exist in our database. As our data consist of the entire databases of 
the five charities, and thus contain information on the full population of donators to 
these charities in the Netherlands, this is the best we can achieve. The 2278 subjects 
truly concern all individuals that are donator to all five charities.  
 A similar, although less severe, situation arises for the subjects with three or 
four active charities. For some charity combinations fewer individuals exist than we had 
anticipated in the experimental design. To ensure that every charity combination is 
equally represented under these restrictions and every charity sends an equal number of 
experimental mailings we first substantially reduced the number of subjects in the 
control condition and when deemed necessary also had a proportional reduction in the 
experimental design cells where mailings were sent. 
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Table 4.3: Actually implemented distribution of individuals across treatment conditions 
with intended distribution in parentheses 
  Number of active charities Total 
  1 2 3 4 5 Subjects Mailings 
Treatment 0 mailings 2400 
(2400)
2401 
(2400)
2396 
(2394)
1772
(1770)
383 
(383) 
9352 
(9347) 
0 
(0) 
 1 mailing 600 
(600) 
601 
(600) 
600 
(600) 
542 
(544) 
380 
(379) 
2723 
(2723) 
2723 
(2723) 
 2 mailings - 598 
(600) 
604 
(600) 
547 
(544) 
380 
(379) 
2129 
(2123) 
4258 
(4246) 
 3 mailings - - 594 
(600) 
541 
(544) 
381 
(379) 
1516 
(1523) 
4548 
(4569) 
 4 mailings - - - 544 
(544) 
381 
(379) 
925 
(923) 
3700 
(3692) 
 5 mailings - - - - 373 
(379) 
373 
(379) 
1865 
(1895) 
       17018 
(17018) 
17094 
(17125) 
 
To have as many subjects as possible, this also resulted in a somewhat unequal 
distribution of subjects across the possible charity combinations. In addition, even 
though we took the mailing restrictions that the charities supplied into account, these 
restrictions are dynamic and can therefore change in the short period of time between 
the delivery of our subject selection to the charities and the actual week of the 
experiment. Combined with some administration issues this results in slight 
discrepancies between our adjusted experimental design and the final implemented 
subject distribution. Table 4.3 presents the final distribution of subjects over the design 
cells. See Appendix 4.A for the exact distribution of subjects over charity combinations. 
A comparison with our adjusted design, which is presented in parentheses, shows that 
from the intended 17125 letters 17094 (99.8%) were eventually sent. 
 
4.5.3 Timing of the experimental mailings 
The experimental mailings of the five charities were sent in the last week of March 2007. 
To represent reality as close as possible we decided not to send all experimental direct 
mailings on one single day.  
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Table 4.4: Average yearly direct mailing frequency for different numbers of active 
charities 
Number of active 
charities 
Mean Standard 
error 
1 4.45 2.56 
2 9.93 3.43 
3 15.09 3.89 
4 20.55 4.29 
5 27.16 4.80 
 
Although this would probably be the most effective way to measure competitive 
interference in the short run, consultation with the involved charity organizations 
convinced us that sending up to five mailings on a single day would raise suspicion with 
the experimental subjects, as this is an extremely rare situation in the Netherlands. Table 
4.4 shows the average yearly direct mailing frequency of these five charities during our 
time span, for each number of active charities.  
 We find that individuals that are donator to all five charities receive on average 
one mailing every two weeks, for example. Furthermore, in our population, only 5% of 
the individuals have received multiple mailings of our five charities on the same day at 
least once in the past two years. However, for around 24% of the individuals there have 
been occasions in the past two years where they received multiple mailings of these 
charities in the same week. Thus, receiving multiple mailings of these charities in one 
week is a much more common situation than receiving them on the same day. 
Therefore, we decided to randomly distribute the experimental mailings for each 
individual over one week, to avoid subjects distrusting the mailings being real and 
guessing that something abnormal is going on.18  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The charities were asked to record donator contacts such as letters or phone calls that 
specifically mentioned high mail pressure in the weeks following the experimental mailings. No 
such events occurred. 
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4.5.4 Measuring charitable giving 
To analyze the effects of the experimental mailings on charitable donating behavior we 
study the responses to the experimental mailings and to the mailings that were sent after 
our experiment, according to the mailing strategies of the charities. For the responses to 
the experimental mailings, or immediate response behavior, we consider all donations to 
experimental mailings received within six weeks after the experiment was conducted. 
For each experimental mailing, we know whether or not the recipient responded, and if 
so, with what amount. 
 To analyze donating behavior after the experimental mailings we have access to 
all mailings and donations of the five participating charities within five months after the 
experiment took place, so from April until August 2007. We distinguish between short 
run and long run behavior. For short run behavior we look at the first mailing campaign 
of each of the five charities in this period. Thus, we only consider the individuals from 
our sample that received a mailing from one of these campaigns. Again, we know for 
each mailing whether the individual responded and if so, with what amount. For long 
run behavior we use the total donated amount per charity during the five months after 
the experiment. Although five months may seem rather short to qualify as long run, in 
Chapter 2 we have shown that the impact of a direct mailing tends to disappear within 
half a year. 
  
4.5.5 Descriptive statistics 
To get a feel for the data we present some descriptive statistics. Our sample consists of 
17018 individuals, 7666 of which receive experimental mailings (see Table 4.3). In 
Table 4.5 we present the number of experimental mailings each charity sent, the 
response rate and the average donation, conditional on response. The response rates vary 
over charities. Most noticeable is the very low response to the mailings of charity 5. This 
is caused by an administrative error, where charity 5 labeled a large part of the mailings 
with an incorrect name, although all individuals did receive a mailing19. We will control 
for these and other systematic differences between the charities and the letters they sent 
through charity-specific intercepts in all models. Finally, the average donation, 
conditional on response, is about the same across charities. 
 
                                                 
19 Delivery of the mailings was verified by contacting some individuals on the charities’ mailing 
lists. These individuals are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for the experimental mailings across charities 
 # experimental 
mailings 
response 
rate 
average donation 
Charity 1 3394 0.198 14.17 
Charity 2 3398 0.109 12.95 
Charity 3 3397 0.186 14.05 
Charity 4  3538 0.187 12.08 
Charity 5  3367 0.014 12.39 
Total 17094 0.139 13.34 
 
Table 4.6: Mailing dates and frequencies of the first mailing campaign after the 
experiment, measuring short run donation behavior 
 mailing date # mailings sent response rate average donation 
Charity 1 May 24th 2007 6475 0.316 16.00 
Charity 2 April 17th 2007 7144 0.233 13.29 
Charity 3 May 26th 2007 9245 0.264 13.70 
Charity 4 April 20th 2007 7523 0.218 12.50 
Charity 5 May 1st 2007 9769 0.179 14.37 
 
 For short run behavior we consider the response to the first mailing campaign 
after the experiment for each charity. Obviously, these campaigns took place at different 
moments for the different charities. In Table 4.6 we present the mailing date at which 
each charity sent out its first mailing after the experiment, and the number of mailings 
that were sent. Furthermore, we present the response rates and average donations 
conditional on response for each of the charities. The mailing campaigns all took place 
within two months after the experiment. In total the charities sent out 40156 mailings 
with a response rate of 0.238. The response rates to these campaigns are substantially 
higher than the response rates for the experimental mailings. The most likely reason for 
this is that we sent out the experimental mailings based on a random selection of 
donators, while the charities use target selection techniques for their regular campaigns, 
which apparently work rather well.20 
                                                 
20 This also highlights the fact that a straightforward analysis of the existing databases provides a 
very biased picture of average behavior, as the sampling for response behavior – that is, the 
sending of a mailing – is not random. 
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Table 4.7: Long run and past donating behavior 
 # donators Total donation 
long run
 Total amount 
past year 
# responses 
past year 
Charity 1 9817 15.34  33.06 1.82 
Charity 2 10032 6.56  22.50 1.54 
Charity 3 9823 5.12  20.49 1.36 
Charity 4  10463 7.29  16.15 1.29 
Charity 5 9817 4.67  17.63 1.08 
Total 17018 22.85  64.27 4.16 
 
 Finally, we study the long run impact of a direct mailing through the resulting 
change in the total donation in the five months after the experiment. We consider the 
total donations to active charities for each individual. Table 4.7 shows the number of 
donators per charity, and their average total donation in the five months after the 
experiment. The table also includes information on past behavior, in particular, the 
average total donation and number of responses per donator in the year before the 
experiment.21 Differences between the charities stem from various sources, including 
differences in their mailing strategies, the attractiveness of their solicitations, and so on. 
 
4.6 Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of our analyses. We model the response behavior to 
the actual experimental mailings – the immediate response behavior – , and the 
donating behavior in response to the mailings the charities sent after the experimental 
mailings, where we look at short run and long run effects. We explain charitable 
donating behavior from the number of experimental mailings individuals received, 
distinguishing between own and other charity’s mailings, where own effects relate to the 
charity sending the mailing, and other effects to the other four charities. We also include 
a number of control variables. In particular, we control for individual heterogeneity in 
donating behavior through the inclusion of two RFM-type22 variables describing past 
behavior: the number of responses and the total donation in the year before the 
                                                 
21 These variables are used to control for systematic differences between donators in the analysis. 
22 RFM comprises Recency, Frequency and Monetary value. RFM-type variables are often used as 
a basis for target selection, as they can describe past behavior, which in turn has been shown to be 
highly predictive of future behavior (Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby 1996). 
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experiment. For these past behavior variables we also distinguish between own and other 
effects. So, for example, when we model the response behavior to the experimental 
mailings, for an experimental mailing of charity 1 the number of own past responses 
concerns the donations made to charity 1 in the year before the experiment, while the 
number of other past responses concerns the donations made to charity 2, 3, 4 and 5. In 
addition, we include dummy variables to indicate which charities are active for each 
individual as this could be indicative of an individual’s attitude towards donating.23 
Finally, we also include charity-specific intercepts to allow for systematic differences in 
response behavior towards charities.  
 
4.6.1 Donating in response to the experimental mailings 
To investigate the immediate effect of competitive mailings we model the response 
decision to the experimental mailings using a Tobit-2 specification (Amemiya 1985, p. 
385). Thus, we assume that, for each experimental mailing that an individual receives, he 
jointly decides whether to respond or not and, if so, with which amount. Let iR  be a 
binary variable to indicate whether the recipient of experimental mailing i responded or 
not. Furthermore, iA  indicates the amount donated conditional on the decision to 
respond to experimental mailing i. Let *iR  be the latent variable related to iR  and
*
iA  
the censored variable related to iA , where ‘ censored’ means partially observed and 
partially latent. Let k denote the number of explanatory variables, including the five 
charity-specific intercepts and iX  the (1 u k) vector of explanatory variables for 
experimental mailing i, then the Tobit-2 model reads as  
 
          
otherwise        0
0 if         1 *®¯­ ! ii RR  (4.1) 
          
otherwise        0
0 if     **®¯­ ! iii RAA  (4.2)   
with 
 RiRii XR HE  *  (4.3) 
 AiAii XA HE  *  (4.4) 
                                                 
23 Individuals who derive much utility from donating, independent of the underlying process, 
might have been more responsive to acquisition mailings of the charities in the past. 
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Table 4.8: Estimation results for donating behavior in response to the experimental 
mailings (standard errors are in parentheses) 
Explanatory variable Response equation Amount equation 
Intercept charity 1 -1.082*** (0.056) -21.980*** (1.471) 
Intercept charity 2 -1.392*** (0.057) -29.458*** (1.534) 
Intercept charity 3 -1.068*** (0.054) -21.965*** (1.431) 
Intercept charity 4 -1.061*** (0.054) -22.095*** (1.432) 
Intercept charity 5 -2.356*** (0.076) -51.232*** (2.147) 
# experimental mailings other -0.019* (0.013) -0.620** (0.304) 
# past responses own  0.094*** (0.008) 1.436*** (0.199) 
# past responses other 0.054*** (0.004) 1.082*** (0.100) 
Total past donation own 0.001*** (0.000) 0.074*** (0.004) 
Total past donation other 0.000** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.002) 
Active charity 1 -0.049* (0.035) -1.187* (0.855) 
Active charity 2 -0.098*** (0.033) -2.101*** (0.803) 
Active charity 3 -0.028 (0.034) -0.258 (0.840) 
Active charity 4 -0.107*** (0.036) -2.702*** (0.877) 
Active charity 5 -0.074*** (0.030) -1.861*** (0.742) 
V 23.988*** (0.411)   
U 0.998*** (0.000)   
*,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 In equation (4.3)-(4.4) RiH  and AiH  represent unobserved factors that 
influence the response decision and amount, respectively. Furthermore, RiH ~ N(0,1) for 
identification of the response equation, AiH ~ N(0,V2) and E[ RiH AiH ] = UV, where U is 
the correlation coefficient. The subscripts R and A for the parameters indicate that the 
parameters are equation-specific.  
 In Table 4.8 we present the estimation results based on all 17094 experimental 
mailings. As we model response behavior to the experimental mailings, the explanatory 
variable experimental mailing own, that indicates whether an experimental mailing was 
received from the same charity as the charity that sent the mailing for which we are 
explaining the response behavior (in this case the experimental mailing itself) always 
equals one and is therefore redundant.  
The impact of mailings from other charities on donating behavior towards 
another mailing is highlighted by the significant influence of the number of other 
experimental mailings in both the response and the amount equation. Thus, there is 
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competition and competitive mail pressure negatively affects donating behavior in 
response to a charity’s mail both in terms of response probabilities and in terms of 
amounts donated. 
 The parameter estimates for experimental mailings represent the effects on the 
latent response and amount (see equation (4.3) and (4.4)) and are thus not 
straightforward to interpret. Furthermore, the strong correlation between RiH  and AiH  
complicates direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients, as the expected amount 
donated contains a correction for a possible selection bias. So, to facilitate 
interpretation, we compute the effect of one extra mailing on the response probability 
and the expected donation, given the data. That is, for each mailing we compute the 
response probability and expected donation given that no competitive mailing vs. one 
competitive mailing is received. For all other explanatory variables we fill in the observed 
values. Thus, the effects vary across all the mailings and we report their average. We find 
that the effect of a competitive mailing on an individual’s response probability to a 
mailing is -0.36 percentage point, compared to a predicted response rate of 13.39% for 
the situation with no competitive mailings. Next, we compare the predicted revenue 
from a mailing given that individuals receive no competitive mailings vs. that they 
receive one competitive mailing. We find that a competitive mailing reduces the 
donation conditional on response, predicted at €16.38 with no competitive mailings, 
with €0.25. The unconditional donation, including non-response and predicted at 
€2.41 with no competitive mailings, is reduced by €0.10. That is, each competitive 
mailing reduces revenues with more than 4%. Taking into account the costs of a mailing 
(both printing and postage costs), estimated by the involved fund managers at around 
€0.50 on average, the reduction in net revenues comes to more than 5%. Thus, 
competitive mailings harm the revenues of a charity’s own mailing. The more mailings 
competitive charities send, the lower the revenues for the focal charity. As all 
experimental mailings were sent in one week, these results demonstrate competition 
between (effectively) simultaneous mailings. 
 Next, we discuss the effects of our control variables. First of all, we find 
significantly positive effects of all past behavior variables. These variables capture 
attitudinal differences between donators, indicating that good donators in the past will 
also be good donators today. The own effects indicate a certain loyalty towards the focal 
charity, while the other effects indicate a more global attitude towards charitable 
donating. Plausibly, the own effects are larger than the other effects. The dummy 
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variables for activity of the charities all have a negative effect, most of which are 
significant. This means that given an individual’s donation level, for which we control 
through the past behavior variables, his response probability and donations are lower if 
more charities are active and he thus donates to more charities. That is, the more 
charities he donates to, the more charities he has to help with a limited budget for 
donations. 
 The charity-specific intercepts show some differences. In particular, the 
intercept for charity 5 is much smaller than that for the other charities. As explained in 
the previous section, this is due to an administrative error by charity 5 causing a very low 
response to this mailing. Overall, the intercepts in the amount equations are very small, 
resulting in highly negative predictions for the censored amount variable *iA . However, 
as the correlation coefficient is very high (0.998), the Heckman selection correction 
(Amemiya 1985) ensures positive predictions for both the conditional and 
unconditional donations. 
 Next, we discuss the results for the donating behavior in response to the 
mailings that were sent after the experimental mailings, where we focus our discussion 
on the impact of the experimental mailings. 
 
4.6.2 Donating behavior after experimental mailings 
Now that we have established that competitive mailings, when received simultaneously, 
negatively affect a charity’s revenues, we study whether this persists over time. Thus, we 
analyze the effect of the experimental mailings on the donating behavior in response to 
the mailings the charities sent after the experiment, according to their original mailing 
strategies. We distinguish short run and long run donating behavior. 
 
Short run - the first mailing campaign after the experiment 
First, we study the short run effects by focusing on the first mailing campaign after the 
experiment for each of the charities. We combine the corresponding mailings and their 
response across charities, resulting in a total of 40156 observations (see Table 4.6). We 
investigate the competitive effects of charitable mailings on short term donating 
behavior by estimating a Tobit-2 model for the response to these 40156 mailings. Again, 
we include charity-specific intercepts to allow for differences between charities and we 
distinguish between the effects of own and other experimental mailings. In Table 4.9 we 
present the estimation results. 
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Table 4.9: Estimation results for donating behavior in response to the first mailing after 
the experimental mailings (standard errors are in parentheses) 
Explanatory variable Response equation Amount equation 
Intercept charity 1 -1.017*** (0.032) -17.171*** (0.705) 
Intercept charity 2 -1.222*** (0.031) -20.995*** (0.679) 
Intercept charity 3 -1.094*** (0.029) -18.595*** (0.639) 
Intercept charity 4 -1.295*** (0.031) -22.378*** (0.687) 
Intercept charity 5 -1.282*** (0.030) -22.189*** (0.658) 
experimental mailing own -0.130*** (0.018) -2.549*** (0.379) 
# experimental mailings other -0.003 (0.008) -0.093 (0.166) 
# past responses own  0.173*** (0.006) 2.117*** (0.123) 
# past responses other 0.045*** (0.003) 0.597*** (0.054) 
Total past donation own 0.002*** (0.000) 0.157*** (0.001) 
Total past donation other 0.001*** (0.000) 0.035*** (0.001) 
Active charity 1 0.003 (0.018) 0.066 (0.390) 
Active charity 2 -0.054*** (0.017) -0.779** (0.368) 
Active charity 3 -0.035** (0.018) -0.675** (0.389) 
Active charity 4 -0.027* (0.018) -0.901*** (0.375) 
Active charity 5 -0.047*** (0.018) -0.514* (0.374) 
V 20.752*** (0.053)   
U 0.996*** (0.000)   
*,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
We find significant cannibalization effects on the charity’s future revenues, as 
the experimental mailing of the same company has a negative impact on both response 
and amount. Individuals that received the experimental mailing donate less on the next 
occasion to donate to the same charity than individuals that did not receive the 
experimental mailing. In fact, the extra mailing reduces the response probability for the 
next mailing with 3.40 percentage point, compared to a predicted response rate of 
22.38% for the situation without the extra mailing. Furthermore, it reduces the 
donation conditional on response, predicted at €16.92, with €0.46 and the 
unconditional donation, predicted at €4.21, even with €0.70, a reduction of almost 17%. 
Taking the costs of a mailing of €0.50 into account, the reduction in net revenues is 
almost 19%.  
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Table 4.10: Estimation results for the total donation in the five months after the 
experimental mailings 
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. error 
Intercept charity 1 5.871*** (0.484) 
Intercept charity 2 -0.691 (0.473) 
Intercept charity 3 -1.481*** (0.469) 
Intercept charity 4 1.804*** (0.462) 
Intercept charity 5 -0.743 (0.461) 
experimental mailing own -1.514*** (0.282) 
# experimental mailings other 0.105 (0.126) 
# past responses own  1.944*** (0.092) 
# past responses other -0.166*** (0.044) 
Total past donation own 0.178*** (0.002) 
Total past donation other 0.017*** (0.001) 
Active charity 1 -0.023 (0.283) 
Active charity 2 0.282 (0.280) 
Active charity 3 0.352 (0.276) 
Active charity 4 -0.250 (0.289) 
Active charity 5 0.005 (0.274) 
         *,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The effects of competitive experimental mailings on response and amount are 
negative as well, but not significant. Thus, although competitive mailings reduce 
response to a charity’s own mailings when sent simultaneously, this does not persist over 
time. In the short run, we do not find evidence of competition between charitable direct 
mailings. 
 
Long run - total donation in the five months after the experiment 
Next, we consider long run donation behavior, which we measure as the total donation 
in the five months after the experiment took place, so from April to August 2007. We 
study the effect of the experimental mailings on the total donation to each of the 
charities from all experimental subjects (see Table 4.3). That is, we aggregate the 
observations of all donators per charity (see Table 4.7) and we estimate a linear model 
with the resulting 49952 observations. In Table 4.10 we present the estimation results. 
 Just as for the short run, we find a significantly negative effect of the 
experimental mailing of the same charity. Thus, sending an extra mailing on top of the 
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current mailing strategy reduces the total future donation with around €1.51. 
Compared to the short run cannibalization effect of €0.70 on the first mailing this also 
implies further negative effects on subsequent mailings.24 Thus, both in the short and in 
the long run, an extra mailing cannibalizes substantially on future revenues. The effect 
of competitive mailings is not significant, so there is no competitive effect of 
experimental mailings in the long run.25 
 Summarizing, we find that extra mailings of competitive charities reduce 
donations to simultaneous mailings of the focal charity. Over time, this effect 
disappears, that is, competitive mailings have no effect on future mailings of the focal 
charity. However, over time there is cannibalization. An extra mailing reduces short run 
and long run donations to future mailings of the same charity. 
  
4.6.3 Net effect of an extra mailing on total charitable giving 
As our results show a cannibalization effect of charitable direct mailings over time it is 
interesting to examine the actual net effect of an extra mailing on the total, overall 
amount of money donated. The mailing yields a certain amount by the donations it 
triggers, competes with simultaneous mailings and cannibalizes future revenues. To be 
able to draw general conclusions about the net effect of extra direct mailings on the total 
amount of charitable activity, we estimate three linear models. That is, we study the 
effect of the experimental mailings on the total amount donated to the experimental 
mailings, on the total donation in the five months after the experiment, and on the sum 
of the two.  
 As we look at the total donation of a donator to all five charities, we now have a 
single observation per individual. In addition there is only a single intercept and no 
distinction between own and other effects. Table 4.11 presents the estimation results of 
the three models for our sample of 17018 individuals. We see that on average an extra 
mailing yields €1.81 by itself. However, it reduces the donation revenues over the next 
five months with €1.12, resulting in a net income of €0.69.  
 
                                                 
24 Of course, for a subsequent mailing other individuals may have been selected. For these 
individuals this mailing would still be their first mailing after the experiment.  
25 Although not significant, the effect of competitive mailings is positive, which can be viewed as 
an indication of synergy between charities. Similar results are reported in Chapter 2. 
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Table 4.11: Estimation results for total donation to experimental mailings, for total 
donation to mailings after experimental mailings, and for the sum of the two 
Explanatory variable Total donation 
experiment 
Total donation     
long run 
Total donation long 
run + experiment 
Intercept 0.213 (0.178) -1.789* (0.937) -1.577  (0.986) 
# experimental mailings 1.812*** (0.059) -1.121*** (0.311) 0.691 ** (0.327) 
# past responses 0.130*** (0.023) 1.463*** (0.122) 1.594 *** (0.128) 
Total past donation 0.014*** (0.001) 0.225*** (0.003) 0.239 *** (0.004) 
Active charity 1 -0.367** (0.157) 6.274*** (0.825) 5.906 *** (0.868) 
Active charity 2 -0.715*** (0.153) 0.710 (0.805) -0.005  (0.847) 
Active charity 3 -0.079 (0.153) 0.062 (0.802) -0.017  (0.843) 
Active charity 4 -0.620*** (0.155) 2.036** (0.816) 1.416 * (0.859) 
Active charity 5 -1.002*** (0.152) -0.135 (0.796) -1.136  (0.837) 
*,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
As the printing and postage costs amount to around €0.50 on average, the net revenue 
for the charities is only €0.19.26 
 Next, to examine if there are differences between individuals in their response 
behavior to more mailings, we perform a median split on our sample, where we divide 
the subjects into subjects that received few vs. many direct mailings in the year before 
the experiment. We compute the median conditional on the number of active charities. 
After all, the more charities an individual donates to, the more mailings he can expect to 
receive. Given a certain number of active charities and the average level of mail pressure 
that goes with this, an individual can receive relatively few or many mailings. There are 
9742 individuals with few direct mailings and 7275 individuals with many, where we 
allocated all individuals who received the median number of mailings to the first sample. 
We re-estimate the models for the total amount donated to the experimental mailings, 
the total donation in the five months after the experiment, and the sum. To capture 
differential behavior in response to additional mailings we include the interaction 
between the number of experimental mailings and a dummy variable that indicates 
many direct mailings in the year before the experiment. Table 4.12 presents the 
estimation results. 
                                                 
26 Note that these are marginal net revenues, that is, the effect of one extra mailing. The average 
revenues are higher. Still it is indicative of excessive fundraising, see Rose-Ackerman (1982) for 
an analytical study of its possible causes and remedies. 
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Table 4.12: Estimation results for total donation to experimental mailings, total 
donation to mailings after experimental mailings, and the sum of the two, including an 
interaction between experimental mailings and a dummy variable for many past mailings 
Explanatory variable Total donation 
experiment 
Total donation      
long run 
Total donation 
long run + 
experiment 
Intercept  0.218 (0.178) -1.760* (0.937) -1.542  (0.986) 
# experimental mailings  1.656*** (0.068) -1.889*** (0.358) -0.233  (0.377) 
Interaction 0.397*** (0.086) 1.952*** (0.454) 2.349 *** (0.478) 
# past responses  0.110*** (0.024) 1.364*** (0.124) 1.474 *** (0.130) 
Total past donation  0.014*** (0.001) 0.224*** (0.003) 0.238 *** (0.004) 
Active charity 1 -0.357** (0.157) 6.323*** (0.825) 5.966 *** (0.867) 
Active charity 2 -0.688*** (0.153) 0.845 (0.805) 0.157  (0.847) 
Active charity 3 -0.034 (0.153) 0.280 (0.803) 0.246  (0.845) 
Active charity 4 -0.622*** (0.155) 2.024** (0.816) 1.402  (0.858) 
Active charity 5 -0.946*** (0.152) 0.140 (0.798) -0.806  (0.840) 
*,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 In all three models, the interaction term has a significant effect, indicating that 
individuals with few vs. many past mailings react differently to extra mailings. 
Individuals with few past mailings donate less to an extra mailing than individuals with 
many past mailings (€1.66 vs. €2.05) and their cannibalization is very high (-€1.89). For 
individuals with many past mailings cannibalization is absent. Consequently, the net 
effect of an extra mailing for individuals that already receive many mailings is €2.12, 
while the net effect for individuals that receive few mailings (-€0.23) is even negative, 
although not significant. There are multiple possible explanations for this. One 
possibility is that individuals that usually receive not so many mailings are more easily 
annoyed by increased mail pressure than individuals that are already used to high 
mailing frequencies. Another possibility is that the charities are currently doing a good 
job in targeting the good donators; they send the most mailings to the individuals that 
yield the highest revenues.  
 Finally, we investigate the endogeneity bias caused by the charities’ target 
selection strategies. As charities send the most mailings to the individuals that have 
proven to be good donators in the past, and these individuals are likely to be good 
donators again in the future, the direct mailings charities send are endogenous. 
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Table 4.13: Estimation results for the total donation to the experimental mailings plus 
the mailings after the experiment, including the effect of regular direct mailings 
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. error 
Intercept  -0.806 (0.983) 
# experimental mailings  0.684** (0.325) 
# regular mailings 2.711*** (0.200) 
# past responses  0.872*** (0.138) 
Total past donation  0.237*** (0.003) 
Active charity 1 -2.270** (1.054) 
Active charity 2 -2.735*** (0.866) 
Active charity 3 -4.259*** (0.896) 
Active charity 4 -5.529*** (0.997) 
Active charity 5 -8.770 (1.006) 
               *,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Then, when estimating the net effect of a mailing on the total long run revenues, this 
estimate will likely be biased. In Table 4.13 we present the results of a linear model for 
the total donation to the experimental mailings and the mailings in the five months after 
the experiment, where we include both the number of experimental mailings and the 
number of regular mailings sent by the charities as explanatory variables. Together these 
are all the donation opportunities provided to the individuals. 
 We find that the effect of regular mailings appears to be much larger than the 
effect of experimental mailings. Thus, if the charities analyzed the net effect of an extra 
mailing based on endogenous mailings alone, they would severely overestimate the 
effect, potentially resulting in bad decisions. For example, based on a €2.71 long run 
yield, the charities could easily decide to strongly increase the mail pressure, while the 
actual net revenues of an extra mailing hardly compensate printing and postage costs.  
Indeed, when we include an interaction of regular mailings with the dummy 
indicating whether someone received many past mailings, we find it is not significant. 
Thus, only considering regular endogenous mailings does not uncover the difference 
between individuals that already receive many mailings versus individuals with low 
mailing frequencies, which we found exists (see Table 4.12). A charity could thus decide 
to increase mail pressure for all individuals, at the risk of actually losing money. For the 
same reasons, one would likely draw incorrect conclusions about the donation behavior 
itself, which we have left for the next section. 
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4.7 Discussion 
The experimental mailings in our natural field experiment demonstrated that charitable 
direct mailings are not independent events, but instead affect individual response 
behavior towards each other. Existing research and theories on donating behavior have 
always treated the response to a mailing independent of the stream of other mailings 
individuals receive. The interactions between the various mailings, however, are 
informative about the type of behavior that might underlie the donation decisions. 
 
4.7.1 Implications for theoretical models of charitable giving 
The theory that is generally used to rationalize donating behavior is the theory of warm 
glow giving (Andreoni 1990). This theory states that one derives utility, that is, a good 
feeling, from making a donation. An alternative explanation could be that individuals 
feel a moral obligation27 to donate whenever they are requested to do so. As long as one 
only considers a single mailing from a single charity, a theory of moral obligation would 
make predictions that are fairly similar to those of a theory of warm glow giving. The 
former would suggest making a donation to pay one’s dues and the latter to buy warm 
glow, but the outcome would be similar. Investigating the natural extensions of both 
theories of charitable giving to the context of multiple donation occasions of multiple 
charities, their predictions diverge, as we outline below. Using our unique data, we will 
thus be able to provide new insights into the motives for donation behavior. 
 
A theory of warm glow giving for multiple donation occasions 
The theory of warm glow giving (Andreoni 1990) has been developed in a static, single 
decision context. As such, it is silent about the construction of a warm glow feeling from 
multiple donations. Extending the warm glow framework to the multiple decisions 
context and assuming all donations contribute to the feeling of warm glow, we should 
find strong substitution effects across mailings that are received simultaneously. An 
individual can simply choose to donate to the one charity that produces warm glow 
most efficiently, or split the amount of money across the charities in case they are equally 
efficient.  
                                                 
27 Donation behavior in the Netherlands is not a very public event with people deriving status 
from donations. The moral obligations, hence, must be related to personal norms more than to 
social norms. 
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 If there was heterogeneity in the warm glow production efficiency of charities, 
individuals would donate to the most efficient charity to achieve specialization in the 
production of warm glow. Compared to the single mailing situation, an individual 
might make a larger donation if a more efficient charity is amongst the multiple 
mailings. Thus, multiple mailings might lead to an increased efficiency in the 
production of warm glow, resulting in a higher donation, but we expect such differences 
to be small. If charities were equally efficient in warm glow production, the amount of 
money available for the donation could be divided over charities in any way. Compared 
to the single mailing situation, the total amount donated would not change if more 
mailings were received.  
 Hence, according to the extended warm glow framework, the average revenue 
on a direct mailing should drop substantially if multiple mailings were received 
simultaneously, particularly in case of equal efficiencies in warm glow production. Now, 
as explained before, the individuals in our dataset have all donated at least once to the 
charities from which they receive an experimental mailing, as they would not have been 
in these charities’ databases otherwise. It is then reasonable to assume that the variation 
in the charities’ efficiency of producing warm glow is not huge, at least among an 
individual’s active charities.28 We should thus observe a substantial decrease in amount 
donated per mailing when multiple mailings are received. 
 Our analysis of the effects of competitive mailings, however, results in a 
completely different picture than would be predicted from the extended warm glow 
framework. A single, additional mailing reduces the response rate from 13.39% to 
13.03%, but this response rate holds for both the original and the additional mailing. So, 
assuming independence for simplicity, the response probability almost doubles to 
24.36%29 when an additional mailing is received, consistent with a distribution of the 
available money over multiple charities. However, the donated amount per response is 
only slightly reduced, which is inconsistent with the extended warm glow framework. In 
sum, the competitive influences on the revenues of a single mailing are relatively minor 
compared to a case of perfect substitutability (although the charitable organizations will 
                                                 
28 Charities might differ much across individuals in the warm glow they provide, so multiple 
charities can survive in this setting. 
29 The probability of donating to both mailings is 0.1303*0.1303=0.0170 and that of donating to 
one of the two is 0.1303*(1-0.1303)=0.1133. The total probability of response is then 
2*0.1133+0.0170=0.2436. 
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obviously not be happy with a 5% loss in net revenues for every competing mailing the 
individual receives). 
 
A theory of moral obligation 
According to a theory of moral obligation, charitable direct mailings can be 
complements as opposed to the substitutability of mailings predicted by the extended 
warm glow framework. When donations are made because one feels morally obligated to 
do so, mailings from multiple charities can be expected to strengthen one another, each 
of them creating a stronger need to help. Hence, the mailings are complementing each 
other in inducing moral obligation and the total amount of money is expected to rise 
substantially when more mailings are received. As one feels morally obliged to help as 
many of those in need as possible, it is also natural to see more but smaller donations, 
which is exactly what we observed in our analysis of competitive mailings.   
 Further support for a theory of moral obligation is provided by the strong 
cannibalization effects and the vanishing effect of competing mailings we found when 
studying the impact of charitable direct mailings on future donating behavior. In 
particular, warm glow could be conceptualized as source independent and hence, if the 
donator’s decision process was driven by warm glow, we should not observe differences 
across senders in the impact of a mailing. In contrast, we find strong cannibalization 
effects of a charity’s own experimental mailings, but no effects of mailings of other 
charities. Moral obligation can much easier be conceptualized as being source 
dependent, with individuals feeling a moral obligation to help the beneficiaries of each 
of the charitable organizations individually. That is, having recently donated to a 
particular charity would lower the inclination to donate to this specific charity again, 
but it would not affect the inclination to donate to other charities. This indeed agrees 
with our empirical results. 
 
4.7.2 Implications for charities  
Charities seem to be doing a decent job in selecting targets to send their mailings to, as 
they currently send the most mailings to the individuals that yield the highest revenues. 
An alternative explanation is that individuals that usually receive not so many mailings 
are more easily annoyed by increased mail pressure than individuals that are already used 
to high mailing frequencies. In any case, it seems to be a bad idea for charities to send 
extra mailings to those individuals that did not receive lots of mailings already as the net 
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revenues of an extra mailing for these individuals does not even exceed the printing and 
postage costs. At the same time, for those individuals that the charities currently mail 
frequently the yield of an extra mailing is quite substantial and could be worth 
increasing the mail pressure a little more.  
 Obviously, our estimate of the net long term revenues of an extra mailing is 
somewhat conservative, as we essentially chose a week at random in which we sent the 
experimental mailings. This means that some charities may have sent a mailing short 
before or after our experimental mailing, distorting the true achievable revenues. That is, 
if the charities would optimize the timing of their stream of mailings including the extra 
mailing, they should be able to achieve a higher yield. Still, cannibalization is strong and 
for those individuals with low mailing frequencies we do not expect that improved 
timing can compensate this. 
 Finally, we want to stress that endogeneity of the direct mailing observations in 
the charities’ databases can result in a distorted image of reality with a severely 
overestimated net effect of an extra mailing. Based on this charities could make mailing 
decisions that are at the least suboptimal, if not disastrous. Therefore, endogeneity 
should always be accounted for when analyzing revenue implications of direct mailings. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Using a natural field experiment to circumvent the issue of endogenously selected 
mailings, we studied individual donating behavior in response to charitable direct 
mailings. We found strong competitive effects across mailings received within a single 
week and also strong cannibalization effects on the donations made to future mailings of 
the same charity. The effects of competing mailings vanish quickly. 
 Our empirical results suggest that donation behavior should be studied as a 
comprehensive process that extends beyond a set of repeated single-shot decisions. Our 
results gave rise to a discussion of an extension to a multiple decisions context of the 
well-known warm glow framework. We argued that one needs observations on mailings 
of multiple charities and donating behavior towards multiple charities to distinguish 
between a theory of warm glow giving and, for example, a theory of moral obligation. 
Having had access to such data, our results support the latter theory. 
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4.A Distribution of experimental subjects over charity combinations 
Table 4.14 presents the distribution of subjects over charity combinations in the 
implemented experimental design. 
 
Table 4.14: Distribution of experimental subjects over charity combinations 
Donator 
to 
Experimental treatment: 
experimental mailings from 
Total # of 
subjects 
Distribution over 
experimental treatments 
A A 120 120 
B B 120 120 
C C 120 120 
D D 120 120 
E E 120 120 
AB A / B /  
AB 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
AC A / C /  
AC 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
AD A / D /  
AD 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
AE A / E /  
AE 
119 31/29/ 
59 
BC B / C /  
BC 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
BD B / D /  
BD 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
BE B / E /  
BE 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
CD C / D /  
CD 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
CE C / E /  
CE 
120 31 / 30 / 
59 
DE D / E /  
DE 
120 30 / 30 / 
60 
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ABC A / B / C /  
AB / AC / BC  / 
ABC 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
ABD A / B / D /  
AB / AD / BD /  
ABD 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
ABE A / B / E /  
AB / AE / BE /  
ABE 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
21 / 20 / 20 / 
59 
ACD A / C / D /  
AC / AD / CD /  
ACD 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
ACE A / C / E /  
AC / AE / CE /  
ACE 
180 21 / 20 / 20 / 
21 / 19 / 20 / 
59 
ADE A / D / E /  
AD / AE / DE /  
ADE 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
21 / 20 / 20 / 
59 
BCD B / C / D /  
BC / BD / CD /  
BCD 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
BCE B / C / E / 
BC / BE / CE /  
BCE 
180 20 / 20 / 20 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
BDE B / D / E /  
BD / BE / DE /  
BDE 
179 20 / 20 / 19 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 
60 
CDE C / D / E /  
CD / CE / DE /  
CDE 
179 20 / 21 / 19 / 
23 / 20 / 19 / 
57 
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ABCD A / B / C / D /  
AB / AC / AD / BC / BD / CD 
/ ABC / ABD / ACD / BCD / 
ABCD 
480 30 / 30 / 30 / 30 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 
30 / 30 / 30 / 30 / 
120 
ABCE A / B / C / E /  
AB / AC / AE / BC / BE / CE / 
ABC / ABE / ACE / BCE /  
ABCE 
255 15 / 16 / 16 / 16 / 
10 / 11 / 11 / 11 / 10 / 11 / 
16 / 16 / 16 / 16 / 
64 
ABDE A / B / D / E /  
AB / AD / AE / BD / BE / DE / 
ABD / ABE / ADE / BDE /  
ABDE 
479 30 / 30 / 30 / 29 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 
30 / 30 / 30 / 30 / 
120 
ACDE A / C / D / E / 
AC / AD / AE / CD / CE / DE 
/ ACD / ACE / ADE / CDE / 
ACDE 
480 30 / 30 / 30 / 30 /  
20 / 21 / 20 / 22 / 20 / 20 / 
30 / 30 / 29 / 28/  
120 
 
BCDE 
 
B / C / D / E /  
BC / BD / BE / CD / CE / DE / 
BCD / BCE / BDE / CDE / 
BCDE 
 
480 
 
30 / 30 / 30 / 30 / 
20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 
30 / 30 / 30 / 30 / 
120 
ABCDE A / B / C / D / E /  
AB / AC / AD / AE / BC / BD / 
BE / CD / CE / DE /  
ABC / ABD / ABE / ACD /  
ACE / ADE / BCD / BCE /  
BDE / CDE /  
ABCD / ABCE / ABDE /  
ACDE / BCDE /  
ABCDE 
1895 75 / 76 / 76 / 77 / 76 / 
38 / 38 / 38 / 38 / 38 / 39 / 
38 / 38 / 38 / 37 / 
39 / 39 / 38 / 40 /  
36 / 38 / 38 / 38 /  
37 / 38 / 
82 / 75 / 75 /  
73 / 76 / 
373 
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Chapter 5 
5 Does Irritation Induced by Charitable Direct 
Mailings Reduce Donations? 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Charities rely heavily on direct mailings to attract the attention of potential donators. In 
addition, billboard, television and radio advertising, as well as online activities, are used, 
but direct mailings by far outnumber other commercial efforts. Much attention is paid 
to the design of the printed material, the catch phrases and the wording. Once the 
material is ready to be sent out, the next focus is on the target audience, where typically 
charities take a selection of donators from their current database or they purchase 
addresses from list brokers to contact prospective donators.     
 The careful attention paid to the content of the solicitation letters, however, 
has not been able to avoid a strong association between charitable direct mailings and 
what is known as “junk mail”. The large number of charities sending out direct mailings, 
and the volumes at which they do this, results in self-stated annoyance towards the 
charities and their direct mailing activities for more than 60% of the population (TNS 
NIPO 2003; NFP Synergy 2004). Although people often see the value of charities, they 
also believe the charities are overdoing it and are wasting their donated money.  
 A potential consequence of irritation is that individuals cut their donations to 
charity or even stop donating all together. Obviously, and most importantly, this 
reduces revenues. Another effect is that the databases of charities become less reliable for 
future target selection. So, for charities it is important to understand what happens 
when people get irritated. Existing literature, however, only provides evidence for 
charitable direct mail irritation, but there is no detailed study on its behavioral 
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consequences, in particular not in terms of actual donating behavior. Diamond and 
Noble (2001) get closest to this, as they elicit respondents’ general response behavior 
towards direct mailings through a survey.   
 Although data collection through a survey is a natural strategy to measure levels 
of irritation and response behavior, there also is a clear drawback of this approach. 
Individuals may misrepresent their actual behavior, as answers to questions on how 
much people actually donate could be subject to a social desirability bias (Burt and 
Popple 1998). In addition, individuals might not recall exactly how many mailings they 
received. To meet these drawbacks, the approach we take in this chapter is to compare 
stated measures of irritation with actual donating behavior. Moreover, as charities 
compete, and hence individuals may receive multiple mailings from multiple charities in 
short stretches of time, we design a natural field experiment in which we create 
controlled variation in the number of mailings individuals receive. This permits us to 
investigate the impact of direct mailings and irritation in a realistic setting within the 
appropriate subject pool (see List and Reiley (2008)). To carry out this natural field 
experiment, we cooperated with five of the largest charities in the Netherlands. An 
analysis of our unique database results in a surprising conclusion. While people do claim 
to get irritated by direct mailings, and they state to get more irritated when they receive 
more mailings, this irritation affects neither stated nor actual donating behavior.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Before we arrive at our 
data analysis and results, we first provide a discussion of the relevant literature. Then we 
discuss the data collection and our statistical methodology. We conclude with a 
discussion of the main results.  
 
5.2 Background 
In this section we describe the relevant background that motivates our study. The 
central issue is the fact that potential donators nowadays feel overwhelmed by so many 
direct mailings from so many charities (Abdy and Barclay 2001; Sargeant and Kähler 
1999), and this may lead to “donor fatigue” (Andreoni 2006). The term junk mail 
surfaces frequently in reference to direct mailings. These unwanted exposures may cause 
irritation, which could in turn influence behavior, for example by reducing charitable 
donations. 
Over the past decades, companies have continuously increased their use of 
direct marketing, with direct mail as the most important direct marketing activity of all 
135
Does irritation induced by charitable direct mailings reduce donations? 
 
 127 
(Direct Marketing Association 2007). One type of company that is known for making 
extensive use of direct print mail is the charity (Francis and Holland 1999). In the 
fundraising process, charity organizations largely depend on soliciting direct mailings for 
approaching potential donators.  
As each direct mail provides an individual with an opportunity to donate, it 
may seem appealing to send direct mailings at high frequencies. The more mailings, the 
higher is the probability that at least one mailing will not be overlooked in the large 
amounts of mail or simply discarded out of lack of interest at the time of receipt. Also, 
repeated advertising exposures can lead to familiarity and liking of a company and can 
prevent forgetting over time (Zajonc 1968; Zielske 1959). Direct mailings can thus serve 
as a reinforcement of the message. Indeed, the amount of charitable direct mailings is 
unabatedly on the rise (Direct Marketing Association 2007). 
Despite the obvious relevance of the subject, not much research has been 
devoted to investigating the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of direct mail 
advertising in general and of charitable direct mail in particular. An exception is the 
study of Korgaonkar, Karson and Akaah (1997), who investigate consumers’ attitudes 
towards direct marketing solicitations. They find that even though part of the 
consumers enjoy direct mailings (for example in the case of catalogs) and describe them 
as informative and entertaining, many consumers view them as useless junk mail. 
 
5.2.1 Charitable direct mailing irritation 
Recently there have appeared some studies establishing that too many direct mailings in 
a short period of time may have a negative long-run effect on the attitude towards the 
mailing company, for example caused by irritation (Diamond and Noble 2001; Elliott 
and Speck 1998). Besides the displeasure incurred by the content of an advertisement 
(as studied by Aaker and Bruzzone (1985), for example), the sheer frequency of 
exposure may cause annoyance (Greyser 1973; Zajonc 1968). Additional, indirect, 
evidence for this frequency induced irritation is presented by Naik and Piersma (2002), 
who find that cumulative direct mailing exposures cause irritation which erodes 
goodwill towards the company.  
This negative effect of direct mailings may be even stronger in the case of 
charitable direct mailings as opposed to, for example, catalogs. This is because charitable 
requests suggest obligation and there are no obvious immediate personal benefits of 
responding for the recipient (Rothschild 1979). Bruce (1995) notes that direct mail 
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donors frequently complain, amongst other things, about the frequency of approaches. 
Individuals do not like to be confronted with an appeal (Diamond and Noble 2001), 
and their tendency to get irritated by high charitable mail frequencies may be much 
stronger than it is with regular direct mail. Another important reason why irritation due 
to charitable direct mail may be stronger than irritation due to other types of direct mail 
is that people feel that charities are wasting their donated money, instead of directing it 
to the cause it was meant for. Indeed, Francis and Holland (1999) show that consumers 
have much stronger feelings about charitable direct mail than other types of direct mail 
and that charitable direct mail results in more irritation.  
 
5.2.2 Behavioral consequences 
So far, only individuals’ attitudinal responses were discussed. High frequencies of direct 
mailings can cause unfavorable attitudinal and emotional responses, such as irritation. 
Obviously, however, the true significance of this knowledge lies in the potential link 
between these responses and the direct mail effectiveness. Naik and Piersma (2002) 
argue that the role of marketing communications and their effects on attitudinal 
variables in direct mailing response is generally ignored. This is particularly striking as it 
is generally agreed that consumer attitudes influence consumer behavior (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). For example, perceived advertising clutter may have an effect on the 
effectiveness of direct mail (Stafford, Lippold and Sherron 2003), possibly due to ad 
avoidance (Elliott and Speck 1998). In sum, individuals who feel they receive too much 
direct mail may have lower intentions to respond to the mail they receive.  
Excessive charitable direct mail could cause so much irritation that response 
rates and donations decrease. Diamond and Noble (2001), for example, find that high 
frequencies of unsolicited donation requests can induce defensive responses. Hence, 
super-saturation might occur (Leeflang et al. 2000, p. 68) and the marginal returns to 
excessive direct mailings might be negative. Irritation caused by charitable direct mailing 
overload could thus reduce total donations. Whereas with regular direct mail people 
only harm the sender of the direct mail when they stop responding, with charitable 
direct mail a third party – the beneficiaries of the charity – is harmed. 
Although the literature provides clear evidence of direct mailing induced 
irritation and has suggested serious consequences for direct mailing effectiveness, not a 
single study has linked direct mailing irritation with actual donating behavior. It is 
precisely this that we study in this chapter. 
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5.3 Data 
We created a unique data set by combining data from three different sources. The three 
sources all address a specific problem inherent to this type of study and subject matter. 
First, to avoid social desirability bias, which is a common problem when measuring 
social behavior such as charitable donating, we need objective behavioral data on actual 
levels of charitable donating. Second, in order to solve potential endogeneity issues, that 
is, people who donate more are also likely selected for a next round of mailings, we need 
to ensure exogenously determined variation in the number of mailings received by 
individuals. To this end, we set up a field experiment. Third, we need a survey to 
measure the subjective construct “irritation”, which cannot be objectively measured 
from behavioral data. Below, we will elaborate on each of these three data sources. 
  
5.3.1 Source 1: Charity databases 
Motivation  
To study the relationships between charitable direct mailings, irritation and donating 
behavior, an obvious method would be to conduct a survey. A well-known problem with 
this type of research, however, is the possibility of a social desirability bias in self-stated 
data. Charitable donating is a typical example of this phenomenon. People tend to 
overestimate their true behavior in an attempt to appear more socially acceptable (Burt 
and Popple 1998). Hence, we cannot be certain that people actually donate as much as 
they say they do. 
 In addition, it is quite plausible that people would overestimate the number of 
charitable direct mailings they receive, simply because they are annoyed by them. Thus, 
if one were to find an effect of the perception of the number of mailings received on 
irritation, but this perception does not correspond to reality, there is not much that 
charities can do about it. They can only directly influence the true number of mailings, 
not people’s perceptions. 
 Hence, for reliable and practically relevant inference on the impact of direct 
mailing induced irritation on donating behavior, we need objective data about the driver 
of irritation, that is, the actual mailing frequencies, and the consequences of irritation, 
that is, actual donating behavior. Both constructs would be poorly captured by self-
stated measures. Of course, it would be very hard, if not impossible, to obtain objective 
individual level data on total mailing frequencies and donations across all charities. For 
this study, however, we have access to the databases of five large charity organizations in 
138
Chapter 5 
 
130 
the Netherlands, allowing us to create a unique dataset of the number of direct mailings 
received and the actual donations made for a sample of active donators. 
 
Measures 
From our combined dataset of the five charities, we can construct an abundance of 
different measures. However, for the purpose of this study, we focus on three main 
constructs. The first is donating behavior. We want to investigate the effect of irritation 
on future donating behavior. Thus, we need to construct a measure of donating 
behavior following the moment that we measure irritation. As a single-donation event is 
often not representative for total donating behavior (Diamond and Gooding-Williams 
2002), we consider an aggregate donating behavior measure. Thus, to measure actual 
future donating behavior, we use the total donation to the five charities in our study in 
the four months after we surveyed irritation. 
The next construct we extract from this dataset is mailing frequency. To study 
the effect of mailing frequency on irritation, we need a measure for the mailing 
frequency prior to our irritation measurement. Thus, we measure past mailing frequency 
as the total number of direct mailings an individual has received from the five charities 
in the twelve months preceding the irritation measurement. 
 Finally, not every individual in our dataset is a donator to all five charities. 
Privacy regulations in the Netherlands allow charities to store only addresses of 
individuals that have donated at least once to their organization in the past. Hence, the 
vast majority of the mailings are sent to individuals that are their own donators.30 If 
someone donates to multiple charities, he may also expect to receive more direct 
mailings. To control for this type of heterogeneity, we construct dummy variables 
indicating to which charities someone donates, and thus which charities are, so to say, 
active. 
 
Sample 
Our charities concern three different issues. Two charities are in health issues, two 
charities are in an international aid issue and one charity concerns social welfare. Our 
dataset covers mailings and donations during more than three and a half years, spanning 
January 2004 until August 2007.  
                                                 
30 Charities also send out direct mailings to acquire new donators, but the number of such 
mailings is negligible in comparison to the mailings sent out to donators on their house lists. 
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5.3.2 Source 2: Natural field experiment 
Motivation 
Instead of randomly selecting individuals from their list of addresses to send a mailing, 
charities generally apply target selection. They aim to select the targets that are most 
likely to respond. As it is generally believed that past behavior is the best predictor for 
future behavior (Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby 1996), most companies use measures 
like Recency, Frequency, and Monetary value (RFM) to implement target selection. 
Essentially, this amounts to predicting future response probabilities using variables of 
the RFM type. Recency can for example be measured by the response to the last mailing, 
Frequency by the total number of purchases in the past, and the average amount 
donated each time can be viewed as Monetary value.  
As a consequence of these behavior-driven target selection rules, the best 
donators receive most direct mails. This means that the number of mailings an 
individual receives from a charity depends on his past donating behavior. When 
modeling the relationship between charitable direct mailings, irritation and donating 
behavior, the number of direct mailings is therefore endogenous. In a sense the sample is 
not fully random anymore, and parameter estimates may be biased, see Donkers et al. 
(2006) or Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta (2004). 
 
Experimental design 
To meet potential endogeneity we design a field experiment. Our goal is to introduce 
exogenous variation in the number of mailings that individuals receive, so that we can 
draw reliable and unbiased conclusions about the relations between direct mailings, 
irritation and donating behavior. It is important to note that the individuals are not 
aware of the fact that they participate in a field experiment. Such experiments are 
known as natural field experiments. See List and Reiley (2008) for the benefits of this 
approach. 
In our field experiment, the five charities sent experimental mailings to their 
donators. Note that the content of these experimental mailings was typical for the 
charities. The experimental feature of the mailings relates to the mailing schedule that 
was designed by us to circumvent the endogeneity problem. To be able to uncover the 
effect of mailing frequency we vary the number of mailings donators receive from the 
charities. We select individuals from the dataset we constructed by merging the 
databases of the five charities. As mentioned before, charities can only send mailings to 
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their previous donators. Hence, for this experiment, we can only select previous 
donators of a charity to receive experimental mailings of that charity. For example, an 
individual that is donator to charity A and B, and is thus on the mailing list of charity A 
and B, can only receive experimental mailings of charity A and B and not of charity C, 
for example. 
We select a treatment group, which will receive experimental mailings, and a 
control group that will receive no experimental mailings. For the treatment group we 
impose different treatments by varying the number of experimental mailings. Each 
charity will send at most one experimental mailing to each individual and the number of 
experimental mailings is therefore equal to the number of charities that send an 
experimental mailing. As this is a field experiment, the charities do continue their usual 
mailing strategies, and we cannot influence that. However, the experimental subjects 
will receive extra mailings compared to the control group, and this manipulation is fully 
under our control. To ensure that the experimental mailings would be able to affect 
irritation, the experimental mailings were all sent out in the same week. This week was 
selected not to coincide with an existing mailing campaign of one of the charities as a 
single charity sending two mailings in one week to one donator would not be realistic. 
In Table 5.1 we depict our initial experimental design, that is, the proposed 
distribution of subjects across the experimental treatments. An individual can also be a 
donator to one charity or to five charities, but these individuals are not included here. 
For the donators to only one charity, we do not expect to find distinct results with 
regards to irritation. For the donators to five charities, our participating charities 
requested that they would not be bothered. 
 Donators to n charities can only receive a maximum of n experimental mailings, 
and hence not all cells in Table 5.1 are filled. We allocate 600 individuals to each feasible 
experimental cell. For example, from the individuals that are donator to three charities, 
600 receive one experimental mailing, 600 receive two experimental mailings and 600 
receive three experimental mailings. Of course, there are various possible charity 
combinations for a particular number of charities. We choose to distribute the subjects 
equally across the different charity combinations, so that each charity sends the same 
number of experimental mailings. We decided to have a relatively large control group, as 
this is the reference group for all treatments within a ‘ number of active charities’ 
condition. We randomly assigned donators from the relevant populations to both the 
control group and the various treatment conditions.  
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Table 5.1: Number of individuals across treatments according to experimental design 
  Number of active charities 
  2 3 4 
Control 0 mailings 2400 2400 2400 
     
Treatment 1 mailing 600 600 600 
 2 mailings 600 600 600 
 3 mailings - 600 600 
 4 mailings - - 600 
 
Sample 
For the experiment we restrict our attention to that part of the population that meets 
the following criteria. First, we only consider individuals that have been active in the 
past eighteen months, where active means they have donated at least once. Consultation 
with the charities involved has resulted in this definition, also because they themselves 
use it when performing analyses and selections on their databases. Next, we eliminate 
individuals that have had an automatic transfer or membership of at least one of the 
charities in the past eighteen months. The reason for this is that these individuals 
constitute a separate type of donator whose behavior is driven by motivations that are 
not very relevant for this study. Furthermore, these individuals are highly valuable to the 
charities and are therefore requested not to be bothered with extra mailings. Finally, 
charities keep track of individual mailing restrictions. For example, donators can 
communicate to the charities that they want to receive a maximum of two mailings a 
year. Individuals with such restrictions are left out of consideration.  
For some charity combinations fewer individuals exist than we had anticipated 
in the experimental design. To ensure that each charity combination is equally 
represented under these restrictions and that each charity sends an equal number of 
experimental mailings, we decided to consider the distribution in Table 5.2, reducing 
the size of the control group for donators active with three charities and having smaller 
cell sizes for donators active with four charities. The experimental mailings of the five 
charities were sent to the selected individuals in the last week of March 2007 and were 
randomly distributed across this week. The actual distribution of donators over the 
various conditions deviates slightly from the design as the charities did not send out 18 
of the 10840 mailings we had scheduled. This was mainly the result of the charities 
continuously updating the status of their donators. 
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Table 5.2:  Number of individuals across experimental treatments according to 
population size restricted experimental design  
  Number of active charities 
  2 3 4 
Control 0 mailings 2400 2394 1770 
     
Treatment 1 mailing 600 600 544 
 2 mailings 600 600 544 
 3 mailings - 600 544 
 4 mailings - - 544 
 
5.3.3 Source 3: Survey 
Motivation 
We have argued that ideally one should use objective, behavioral measures to obtain 
reliable results. However, for some constructs this is simply not feasible. Subjective 
constructs such as emotions and attitudes cannot be measured objectively from observed 
behavioral data. Of course, we can make conjectures about an emotion or attitude from 
its behavioral consequences, but alternative explanations and underlying processes 
cannot be ruled out this way. Hence, to find out how people feel we have to ask them. 
Therefore, we conduct a survey to measure irritation regarding charitable direct 
mailings. 
 
Measures 
Data were collected through a questionnaire which was conducted amongst the subjects 
in the experiment via postal mail three weeks after the experiment took place. Two main 
constructs for this study were measured through the survey, that is, irritation and 
donating behavior. Although we measure actual donating behavior through the 
charities’ databases, we decided to measure stated donating behavior as well. We can 
then compare our results based on stated and actual donation behavior and we can 
investigate whether social desirability bias might affect our conclusions. 
 Irritation was measured by four items which are all related to direct mailing 
induced irritation (intrusiveness, annoyance, quantity, boredom) and were partly based 
on Akaah, Korgaonkar and Lund (1995). For each item, respondents indicated their 
degree of agreement/disagreement on a seven-point Likert scale. For future donating 
behavior, we use donation intent, that is, intended total donation to charities in the next 
143
Does irritation induced by charitable direct mailings reduce donations? 
 
 135 
year. This was measured in seven categories, ranging from “Less than 25 Euros” to 
“More than 1000 Euros”. The exact measures are presented in Appendix 5.A. 
To minimize common-method bias the two constructs were measured using 
different methods. That is, we used a multi-item Likert scale for irritation and an 
ordinal scale for donating behavior. Furthermore, we attempt to control for common-
method variance using Harman's one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). As factor 
analysis in our case does not indicate a single ‘ general’ factor that accounts for the 
majority of the covariance in our variables, common-method bias is unlikely to be 
present here. 
 
Sample 
We sent the questionnaire to 4230 donators, split almost equally across the treatment 
group (2050 questionnaires) and the control group (2180 questionnaires). These precise 
numbers were obtained from a procedure that ensured an equal distribution of 
questionnaires across all possible experimental conditions in combination with the set of 
charities for which the donators are active. Particularly the latter makes this a nontrivial 
task, as there are, for example, ten combinations of three active charities out of the five 
charities participating. We use all completed questionnaires that we received within two 
weeks after they were sent out. Eliminating useless responses, such as completely blank 
questionnaires or decease notifications, resulted in a final sample of 1020 respondents, 
which amounts to a reasonably high response rate of 24.1%. 
 
Data cleaning and reduction 
On average, the 1020 respondents failed to complete 1% of the questions used in 
measuring our constructs. We applied mode substitution for the four items measuring 
irritation and for donation intent. In each of our analyses we check whether they are 
robust to removing the observations that had a missing value. We then applied 
confirmatory factor analysis and reliability analysis to form a composite scale of the 
multiple item measure for irritation. Indeed, irritation appears to be a one-dimensional 
construct and 67% of the variance is accounted for by one component. Furthermore, 
this measurement is sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83). As the factor 
loadings of all four items are very similar, we use average scores to form the composite 
irritation variable. As a robustness check, we also did all analyses with factor regression 
scores for irritation instead of average scores, but this did not alter any conclusions. 
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Figure 5.1: Time frame of the variables 
 
5.3.4 Combined dataset 
Our final dataset consists of ten variables for 1020 individuals. That is, from the 
charities’ databases (source 1) we have actual future donating behavior, the total number 
of charitable direct mailings in the past year, and the five dummy variables for activity 
concerning each of the charities. From the experiment (source 2) we have the number of 
experimental mailings for each individual, and from the survey (source 3) we have a 
measure for irritation and for self-stated future donation behavior. For an overview of 
the time frames for the various measures, see the (rough) time line in Figure 5.1. Figure 
5.1 does not show the activity dummy variables. The fact that an individual is in a 
charity’s database means that this individual has donated at least once to this charity in 
the recent past and thus that the indicator for activity of this charity is one. No specific 
time frame can be attached to these variables. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Perceived irritation is quite high, as, on a seven-point scale, it obtains an average value of 
5.33 (standard deviation is 1.42). We find that 829 individuals (81.3%) have an average 
score higher than 4 across the four items, meaning they are (at least somewhat) irritated 
by charitable direct mailings. Moreover, 163 individuals (16.0%) scored the maximum 
on all items and accordingly they are very irritated. Thus, irritation is indeed substantial. 
 
irritation 
survey 
number of past mailings 
actual donating behavior 
experimental mailings 
22-04-06
27-03-07
    until 
31-03-07 21-04-07 01-09-07 21-04-08
donating intent 
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Table 5.3: Distribution of respondents to the survey across the various conditions in the 
experiment 
  Number of active charities 
  2 3 4 
Control 0 mailings 148 188 140 
     
Treatment 1 mailing 64 51 65 
 2 mailings 54 53 68 
 3 mailings - 70 55 
 4 mailings - - 64 
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics for individuals with different numbers of active charities  
(Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
Number of active 
charities 
Number of direct 
mailings past year 
Actual donating 
behavior 
Stated donating 
behavior 
2 9.30 (2.98) 12.12 (24.83) 4.76 (1.55) 
3 14.13 (3.12) 22.71 (86.16) 5.17 (1.46) 
4 19.83 (3.53) 27.81 (48.43) 5.27 (1.34) 
 
 In Table 5.3 we present the distribution of the 1020 respondents across the 
experimental conditions. Note that none of them noticed a connection between the 
survey and the experiment. That is, in the space for general comments, no one indicated 
a recent unusual high number of mailings. Individuals in the combined dataset received 
on average 1.1 experimental mailings, and 2.1 conditional on experimental treatment. 
 In the year prior to the survey, individuals received an average of 15.1 (standard 
deviation is 5.3) direct mailings in total from the five charities in our study, so about one 
mailing every three weeks. This may seem low for US standards, but charities in the 
Netherlands have a much lower mailing frequency that in the US. Importantly, the 
number of experimental mailings sent out represents a substantial increase in mail 
pressure, at least in the week of the field experiment. 
 As expected, we see that when someone donates to more charities, he will also 
receive more direct mailings, see Table 5.4. And, when a person donates to more 
charities, actual and stated donating behavior also increase. Note that the two are not 
directly comparable, as actual donating behavior is measured by the total donation 
amount in the four months after the survey, so this is in real money, while stated 
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donating behavior is measured on an ordinal scale of 1 to 7 representing categories with 
increasingly higher intended donation amounts. The fact that both show the same 
pattern is an indication that stated behavior is linked with actual behavior. However, as 
we do not observe the total amount of money actually donated, we cannot conclude 
whether people are truly honest about their donating behavior, or whether they 
systematically over-report their actual behavior. 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
To uncover the relationships between charitable direct mailings, irritation, and donating 
behavior, we estimate various models. The first relates irritation associated with 
charitable direct mailings to the received number of these mailings. Thus, we study the 
effect of charitable mailings on irritation. Do more mailings indeed lead to more 
irritation? Or are people simply irritated with charitable requests in general, no matter 
how many mailings they receive? Next, we estimate a model for both stated and actual 
donating behavior, relating them to irritation and charitable direct mailings. Given that 
people tend to be quite irritated about charitable direct mailings, does this irritation 
reduce revenues for the charities? 
 
5.4.1 Irritation 
In Table 5.5 we present the results of two linear models. The first model is a linear 
regression of irritation on charitable direct mailings in the past year, where we 
distinguish between mailings from the experiment and mailings according to the 
charities’ mailing strategies. For the regular mailings, there is systematic variation in the 
number of direct mailings people receive, depending on the number of active charities. 
In addition, donators have chosen to donate to a given number of charities, depending 
at least in part on their overall attitude towards charities. To control for these systematic 
influences, we add five dummy variables, one for the activity of each of the five charities. 
We present the results where missing values are substituted by the mean of irritation. 
Excluding individuals with a missing value for irritation from the analyses effectively 
gives the same conclusions. 
 First of all, we find from model 1 that the experimental mailings and the regular 
mailings both have a significant and positive effect on irritation. So, at first sight, we 
conclude that charitable direct mailings do in fact cause irritation. The more mailings 
someone has received previously, the higher is the level of irritation.  
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Table 5.5: Estimation results for irritation  
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 4.977 *** (0.141) 4.796 *** (0.194) 
Number of experimental mailings 0.078 ** (0.033) 0.061 * (0.034) 
Number of mailings past year 0.018 ** (0.009) -0.007  (0.014) 
Active charity 1 ---   0.216  (0.133) 
Active charity 2 ---   0.233 ** (0.115) 
Active charity 3 ---   0.193 * (0.116) 
Active charity 4 ---   0.268 * (0.138) 
Active charity 5 ---   0.005  (0.115) 
*,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 However, as said, endogeneity could complicate the interpretation of the effect 
of past mailings. To clarify, we describe how target selection affects the estimation 
process and explain how the direction of causality may be reversed. Obviously, there is 
heterogeneity across individuals in the extent to which direct mailings cause irritation. 
Thus, some individuals might get easily irritated, so that mailings have a large effect on 
irritation for them, while others do not get irritated that easily and mailings have only a 
small effect on irritation. The total effect of mailings on irritation is the average of the 
effects per individual. Target selection by the charities causes the good donators to 
receive more mailings. Also, if irritation affects donating behavior, people that are highly 
irritated will generally donate less than people with a low level of irritation. Then, 
someone who does not get easily irritated will generally have a high donation level and 
will receive many direct mailings. 
 In sum, because of target selection, the number of mailings an individual 
receives may be negatively correlated with his irritation tendency. So, the number of 
mailings negatively correlates with the degree to which mailings cause irritation through 
the donation behavior. That is, someone with a low irritation tendency and thus a low 
irritation level will have a high donation level and will receive many direct mailings, and 
vice versa.  
 When estimating the effect of mailings on irritation, target selection may 
induce an overrepresentation of people with many mailings and little irritation and of 
people with few mailings and a lot of irritation. The result would be a general 
underestimation of the effect of mailings on irritation. Hence, although endogeneity 
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does complicate interpretation of the estimated effect, we can conclude that the already 
significantly positive effect of mailings on irritation in Table 5.5 may be downwards 
biased and could in reality be even larger. 
 To solve the endogeneity issue we conducted the mailing experiment described 
before. As the experimental mailings are randomly assigned and thus exogenously varied 
across individuals, they are independent from the individual irritation tendencies. 
Hence, the estimate of the effect of experimental mailings does not suffer from potential 
endogeneity bias, demonstrating a positive effect, see Table 5.5 again. All in all, we can 
conclude from model 1 that charitable direct mailings do indeed cause irritation. 
 To be more precise, the experimental mailings were indeed randomly assigned 
across individuals, but they were conditional on the number of active charities. That is, 
if an individual is a donator to three charities, he randomly receives at most three 
experimental mailings. In model 1 the number of experimental mailings is actually not 
completely random, and therefore we have to correct for heterogeneity by including 
dummy variables for activity of the five charities in model 2. However, the results of 
model 2 confirm that direct mailings from charities cause irritation as the number of 
experimental mailings still has a significant and positive effect on irritation. 
Comparing the results for model 1 with those of model 2 in Table 5.5 indicates 
that the “active charity” dummy variables mop up the effect of the number of regular 
mailings in the past year. That is, the cause of irritation appears to be not so much the 
number of direct mailings per se, but the number of charities someone has chosen to be a 
donator to, and not which specific charities, as the parameter estimates for the activity 
dummy variables do not differ significantly (p-value = 0.236). Hence, if one decided to 
donate to many charities, one will receive many mailings, and therefore one gets 
irritated.  
 
5.4.2 Donation behavior 
Next we investigate the effect of irritation and mailings on donating behavior. Our 
combined data set of both self-stated and actual data allows us to study potential 
differences between the two. For example, people may overestimate their true charitable 
donations in an attempt to appear more socially acceptable. This could nullify a 
potential negative effect of irritation on donations. For self-stated behavior, we estimate 
an ordered logit model for donation intention for next year, where such an intention is 
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measured in the survey as an ordinal variable with seven categories. This ordered logit 
model reads as follows: 
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Here donation* is a latent variable and P1 to P6 are unobserved thresholds that satisfy 
P1<P2<…<P5<P6. Furthermore, X contains all relevant explanatory variables and H  has a 
cumulative standard logistic distribution. For actual behavior, we estimate a linear 
regression for the total donation to the five charities in our study in the four months 
after the survey, acquired from the charities’ databases.  
Table 5.6 presents the estimation results. In both models we include dummy 
variables for the activity of each charity to correct for systematic heterogeneity in the 
number of mailings people receive. Excluding these dummy variables does not alter the 
conclusions regarding the effects of irritation and direct mailings. Therefore we do not 
present results without these dummy variables. Including a dummy variable for the 
missing values in irritation does not alter the conclusions either. Furthermore, repeating 
the analyses without the individuals with missing values for the respective dependent 
variables also results in the same conclusions. Therefore, we only present the results 
where missing values are substituted by either the mean or the mode, depending on the 
type of variable. 
 Remarkably, and contrary to expectations, there are hardly any differences 
between the self-stated and actual behavior models. Of course, because of differences in 
scale and type of the dependent variable, we cannot directly compare the parameter 
estimates in the two models, but we can compare the main conclusions about the 
direction and significance of the effects. There are no differences in the conclusions 
about our main constructs and hence, social desirability bias does not appear to bias the 
conclusions in our study. 
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Table 5.6: Estimation results for self-stated and actual donating behavior  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Explanatory variable Stated behavior Actual behavior 
Intercept ---   3.737  (9.327) 
Irritation -0.011  (0.040) -0.785  (1.245) 
Number of experimental mailings 0.017  (0.047) -0.922  (1.309) 
Number of mailings past year 0.070 *** (0.018) 2.906 *** (0.829) 
Active charity 1 0.126  (0.171) 0.701  (4.081) 
Active charity 2 -0.067  (0.152) -7.045  (6.964) 
Active charity 3 0.296 ** (0.146) -4.026  (3.008) 
Active charity 4 -0.424 ** (0.184) -9.955 ** (4.247) 
Active charity 5 -0.041  (0.151) -11.530  (7.231) 
P1 -3.370 *** (0.374) ---   
P2 -2.280 *** (0.312) ---   
P3 -0.953 *** (0.297) ---   
P4 0.203  (0.294) ---   
P5 1.242 *** (0.296) ---   
P6 2.283 *** (0.303) ---   
        *,**,***: significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
  
 We find that the effect of irritation, although negative in both models, is not 
significantly different from zero. In other words, we find no indications that irritation 
reduces donations. Although people are highly annoyed by the high direct mailing 
frequencies of charities, this does not seem to affect their donating behavior. 
 Curiously, we find a significant and positive effect of the number of mailings in 
the year before the survey on donating behavior after the survey. This unlikely reflects a 
direct causal relationship. An explanation might again lie in the potential endogeneity of 
the number of mailings in the past year. Most target selection is based on the idea that 
past behavior is the best predictor for future behavior. In general, generous donators in 
the past will be generous donators in the future, so past and future donations are 
positively correlated. Through target selection, charities send most direct mailings to the 
most generous donators in the past, who will also be generous donators in the future. 
Thus, the positive effect is caused by reversed causality, in that people with a high total 
donation after the survey are the people that also receive many direct mailings. The 
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number of direct mailings in the past can therefore best be interpreted as an attitudinal 
measure, indicating generosity.  
 The effects of the dummy variables for activity of the different charities are 
significantly different from each other in both the stated behavior (p-value = 0.001) and 
the actual behavior model (p-value = 0.004). These dummy variables for activity of the 
charities pick up all relevant variation across charities. For both models it holds that 
being a donator of charity 4 has a negative effect on future donation behavior. Thus, on 
average donators of charity 4 are less generous.  
 Table 5.6 also reports a positive effect of being a donator of charity 3 on stated 
donating behavior. Donators of charity 3 apparently are relatively generous donators. A 
possible explanation is that charity 3 is the only social welfare charity, while the others 
are health and international aid organizations. There are a number of reasons why, in 
general, people will be less likely to donate to social welfare charities, as we learned from 
our communications with various charity managers. They will be less likely to benefit 
themselves from the donation, unlike from donations to health organizations. In 
comparison with international aid organizations, people sympathize more with poor 
people in 3rd world countries than with those closer to home, as the people in the 3rd 
world countries cannot be blamed for being born there, while poor people closer to 
home are more likely to have had an opportunity to become affluent. Hence, donators 
who do donate to social welfare organizations can be expected also to donate to many 
other charities. 
In related research we performed for the charities involved we indeed found 
that the fraction of donators donating to five or more charities from a set of fourteen is 
twice as high for donators to charity 3 than for donators to charity 2, 4 and 5. Contrary 
to our arguments above, the fraction for international aid charity 1 is on the same level 
as social welfare charity 3, so donators of charity 1 also donate to relatively many other 
charities. This can be explained by the fact that charity 1 has a religious background, and 
therefore has many religious donators. Indeed, religion tends to increase generosity, as 
has been shown previously (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). In sum, the direction of the 
effects of the dummy variables matches our previous findings. 
The results for actual donating behavior in Table 5.6 do not corroborate the 
positive effect of being a donator to charity 3. The reason for this lies in our 
experimental design and sampling frame. Actual donating behavior is measured only for 
the five charities contributing to our study, while stated behavior concerns donations to 
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all charitable causes. Although individuals that donate to charity 3 donate to a relative 
high number of charities on average, we selected our subjects in such as way that this 
effect is annulled for the five charities under consideration. That is, for all five charities 
we selected an equal number of individuals that donate to no other charities, to one 
other charity, and so forth. Hence, being a donator to charity 3 cannot have an effect on 
the number of other active charities by design.  
In sum, we find that there are no major differences between the results for self-
stated and actual behavior. It appears that donating behavior is mainly determined by 
attitudinal factors, and is not affected by feelings of irritation regarding charitable direct 
mailings. 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The main conclusions from our study can be easily summarized. Individuals are irritated 
by the amount and frequency of charitable direct mailings, but these negative feelings 
are not propagated into stated nor actual donating behavior. We could obtain these 
clear-cut findings due to the fact that five of the largest charities in the Netherlands 
allowed us to control the number of mailings that individuals received in a field 
experiment. In contrast, in a non-experimental setting one would have a hard time 
disentangling the consequences of target selection rules typically used by charities and 
the actual received messages and subsequent reactions. In particular, because of target 
selection, people who donated more – as a result of their inherently positive attitude 
towards charities – will receive more mailings and hence will be more irritated. Not 
controlling for endogeneity could hence lead to the conclusion that charities should 
induce more irritation, as the irritated donators donate most. 
 Our analysis of this unique database does support a common wisdom amongst 
managers at charities. They always felt that irritation could arise but also that donations 
were not slowing down. A main message from this study could be that irritation is not a 
key emotional driver when it comes to responding to charities’ direct mailings. It is quite 
conceivable that such mailings induce feelings of guilt and of social responsibility that 
are stronger than irritation. In addition, donators cannot blame the eventual 
beneficiaries of the money they donate, that is, the children in 3rd world countries or 
those suffering from a particular disease, for the unpleasant behavior of the charity. 
 This separation of beneficiary and charity and the resulting disconnection 
between the requester and the recipient of the money seems to result in a failure of 
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market-like correction mechanisms. If a regular store provides poor service, you simply 
go to shop elsewhere. In case all charities send many mailings, as they tend to do, you 
cannot go elsewhere to help the beneficiaries. With the charities sending more and more 
mailings, but the donators having nowhere else to go, this is a typical case for 
government intervention or at least self-regulation from the charities. In particular, caps 
could be imposed on the number of solicitations sent our or on the amount of irritation 
induced by charitable direct mailings. The rise of the number of private initiatives to 
provide aid to those in need, even suggests that more and more donators have found an 
alternative means to reach the final beneficiaries without being irritated.  
Note that our findings do not refute those of Diamond and Noble (2001). 
They found that direct mail pressure and the resulting negative affective responses like 
irritation cause recipients to use defensive actions. Taking their results as a starting 
point, our results show that these defensive mechanisms are not very effective. Similar to 
regular advertising, where people think they are not affected as they develop defensive 
strategies (e.g. Speck and Elliott 1997), people also seem to think they have found an 
effective way of handling charitable mailings, but still keep on donating in response to at 
least some of them. 
 Our study does have one limitation, which we feel opens up an important 
avenue for further research. In the field experiment, we manipulated mail pressure by 
having five different charities send additional direct mailings on top of their regular 
mailing strategy in a single week. Although this did boost the mail pressure substantially, 
it did so in only a limited period of time. Further research could extend the duration of 
the variation in mail pressure to see whether our results continue to hold in these 
circumstances. It is, however, important to note that our experiment already did 
increase irritation among the recipients, so our manipulation was effective in that 
respect. 
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5.A Measures used in the questionnaire 
Irritation and stated donating behavior were measured using the following questions. 
 
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7       
 = strongly agree) 
a) It irritates me that I am approached by charities without my consent 
b) The frequency at which I am approached by charities annoys me 
c) I find letters of charities annoying 
d) I am bored by the large amounts of letters from charities I receive 
 
2. How much do you expect to donate to charity next year? 
    Less than €25 
    €25 - €50 
    €50 - €100 
    €100 - €250 
    €250 - €500 
    €500 - €1000 
    More than €1000 
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Chapter 6 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis we studied the dynamic and competitive effects of charitable direct 
mailings on donating behavior. In this way we contributed to the direct mailing and 
charitable giving literature, which both have largely overlooked these effects. Besides 
establishing that substantial dynamic and competitive effects exist and that the single 
decision context can thus not be justified for accurately describing direct mailing 
response behavior, we also illustrated some practical implications of these results for 
charities. 
  In the first part, we discussed two direct mailing response models, with the first 
focusing primarily on the competitive dimension, and the second mainly on the 
dynamic dimension. In the second part, we presented the analysis of our direct mailing 
field experiment, where we concentrated first on the direct mailing effects on actual 
behavior, and second on the underlying motivational process. Below we provide a 
summary of each of the four chapters, followed by our main conclusions, implications, 
and recommendations for further research. 
 
6.1 Summary  
In Chapter 2 we have presented a dynamic direct mailing response model with 
competitive effects. We discussed the lack of dynamic and competitive effects in the 
current direct marketing literature and motivated why they are important to 
incorporate in direct marketing models. Furthermore, we described the theoretical 
ambiguity of both dimensions. Past direct mailings can be argued to have positive and 
negative effects, and although one would generally expect negative competitive effects, 
situations have been found where positive competitive externalities exist. 
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 We modeled the individual response decision using a Tobit-2 specification that 
incorporates past direct mailings and past purchase behavior. The effect of an event was 
diminishing over time through a Koyck lag structure and we distinguished between own 
effects and cross effects. We accounted for unobserved heterogeneity through 
individual-specific parameters and estimated the model using Bayesian estimation 
methods. To overcome a possible endogeneity bias due to the non-randomness of the 
direct mailing observations, we simultaneously estimated both our Tobit-2 model for 
the response decision and mailing strategy models for all organizations as a function of 
the individual-specific parameters. 
 Although applicable to all kinds of direct mailings that elicit a direct response, 
we applied our model to donating behavior to charities. As charitable mailings differ 
from regular mailings in various respects, we described the implications of a number of 
theoretical drivers of donating behavior for the model parameters. These drivers were 
irritation, guilt buildup, licensing, defection, generosity, competition and giving 
patterns. 
To estimate the model we had access to a dataset of direct mailings from and 
donations to three health charities, for 5000 individuals during a five year period. Our 
estimation results indicated that substantial dynamic and competitive effects exist. This 
result is interesting, as the relevant literature on direct mailings has largely overlooked 
these effects. In our context of charitable giving, direct mailings of the same charity are 
short-run substitutes, in that an extra mailing cannibalizes the revenues of subsequent 
mailings. In fact, we found that up to a quarter of the revenues of an extra mailing are 
cancelled out within two years. Most cannibalization takes place in the first six months 
and this effect dies out over time. Regarding competitive interactions, we found that 
particularly in the short run, competitive charitable direct mailings tend to be 
complements, so that competition is reinforcing.  
Finally, we used our model to shed light on the practical relevance of a number 
of theoretical drivers of donating behavior. Our main findings substantiated the idea of 
direct mailing irritation, in that too many requests can be detrimental for a charity’s 
revenues. However, small numbers of competitive mailings seem to be reinforcing, 
suggesting that these increase guilt and consequently the inclination to donate. Also, 
licensing appears to take place, in that people who recently donated feel licensed to 
donate smaller amounts. And finally, people give according to certain giving patterns, 
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that is, some people give a substantial donation occasionally, while others frequently give 
small amounts.  
 In Chapter 3 we have presented a dynamic model of donating behavior in 
response to direct mailings of multiple charities, where the main driving force was guilt. 
We focused on guilt as this is a driver of donating behavior that can be viewed as a 
dynamic concept. Guilt can be experienced as a reaction to past behavior and also future 
guilt can be anticipated. Moreover, guilt can be a consequence and a driver of behavior. 
Based on psychological and charitable giving literature we developed a 
structural model of donating behavior. We considered an individual’s stock of guilt that 
represents the total accumulated feelings of guilt at a certain point in time. We assumed 
people have a single stock of guilt and we proposed that the stock of guilt will typically 
grow as a result of a general sense of moral obligation and receiving charitable direct 
mailings. The model also accounts for other but unobserved changes in guilt feelings. 
Making a donation reduces the stock of guilt, but comes at certain costs. The model 
assumptions imply that a donation is made when the stock of guilt reaches a sufficiently 
high level and the donation will be higher, the higher the level of guilt. Because of target 
selection techniques, charities send more mailings to their better donators. Assuming 
rational expectations, individuals anticipate the impact of their donating decision on the 
amount of mailings they will receive in the future. They take this into account when 
deciding on their donation and plan their donations optimally. 
We inferred individual donating behavior by solving the corresponding 
stochastic dynamic programming model. We estimated the model using a dataset with 
records of all direct mailings received from and donations made to five charities for 5000 
individuals during three years. We introduced heterogeneity in the parameters by 
imposing a latent class structure with two segments. Our parameter estimates indicated 
that there is a large segment of individuals who donate not so often but with large 
amounts, and that there is a smaller segment of individuals who donate more frequently 
with smaller amounts. This corroborates the result in Chapter 2 where we found that 
people give according to certain giving patterns. Furthermore, some charities seem to 
induce more guilt than others, and also some charities are more effective in reducing 
guilt than others. We showed that our model of guilt build-up and relief fits actual 
behavior quite accurately. The predicted distributions of donated amounts and of the 
number of non-responses between two consecutive responses closely followed the 
patterns in the data. Differences between charities were also matched remarkably well. 
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 The structural model enabled us to do policy experiments, which is an 
important contribution. We showed that the mailing strategies can be improved, where 
two cases are particularly relevant. The optimal mailing strategy from the beneficiaries’ 
point of view acquires more funds for the charities, but decreases donators’ welfare. In 
this case, charities which induce guilt should increase their mailing frequencies, because 
individuals will then donate more often to reduce their high guilt levels. The optimal 
mailing strategy from the donators’ point of view makes donators feel better but reduces 
revenues for the charities. In this case, the charities that do not induce guilt should 
increase their mailing frequencies, as this would result in more opportunities to 
attenuate guilt without increasing it. The results of the current mailing strategies of the 
charities are somewhere between the results of the optimal strategies from both 
viewpoints, indicating that the charities seem to be taking both types of stakeholders 
into account. 
 In Chapter 4 we have discussed the analysis of the charitable direct mailing field 
experiment we conducted. In order to study the effect of a mailing on other mailings – 
both on future mailings from the same organization and on mailings from competitive 
organizations – we need individual level data of direct mailings and donations of 
multiple charities over time. However, because of target selection, observations available 
from the charities’ databases are endogenous. Instead of solving this issue using intricate 
econometric modeling techniques as we did in Part I of this thesis, in this chapter we 
designed a field experiment to create new data that does not suffer from endogeneity. 
That is, we induced exogenous variation in the number of mailings that 7666 
individuals received of five charities in a single week, and collected information on actual 
donations made in response to the experimental mailings, as well as the responses to 
subsequent mailings sent out by the charities. In this way we could draw reliable and 
unbiased conclusions about the competitive effects of charitable direct mailings over 
time through relatively simple analyses.  
 Our results indicated that competitive mailings sent contemporaneously have a 
negative effect on both the response probability and the amount donated to the focal 
mailing. In fact, each competitive mailing reduces the net revenues with more than 5%. 
Thus, competitive mailings sent simultaneously harm the revenues of a charity’s own 
mailing and the more mailings competitive charities send, the lower the revenues for the 
focal charity. In the short run, we found significantly negative effects of the 
experimental mailing of the same company on both response and amount. Thus, 
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sending an extra mailing on top of the charity’s current mailing strategy cannibalizes on 
the charity’s future revenues. In fact, the extra mailing reduces the net revenues for the 
next mailing with almost 19%. In the long run, the extra mailing cannibalizes even 
further on future revenues. In both the short and the long run, the effects of competitive 
experimental mailings on response and amount were not significant. Thus, although 
competitive mailings reduce response to a charity’s own mailings when sent 
simultaneously, this effect does not persist over time.  
 Another finding was that the net revenues of an extra mailing, taking 
competition and cannibalization into account, only just covers the printing and postage 
costs in the current charitable mailing environment. It appeared that the net effect of an 
extra mailing for individuals that already receive many mailings was quite substantial, 
while the net effect for individuals that receive few mailings was even negative, although 
not significant. Thus, it seems that charities should not send extra mailings to those 
individuals that did not receive lots of mailings already, whereas for those individuals 
that the charities currently mail frequently it could be worth increasing the mail pressure 
a little more.  
 A final important finding was that charities could make disastrous mailing 
decisions if they ignored the endogeneity of the direct mailing observations in their 
databases. Analyzing the net effect of an extra mailing based on endogenous mailings 
alone resulted in a severe overestimation of the effect. Thus, if endogeneity is ignored, 
charities could easily decide to strongly increase mail pressure, while the actual net 
revenues of an extra mailing only just compensate printing and postage costs. 
 All in all, our results suggested that donation behavior should be studied as a 
comprehensive process that extends beyond a set of repeated single-shot decisions. We 
considered our results a starting-point to reflect on their implications for theoretical 
development of charitable giving. We discussed an extension of the well-known warm 
glow framework, the theory that is generally used to rationalize donating behavior, to a 
multiple decisions context. We argued that one needs observations on mailings and 
donations for multiple charities to distinguish between a theory of warm glow giving 
and, for example, a theory of moral obligation. Our results, which sprung from such 
data, supported the latter theory. 
 In Chapter 5 we combined the data from our field experiment with a survey in 
which we measured irritation, in order to study the underlying motivational process of 
donating in response to direct mailings. As charitable direct mailing frequencies are 
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increasing, potential donators may become overwhelmed by so many direct mailings 
from so many charities. High frequencies of unwanted exposures may cause irritation, 
which in turn could influence behavior, for example by reducing charitable donations. 
Although existing literature provides evidence for charitable direct mail irritation and 
has suggested serious consequences for direct mailing effectiveness, not a single study has 
linked direct mailing irritation with actual donating behavior, which is what we did in 
this chapter.  
 We created a unique dataset by combining data from three different sources. 
The three sources all addressed a specific problem inherent to this type of study and 
subject matter. First, to avoid social desirability bias, which is a common problem when 
measuring social behavior such as charitable donating, we obtained objective behavioral 
data on actual levels of charitable donating from the databases of five charities. Second, 
in order to solve potential endogeneity issues, we had to ensure exogenously determined 
variation in the number of mailings received by individuals, which we achieved through 
the field experiment described above. Third, we conducted a survey to measure the 
subjective construct “irritation”, which could not be objectively measured from 
behavioral data. In this survey we also measured stated donating behavior, to be able to 
assess potential differences with actual donating behavior. In sum, our dataset contained 
observations on charitable direct mail frequencies, irritation and both stated and actual 
donating behavior for 1020 individuals. 
The analysis of this dataset showed first of all that charitable direct mailings do 
indeed cause irritation. That is, the more mailings someone received, the higher was the 
level of irritation. Surprisingly, we found no significant effects of irritation on donating 
behavior. Thus, we found no indications that irritation reduces donations. Although 
people are highly annoyed by the high direct mailing frequencies of charities, this does 
not affect their donating behavior. Donating behavior seems to be mainly determined by 
attitudinal factors such as generosity, and is not affected by feelings of irritation. 
Contrary to expectations, there were hardly any differences between the results for self-
stated and actual behavior. Hence, social desirability bias did not appear to bias the 
conclusions in our study. 
 A key insight from this chapter was that irritation is not a key emotional driver 
when responding to direct mailings from charities. It is quite conceivable that charitable 
mailings induce feelings of guilt and social responsibility that are stronger than 
irritation. In addition, donators cannot blame the eventual beneficiaries of the money 
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they donate for the annoying behavior of the charity. Although they may want to punish 
the charity, they do not want the beneficiaries to suffer for it.  
 
6.2 Conclusions  
This thesis originated from a scientific and a societal motivation. Below we will describe 
our main conclusions, implications and further research suggestions from both 
viewpoints. 
 Scientifically, we aimed to fill a gap in the direct mailing and charitable giving 
literature, which both have generally ignored dynamic and competitive effects. All four 
chapters showed that substantial dynamic and competitive effects of charitable direct 
mailings exist. The response to a current direct mailing is affected by past direct mailings 
from the same charity, and also by direct mailings from competing charities. Hence, 
charitable direct mailings cannot be viewed independently and donation behavior in 
response to direct mailings should be studied as a comprehensive process. 
 This finding of course opens up myriads of avenues for further research both 
for charitable direct mail studies in particular and for direct mail studies in general. 
Existing knowledge of charitable giving and direct mail should be re-evaluated in the 
light of these insights. For example, existing direct mail response models could be 
extended to include dynamic and competitive effects and well-known drivers of 
charitable giving may be reconsidered in a multiple-decision context.  
 Also, extending the studies in this thesis would contribute to a further 
understanding of dynamic and competitive effects. For example, although our studies 
focused on the charitable giving context, we suspect that these types of effects also exist 
for other types of mailings, such as catalogs and promotional offers. It would be 
interesting to investigate what role dynamics and competition play in different contexts, 
and to assess potential differences with the charitable giving context. To this end, one 
could apply several methods presented in this thesis, such as the direct mailing response 
model from Chapter 2.  
 Furthermore, our data did not cover all competition. An interesting extension 
would be to include more charities and investigate patterns across different types of 
charities. Questions that could be answered include: Is competition stronger between 
charities within the same sector than between charities in different sectors? Do donators 
spread their donations over different sectors or over different charities within a sector?  
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 Finally, our field experiment can be extended and refined along multiple 
directions. One can think of the number of charities included in the experiment, 
variation in the timing of the experimental mailings and variation in the content of the 
experimental mailings. We feel our experiment is a great starting point to inspire lots of 
new insights. 
 Besides the two main scientific themes of this thesis, we also shed some light on 
the endogeneity issue resulting from the target selection procedures applied by charities. 
In several instances we established empirically that charities indeed apply target selection 
and direct mail observations are therefore endogenous. Furthermore, we illustrated the 
bias that results from this endogeneity if it is ignored and argued that in some cases 
ignoring endogeneity can even lead to opposite conclusions. Hence, to obtain accurate 
and reliable results when studying charitable direct mail effects – or direct mail from any 
targeting organization, for that matter – one should find a way to solve the endogeneity 
issue. This can be done through econometric techniques, from which we presented two 
examples in Part I of this thesis, or by creating exogenous variation in the variable of 
interest, for example through an experiment, as we did in Part II of this thesis. As not 
much research has been done on correction mechanisms for endogeneity bias, this issue 
provides further opportunities for future research. 
 The second part of the motivation for this thesis was of a societal nature and 
sprung from the frustrations and complaints regarding charitable direct mail that 
nowadays surface more and more frequently. We aimed to study whether society’s 
current opinions translate to actual donating behavior and to provide socially relevant 
insights to charities to guide their mailing strategies and help increase their revenues. 
 In this light, the main conclusion from this thesis is that charities should mail 
more to increase their revenues. The results from all four chapters indicate that higher 
mailing frequencies will increase revenues, even in the long run. An extra mailing will 
cannibalize on future revenues of the same charity, but the net effect will still be positive, 
although this only holds for people that already receive many direct mailings and not for 
all donators. And although competitive mailings may have a negative effect when sent 
simultaneously, over time they tend to have a complementing effect. Thus, charities in 
the Netherlands have not yet reached the limit and there is still room for more mailings 
and more funds to raise. A hint for this result is also provided by the situation in the US, 
where mailing frequencies are many times higher than in the Netherlands, and charities 
still raise enormous amounts of money. Future research could further explore the 
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boundaries of charities’ mailing behavior and investigate when donations would actually 
start to decrease.   
 This thesis showed that donators may become annoyed but their irritation does 
not find its way into their donating behavior. We feel that the most plausible 
explanation for this comes from the fact that the charity serves as an intermediary to 
transfer funds from the donators to the eventual beneficiaries. As mentioned before, 
donators may want to punish the charities for deluging them with requests, but in the 
end their will to help the beneficiaries outweighs their will to punish. 
 Obviously it would still be wise for charities to attempt to contain irritation 
amongst potential donators. However, instead of adjusting their mailing frequencies 
there could be other ways for charities to achieve this. For example, the content of the 
mailings and information brochures can be experimented with, and charities can try to 
restore trust by better communicating what the donated money is spent on exactly. 
Future research could investigate which factors affect donators’ attitudes in order to aid 
charities in turning around the negative opinions and sustaining a fruitful relationship 
with their donators. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivatie 
De goededoelenindustrie is een enorme industrie. Alleen al in Nederland zamelden 
goede doelen in 2005 in totaal zo’n 4,4 miljard euro in. Hoewel stichtingen en bedrijven 
substantieel bijdragen aan dit bedrag is het grootste gedeelte afkomstig van individuele 
donateurs. Om ervoor te zorgen dat donateurs blijven geven, maken goede doelen 
gebruik van allerlei hulpmiddelen en activiteiten, waarvan de meest populaire direct mail 
is. Potentiële donateurs worden tegenwoordig overstelpt door enorme aantallen 
mailings van vele goede doelen, die allemaal om een donatie vragen. Aangezien goede 
doelen voor een groot deel afhankelijk zijn van hun inkomsten uit direct mail is het 
belangrijk de precieze effecten van deze mailings op donatiegedrag te achterhalen.  
 De motivatie voor dit proefschrift is tweeledig, wetenschappelijk en 
maatschappelijk. Vanuit wetenschappelijk oogpunt zijn twee aspecten vooral van belang, 
namelijk dynamiek en concurrentie. Bestaande modellen van donatiegedrag beperken 
zich tot een eenmalige beslissingscontext, een enkele donatie aan een enkel goed doel. In 
werkelijkheid ontvangen mensen echter vele donatieverzoeken, die intuïtief niet 
onafhankelijk zijn. Men kan zich bijvoorbeeld voorstellen dat iemand die kortgeleden 
aan een bepaald goed doel heeft gegeven vandaag niet opnieuw aan dit doel zal geven. En 
wanneer hij tegelijkertijd verzoeken ontvangt van meerdere goede doelen zal hij 
misschien beslissen om er één te kiezen of om kleinere bedragen aan allemaal te doneren. 
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we individueel donatiegedrag jegens meerdere goede 
doelen over de tijd, waarbij we nieuwe inzichten verschaffen in geefgedrag en het 
fondsenwervingsproces.  
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 Het tweede deel van de motivatie voor dit proefschrift is van maatschappelijke 
aard. Aangezien goede doelen steeds meer mailings sturen, zouden mensen zich 
overweldigd kunnen gaan voelen of zelfs geïrriteerd raken. De term ‘ junkmail’ wordt 
steeds vaker genoemd naar aanleiding van direct mail van goede doelen. Ook de vele 
artikelen in kranten en tijdschriften over verzoeken van goede doelen en de ergernis die 
deze veroorzaken getuigen van de ernst van het onderwerp. De fondsenwervings-
methoden en direct mailings in het bijzonder zijn onderwerpen die de maatschappij 
bezighouden. De publieke opinie lijkt steeds meer te worden gedomineerd door 
negatieve aspecten. Vanuit het oogpunt van de goede doelen is dan de vraag of hun 
mailfrequentie het donatiegedrag op de lange termijn wellicht negatief beïnvloedt. In dit 
proefschrift onderzoeken we dus de effecten van direct mailings van goede doelen op 
donatiegedrag. 
 Samenvattend is het doel van dit proefschrift het bestuderen van donatiegedrag 
in reactie op direct mailings van meerdere goede doelen over de tijd, om zo bij te dragen 
aan de geefgedrags- en directmailliteratuur op twee belangrijke, weinig onderzochte 
fronten, en tegelijkertijd aan goede doelen maatschappelijk relevante inzichten te 
verschaffen die als richtlijn kunnen dienen voor hun mailstrategieën en hun inkomsten 
kunnen helpen verhogen. In deel I van dit proefschrift bespreken we twee directmail-
responsmodellen, waarbij het eerste zich voornamelijk richt op de concurrentiedimensie 
en het tweede voornamelijk op de dynamische dimensie. In deel II presenteren we de 
analyse van ons directmailveldexperiment, waarbij we ons eerst concentreren op de 
effecten van direct mailings op werkelijk donatiegedrag en vervolgens op het 
onderliggende motivatieproces. Hieronder volgt een samenvatting van elk van de vier 
hoofdstukken, gevolgd door onze voornaamste conclusies, implicaties en aanbevelingen 
voor vervolgonderzoek.  
 
Samenvatting 
In hoofdstuk 2 presenteren we een dynamisch directmailingresponsmodel met 
competitieve effecten. We bespreken het gebrek aan dynamische en competitieve 
effecten in de huidige directmarketingliteratuur en motiveren waarom deze belangrijk 
zijn om op te nemen in directmarketingmodellen. Ook beschrijven we de theoretische 
dubbelzinnigheid van beide dimensies: van direct mailings in het verleden kan worden 
beargumenteerd dat zij positieve en negatieve effecten hebben, en hoewel men in het 
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algemeen negatieve competitieve effecten zou verwachten, komen er situaties voor 
waarin positieve competitieve externaliteiten bestaan. 
 We modelleren de individuele responsbeslissing met een Tobit-2-specificatie 
waarin zowel direct mailings als aankoopgedrag in het verleden zijn opgenomen. Het 
effect van een gebeurtenis neemt af over de tijd door middel van een Koyck-lagstructuur 
en we maken onderscheid tussen eigen en kruiseffecten. We houden rekening met 
ongeobserveerde heterogeniteit via individueel specifieke parameters en schatten het 
model met Bayesiaanse schattingsmethoden. Om een mogelijke endogeniteits-
vertekening als gevolg van de onwillekeurigheid van de directmailingobservaties te 
voorkomen, schatten we ons Tobit-2-model voor de responsbeslissing en 
mailingstrategiemodellen voor alle organisaties als functie van de individuele parameters 
simultaan. 
 Hoewel ons directmailingresponsmodel toepasbaar is op allerlei soorten direct 
mailings die een directe reactie opwekken, passen wij het toe op donatiegedrag aan goede 
doelen. Aangezien mailings van goede doelen in meerdere opzichten verschillen van 
reguliere mailings, beschrijven we eerst de implicaties voor de modelparameters van een 
aantal theoretische invloeden op donatiegedrag. Deze invloeden zijn irritatie, opbouw 
van schuldgevoel, rechtvaardiging, defectie, vrijgevigheid, concurrentie en geefpatronen. 
 Om het model te schatten, maken we gebruik van een dataset met direct 
mailings van en donaties aan drie gezondheidsfondsen, voor 5000 individuen gedurende 
een periode van vijf jaar. Onze schattingsresultaten tonen aan dat er substantiële 
dynamische en competitieve effecten bestaan. Dit is een interessant resultaat, aangezien 
de relevante literatuur over direct mailings deze effecten grotendeels buiten 
beschouwing laat. In onze context van donatiegedrag zijn direct mailings van hetzelfde 
goede doel substituten op de korte termijn, wat wil zeggen dat een extra mailing de 
opbrengsten van vervolgmailings kannibaliseert. Het blijkt dat tot aan een kwart van de 
opbrengsten van een extra mailing binnen twee jaar teniet worden gedaan. De meeste 
kannibalisatie vindt plaats in de eerste zes maanden en dit effect verdwijnt over de tijd. 
Wat betreft de competitieve effecten vinden we dat met name op de korte termijn 
concurrerende mailings van goede doelen elkaar lijken te complementeren, zodat 
concurrentie versterkend werkt. 
 Ten slotte gebruiken we ons model om inzicht te geven in de praktische 
relevantie van een aantal theoretische invloeden op donatiegedrag. Onze voornaamste 
bevindingen staven het idee van directmailingirritatie, wat wil zeggen dat te veel 
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verzoeken nadelig kunnen zijn voor de opbrengsten van een goed doel. Echter, kleine 
aantallen concurrerende mailings lijken een versterkende werking op de opbrengsten te 
hebben, wat suggereert dat deze mailings schuldgevoelens verhogen en daarmee de 
geefintentie. Verder blijkt er rechtvaardiging plaats te vinden, waarmee wordt bedoeld 
dat mensen die kortgeleden hebben gedoneerd zich gerechtvaardigd voelen om nu 
kleinere bedragen te doneren. Ten slotte geven mensen volgens zekere geefpatronen, wat 
wil zeggen dat sommige mensen af en toe een grote donatie doen, terwijl anderen 
regelmatig een klein bedrag geven. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 presenteren we een dynamisch model van donatiegedrag naar 
aanleiding van direct mailings van meerdere goede doelen, met schuldgevoel als 
voornaamste drijvende kracht. We richten ons op schuldgevoel aangezien dit een 
drijfveer van donatiegedrag is die kan worden gezien als een dynamisch concept. 
Schuldgevoel kan worden ervaren als een reactie op gedrag in het verleden en op 
toekomstige schuldgevoelens kan ook worden geanticipeerd. Daarbij kan schuldgevoel 
een gevolg van, maar ook een aanleiding tot gedrag zijn. 
 Aan de hand van de psychologische en donatieliteratuur ontwikkelen we een 
structureel model van donatiegedrag. We gaan uit van een individu’s voorraad 
schuldgevoel, die het totaal aan opgebouwde schuldgevoelens op een bepaald moment 
weergeeft. We nemen aan dat mensen een enkele voorraad schuldgevoel hebben en 
stellen voor dat deze voorraad doorgaans zal groeien als gevolg van een algemeen gevoel 
van morele verplichting en het ontvangen van mailings van goede doelen. Het model 
houdt ook rekening met andere, ongeobserveerde veranderingen in schuldgevoelens. 
Het maken van een donatie verlaagt de voorraad schuldgevoel, maar brengt zekere 
kosten met zich mee. De modelaannamen impliceren dat een donatie zal worden gedaan 
wanneer de voorraad schuldgevoel een voldoende hoog niveau bereikt, en de donatie zal 
hoger zijn naarmate het schuldniveau hoger is. Door doelgroepselectietechnieken sturen 
goede doelen meer mailings naar hun betere donateurs. Uitgaande van rationele 
verwachtingen, anticiperen individuen op de invloed van hun donatiebeslissing op het 
aantal mailings dat zij in de toekomst zullen ontvangen. Ze houden hier rekening mee 
wanneer zij hun donatiebeslissing nemen en plannen hun donaties optimaal. 
 We leiden individueel donatiegedrag af uit het oplossen van het bijbehorende 
stochastisch dynamisch programmeringsmodel. We schatten het model met behulp van 
een dataset met alle direct mailings van en donaties aan vijf goede doelen voor 5000 
individuen gedurende drie jaar. We introduceren heterogeniteit in de parameters door 
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een latenteklassenstructuur met twee segmenten op te leggen. Onze parameter-
schattingen suggereren dat er een groot segment bestaat van individuen die niet zo vaak 
doneren, maar wel grote bedragen, en dat er een kleiner segment bestaat van individuen 
die vaker kleinere bedragen doneren. Dit bevestigt het resultaat in hoofdstuk 2 waar we 
constateren dat mensen geven volgens zekere geefpatronen. Verder blijken sommige 
goede doelen meer schuldgevoel te veroorzaken dan andere, en zijn sommige goede 
doelen effectiever in het reduceren van schuldgevoel dan andere. We laten zien dat ons 
model van opbouw en verlichting van schuldgevoel vrij nauwkeurig overeenkomt met 
werkelijk gedrag. De voorspelde verdelingen van gedoneerde bedragen en van het aantal 
non-responsen tussen twee opeenvolgende responsen volgen de patronen in de data 
nauwgezet. Verschillen tussen goede doelen worden ook opvallend goed opgepikt. 
 Een belangrijke bijdrage is dat het structurele model het mogelijk maakt om 
beleidsexperimenten te doen. We tonen aan dat de mailingstrategieën kunnen worden 
verbeterd, waarbij twee gevallen in het bijzonder relevant zijn. De optimale 
mailingstrategie vanuit het oogpunt van de begunstigden verwerft meer fondsen, maar 
verlaagt het welzijn van de donateurs. Bij deze strategie dienen goede doelen die 
schuldgevoel opwekken hun mailfrequentie te verhogen aangezien individuen dan vaker 
zullen doneren om hun hoge schuldniveau te verlagen. De optimale mailingstrategie 
vanuit het oogpunt van de donateurs zorgt voor een beter gevoel voor de donateurs, 
maar lagere inkomsten voor de goede doelen. Bij deze strategie dienen goede doelen die 
geen schuldgevoel opwekken hun mailfrequentie te verhogen, aangezien dit zal leiden 
tot meer mogelijkheden tot vermindering van het schuldgevoel, zonder het te verhogen. 
De resultaten van de huidige mailingstrategieën van de goede doelen zitten ergens tussen 
de resultaten van de optimale strategieën uit beide oogpunten in, wat aangeeft dat de 
goede doelen met zowel de donateurs als de begunstigden rekening lijken te houden. 
 In hoofdstuk 4 bespreken we de analyse van het veldexperiment over direct 
mailings van goede doelen dat we hebben uitgevoerd. Om het effect van een mailing op 
andere mailings te bestuderen – zowel op toekomstige mailings van dezelfde organisatie 
als op mailings van concurrerende organisaties – hebben we individuele data van direct 
mailings en donaties van meerdere goede doelen over de tijd nodig. Echter, vanwege 
doelgroepselectie door de goede doelen zijn de observaties in hun databases endogeen. In 
plaats van dit probleem op te lossen door middel van ingewikkelde econometrische 
modelleringstechnieken zoals we doen in deel I van dit proefschrift, zetten we in dit 
hoofdstuk een veldexperiment op om nieuwe data te creëren die geen last hebben van 
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endogeniteit. Dat wil zeggen, we brengen exogene variatie aan in het aantal mailings dat 
7666 individuen ontvangen van vijf goede doelen in een enkele week. Vervolgens 
verzamelen we informatie over daadwerkelijk gemaakte donaties in reactie op de 
experimentele mailings, alsmede de responsen op vervolgmailings die worden verzonden 
door de goede doelen. Op deze manier kunnen we via relatief simpele analyses 
betrouwbare en onvertekende conclusies trekken over de competitieve effecten van 
direct mailings van goede doelen over de tijd. 
 Onze resultaten laten zien dat zowel de responskans als het gedoneerde bedrag 
op een mailing negatief wordt beïnvloed door concurrerende mailings die ongeveer 
gelijktijdig worden ontvangen. Elke concurrerende mailing verlaagt de netto-opbrengst 
zelfs met meer dan 5%. Dus, concurrerende mailings die gelijktijdig worden verzonden, 
schaden de inkomsten op een mailing van een goed doel, en hoe meer concurrerende 
mailings worden verstuurd, hoe lager de opbrengsten voor het goede doel. Op de korte 
termijn vinden we significant negatieve effecten van de experimentele mailing van 
dezelfde organisatie op zowel respons als bedrag. Het sturen van een extra mailing 
bovenop de huidige mailstrategie van een goed doel kannibaliseert dus de toekomstige 
opbrengsten van dat goede doel. De extra mailing verlaagt de netto-opbrengst van de 
volgende mailing zelfs met bijna 19%. Op de lange termijn treedt nog meer 
kannibalisatie op. De effecten van concurrerende experimentele mailings op respons en 
bedrag zijn echter zowel op de korte als de lange termijn niet significant. Dus, hoewel 
concurrerende mailings die gelijktijdig worden verzonden de respons op een mailing van 
een goed doel verlagen, zet dit effect niet door over de tijd. 
 Een ander resultaat is dat de netto-opbrengst van een extra mailing, waarbij 
rekening wordt gehouden met concurrentie en kannibalisatie, de druk- en portokosten 
maar net dekken in het huidige mailklimaat. Het netto-effect van een extra mailing voor 
individuen die reeds veel mailings ontvangen blijkt aanzienlijk, maar het netto-effect 
voor individuen die weinig mailings ontvangen is, hoewel niet significant, zelfs negatief. 
Het lijkt er dus op dat goede doelen geen extra mailings moeten sturen naar individuen 
die niet al veel mailings ontvingen, terwijl het voor de individuen die van de goede 
doelen nu al vaak mailings krijgen, de moeite waard zou zijn om de maildruk nog iets te 
verhogen. 
 Een laatste belangrijke bevinding is dat goede doelen desastreuze mail-
beslissingen zouden kunnen nemen wanneer zij de endogeniteit van de directmailing-
observaties in hun databases zouden negeren. Wanneer het netto-effect van een extra 
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mailing wordt geanalyseerd puur op basis van endogene mailings wordt het effect ernstig 
overschat. Wanneer goede doelen de endogeniteit zouden negeren, zouden zij dus 
gemakkelijk kunnen besluiten om de maildruk sterk te verhogen, terwijl de werkelijke 
netto-opbrengsten van een extra mailing de druk- en portokosten maar net 
compenseren. 
 Al met al wijzen onze resultaten uit dat geefgedrag moet worden bestudeerd als 
een alomvattend proces, dat verder reikt dan een stel herhaalde eenmalige beslissingen. 
We beschouwen onze resultaten als een uitgangspunt om na te denken over hun 
implicaties voor de ontwikkeling van geefgedragtheorieën. We bespreken een 
uitbreiding naar een meervoudige beslissingscontext van de bekende warm glow-theorie, 
die vaak gebruikt wordt om geefgedrag te rationaliseren. We beargumenteren dat men 
observaties van mailings en donaties voor meerdere goede doelen nodig heeft om een 
onderscheid te kunnen maken tussen een warmglowtheorie en bijvoorbeeld een theorie 
van morele verplichting. Onze resultaten, die voortkomen uit zulke data, ondersteunen 
deze laatste theorie. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 combineren we de data van ons veldexperiment met een 
enquête waarin we irritatie meten, om zo het onderliggende motivatieproces van 
doneren naar aanleiding van direct mailings te bestuderen. Aangezien de mailfrequentie 
van goede doelen alsmaar stijgt, zouden potentiële donateurs overweldigd kunnen 
worden door zoveel mailings van zoveel goede doelen. Een hoge frequentie van 
ongewenste blootstelling kan irritatie veroorzaken, wat vervolgens gedrag kan 
beïnvloeden, bijvoorbeeld door donaties te verlagen. Hoewel de bestaande literatuur 
bewijs levert voor irritatie naar aanleiding van direct mail van goede doelen en serieuze 
gevolgen voor de effectiviteit van de direct mailings suggereert, heeft geen enkele studie 
directmailirritatie gekoppeld aan werkelijk donatiegedrag, zoals wij in dit hoofdstuk 
doen. 
 We creëren een unieke dataset door data uit drie verschillende bronnen te 
combineren. Elk van de drie bronnen richt zich op een specifiek probleem dat inherent 
is aan dit type studie en dit onderwerp. Ten eerste gebruiken we, om een vertekening 
door sociaal wenselijke antwoorden – een veelvoorkomend probleem bij het meten van 
sociaal gedrag zoals doneren aan goede doelen – te voorkomen, objectieve gedragsdata 
over werkelijke donatieniveaus uit de databases van vijf goede doelen. Ten tweede 
zorgen we, met het oog op potentiële endogeniteitskwesties, voor exogeen bepaalde 
variatie in het aantal mailings dat de individuen ontvangen, door middel van het 
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veldexperiment dat hierboven is beschreven. Ten derde gebruiken we een enquête om 
het subjectieve construct ‘ irritatie’ te meten, aangezien dit niet objectief kan worden 
gemeten met gedragsdata. In deze enquête meten we ook gerapporteerd donatiegedrag 
om mogelijke verschillen met werkelijk donatiegedrag vast te kunnen stellen. 
Samenvattend bevat onze dataset observaties van directmailfrequenties van goede 
doelen, irritatie, en zowel gerapporteerd als werkelijk donatiegedrag voor 1020 
individuen. 
 De analyse van deze dataset toont allereerst aan dat direct mailings van goede 
doelen inderdaad irritatie veroorzaken. Dat wil zeggen, hoe meer mailings iemand 
ontvangt, hoe hoger zijn irritatieniveau is. Verrassend genoeg vinden we geen 
significante effecten van irritatie op donatiegedrag en we vinden dus geen aanwijzingen 
dat irritatie donaties verlaagt. Hoewel mensen zeer geërgerd zijn door de hoge 
mailfrequenties van goede doelen, beïnvloedt dit hun donatiegedrag niet. Donatiegedrag 
lijkt voornamelijk te worden bepaald door attitudefactoren zoals vrijgevigheid, en wordt 
niet beïnvloed door irritatiegevoelens. Tegen de verwachtingen in blijken de resultaten 
voor gerapporteerd en werkelijk gedrag nauwelijks te verschillen. Sociaal wenselijke 
antwoorden lijken de conclusies in onze studie dus niet te vertekenen. 
 Een belangrijk inzicht uit dit hoofdstuk is dat irritatie geen centrale emotionele 
drijfveer is bij de reactie op direct mailings van goede doelen. Het is goed denkbaar dat 
mailings van goede doelen gevoelens van schuld en sociale verantwoordelijkheid 
opwekken die sterker zijn dan irritatie. Daarbij komt dat donateurs de uiteindelijke 
begunstigden van het geld dat zij doneren het vervelende gedrag van het goede doel niet 
kunnen verwijten. Hoewel ze wellicht het goede doel willen bestraffen, willen ze niet dat 
de begunstigden hieronder lijden. 
 
Conclusies 
Dit proefschrift komt voort uit een wetenschappelijke en een maatschappelijke 
motivatie. Hieronder beschrijven wij de voornaamste conclusies, implicaties en 
suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek vanuit beide oogpunten.  
 Wetenschappelijk gezien is het doel van dit proeschrift een gat te vullen in de 
directmailing- en de geefgedragsliteratuur, die beide dynamische en competitieve 
effecten in het algemeen genegeerd hebben. Alle vier de hoofdstukken tonen aan dat er 
wel degelijk substantiële dynamische en competitieve effecten van mailings van goede 
doelen bestaan. De respons op een direct mailing nu wordt beïnvloed door mailings in 
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het verleden van het zelfde goede doel, en ook door direct mailings van concurrerende 
goede doelen. Direct mailings van goede doelen kunnen dus niet als onafhankelijk 
beschouwd worden en donatiegedrag in reactie op direct mailings moet worden 
bestudeerd als een doorlopend proces en niet als opzichzelfstaande beslissingen.  
 Deze bevinding opent natuurlijk oneindig veel richtingen voor 
vervolgonderzoek, zowel voor studies naar direct mail van goede doelen als voor studies 
naar direct mail in het algemeen. Bestaande kennis van geefgedrag en direct mail moet 
opnieuw worden geëvalueerd in het licht van deze inzichten. Bestaande directmail-
responsmodellen kunnen bijvoorbeeld worden uitgebreid met dynamische en 
competitieve effecten en bekende drijfveren van geefgedrag kunnen worden 
heroverwogen in een meervoudige beslissingscontext.  
 Ook het uitbreiden van de studies in dit proefschrift zou bijdragen aan een 
verder begrip van dynamische en competitieve effecten. Hoewel onze studies zich 
bijvoorbeeld richten op een donatiecontext, vermoeden we dat dit soort effecten ook 
bestaan voor andere soorten mailings, zoals catalogi en reclameacties. Het zou 
interessant zijn om te onderzoeken welke rol dynamiek en concurrentie spelen in 
verschillende contexten, en om mogelijke verschillen met de donatiecontext vast te 
stellen. Hiertoe zou men verschillende methoden die zijn beschreven in dit proefschrift 
kunnen toepassen, zoals het directmailingresponsmodel uit hoofdstuk 2. 
 Daarnaast bevatten onze data niet alle concurrentie. Een interessante 
uitbreiding zou zijn om meer goede doelen bij het onderzoek te betrekken en patronen 
tussen verschillende soorten goede doelen te onderzoeken. Voorbeelden van vragen die 
zouden kunnen worden beantwoord zijn: Is concurrentie sterker tussen goede doelen in 
dezelfde sector dan tussen goede doelen in verschillende sectoren? Spreiden donateurs 
hun donaties over meerdere sectoren of over meerdere goede doelen binnen een sector? 
 Ten slotte kan ons veldexperiment op meerdere fronten worden uitgebreid en 
verfijnd. Men kan denken aan het aantal goede doelen betrokken bij het experiment, 
variatie in de timing van de experimentele mailings en variatie in de inhoud van de 
experimentele mailings. Wij beschouwen ons experiment als een prima startpunt om 
vele nieuwe inzichten te inspireren.  
 Naast de twee wetenschappelijke hoofdthema’s van dit proefschrift werpen we 
ook enig licht op de endogeniteitskwestie die voortvloeit uit de doelgroepselectie-
procedures die worden toegepast door goede doelen. In verschillende gevallen stellen we 
empirisch vast dat goede doelen inderdaad doelgroepselectie toepassen en dat de 
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directmailobservaties daardoor endogeen zijn. Daarnaast illustreren we de vertekening 
die het gevolg is van deze endogeniteit wanneer deze wordt genegeerd, en betogen we dat 
het negeren van endogeniteit in sommige gevallen zelfs kan leiden tot tegengestelde 
conclusies. Om dus nauwkeurige en betrouwbare resultaten te verkrijgen wanneer men 
de effecten van direct mailings van goede doelen bestudeert – of overigens van elke 
organisatie die aan doelgroepselectie doet – moet men een manier vinden om de 
endogeniteitskwestie op te lossen. Dit kan worden bereikt via econometrische 
technieken, waarvan we twee voorbeelden beschrijven in deel I van dit proefschrift, of 
door exogene variatie te creëren in de variabele waar het om draait, bijvoorbeeld door 
middel van een experiment, zoals wij doen in deel II van dit proefschrift. Aangezien er 
niet veel onderzoek is gedaan naar correctiemechanismen voor de vertekening door 
endogeniteit, levert deze kwestie verdere mogelijkheden voor vervolgonderzoek.  
 Het tweede deel van de motivatie voor dit proefschrift is van maatschappelijke 
aard en komt voort uit de tegenwoordig steeds vaker opduikende frustraties en klachten 
over direct mail van goede doelen. Het doel is om te bestuderen of de huidige meningen 
van de maatschappij zich daadwerkelijk vertalen naar donatiegedrag en om aan goede 
doelen maatschappelijk relevante inzichten te verschaffen die als richtlijn kunnen 
dienen voor hun mailstrategieën en die hun inkomsten kunnen helpen verhogen.  
 In dit licht is de belangrijkste conclusie van dit proefschrift dat goede doelen 
meer moeten mailen om hun inkomsten te verhogen. De resultaten van alle vier de 
hoofdstukken wijzen uit dat hogere mailfrequenties de opbrengsten zullen verhogen, 
zelfs op de lange termijn. Een extra mailing zal de toekomstige opbrengsten voor 
hetzelfde goede doel kannibaliseren, maar het netto-effect zal nog steeds positief zijn, 
hoewel dit alleen geldt voor mensen die reeds veel mailings ontvangen en niet voor alle 
donateurs. Concurrerende mailings mogen dan een negatief effect hebben wanneer ze 
gelijktijdig worden verstuurd, over de tijd lijken ze een aanvullend effect te hebben. 
Nederlandse goede doelen hebben de grens dus nog niet bereikt en er is nog steeds 
ruimte om meer mailings te sturen en meer fondsen te werven. Een hint voor dit 
resultaat wordt ook al verschaft door de situatie in de VS, waar de mailfrequenties vele 
malen hoger zijn dan in Nederland en goede doelen nog steeds enorme bedragen werven. 
Vervolgonderzoek zou de grenzen van het mailgedrag van goede doelen verder kunnen 
verkennen en onderzoeken wanneer donaties daadwerkelijk zouden beginnen te dalen.  
 Dit proefschrift laat zien dat donateurs weliswaar geïrriteerd raken, maar dat 
hun irritatie niet tot uiting komt in hun donatiegedrag. Volgens ons komt de meest 
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plausibele verklaring hiervoor voort uit het feit dat het goede doel dient als intermediair 
voor de overdracht van fondsen van de donateurs naar de uiteindelijke begunstigden. 
Zoals al eerder gezegd, donateurs willen de goede doelen misschien wel bestraffen voor 
de stortvloed aan verzoeken, maar uiteindelijk wint hun wil om de begunstigden te 
helpen het van hun wil om de goede doelen te bestraffen. 
 Uiteraard zou het voor goede doelen nog steeds verstandig zijn om te proberen 
irritatie onder potentiële donateurs in te dammen. In plaats van hun mailstrategieën aan 
te passen zouden er echter andere manieren kunnen zijn om dit te bereiken. Er kan 
bijvoorbeeld worden geëxperimenteerd met de inhoud van de mailings en de 
nieuwsbrieven, en goede doelen kunnen proberen het vertrouwen te herstellen door 
beter te communiceren waar het gedoneerde geld precies aan wordt uitgegeven.  
Vervolgonderzoek kan bestuderen welke factoren de attitude van donateurs 
beïnvloeden, om zo goede doelen te helpen de negatieve meningen te verbeteren en een 
vruchtbare relatie met hun donateurs te behouden.  
176
 
 
177
 
169 
 
References 
 
 
 
 
 
Aaker, David A. and Donald E. Bruzzone (1985), “Causes of Irritation in Advertising”, 
Journal of Marketing, 49 (2), 47-57. 
 
Abdy, Meg and Jean Barclay (2001), “Marketing Collaborations in the Voluntary 
Sector”, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 6 (3), 
215-230. 
 
Akaah, Ishmael P., Pradeep K. Korgaonkar and Daulatram Lund (1995), “Direct 
Marketing Attitudes”, Journal of Business Research, 34 (3), 211-219. 
 
Amemiya, Takeshi (1985), Advanced Econometrics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Andreoni, James (1990), “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public goods: A Theory 
of Warm-glow Giving”, The Economic Journal, 100 (401), 464-477. 
 
Andreoni, James (1998), “Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 106 (6), 1186-1213. 
 
Andreoni, James (2006), “Philanthropy”, in Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and 
Altruism, S-C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds., Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1201-1269. 
 
Andreoni, James and A. Abigail Payne (2003), “Do Government Grants to Private 
Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?” American Economic Review, 93 (3), 
792-812. 
178
References 
 
170 
Ansari, Asim, Carl F. Mela and Scott A. Neslin (2008), “Customer Channel Migration”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 45 (1), 60-76. 
 
Ausubel, David P. (1955), “Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing 
Process”, Psychological Review, 62 (5), 378-390. 
 
Bardsley, Nicholas (2005), “Experimental Economics and the Artificiality of 
Alteration”, Journal of Economic Methodology, 12 (2), 239-251. 
 
Basil, Debra Z., Nancy M. Ridgway and Michael D. Basil (2008), “Guilt and Giving: A 
Process Model of Empathy and Efficacy”, Psychology and Marketing, 25 (1), 1-23. 
 
Baumeister, Roy F., Arlene M. Stillwell and Todd F. Heatherton (1994), “Guilt: An 
Interpersonal Approach”, Psychological Bulletin, 115 (2), 243-267. 
 
Bekkers, René and Olaf Crutzen (2007), “Just Keep it Simple: A Field Experiment on 
Fundraising Letters”, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Marketing, 12 (4), 371-378. 
 
Bekkers, René and Theo N.M. Schuyt (2008), “And who is your neighbor? Explaining 
the effect of religion on charitable giving and volunteering”, Review of Religious 
Research, forthcoming. 
 
Bendapudi, Neeli, Surendra N. Singh and Venkat Bendapudi (1996), “Enhancing 
Helping Behavior: An Integrative Framework for Promotion Planning”, Journal of 
Marketing, 60 (3), 33-49. 
 
Bennett, Roger (2003), “Factors Underlying the Inclination to Donate to Particular 
Types of Charity”, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Marketing, 8 (1), 12-29. 
 
Benz, Matthias and Stephan Meier (2006), “Do People Behave in Experiments as in the 
Field? – Evidence from Donations”, Working Paper No. 248, Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
179
References 
 
 171 
Bruce, Ian (1995), “Do Not-for-profits Value Their Customers and Their Needs?”, 
International Marketing Review, 12 (4), 77-84. 
 
Bult, Jan R. and Tom Wansbeek (1995), “Optimal Selection for Direct Mail”, 
Marketing Science, 14 (4), 378-394. 
 
Burnett, Melissa S. and Dale A. Lunsford (1994), “Conceptualizing Guilt in the 
Consumer Decision-making Process”, Journal of Consumer Marketing, 11 (3), 33-
43. 
 
Burt, Christopher D.B. and Jennifer S. Popple (1998), “Memorial distortions in 
donation data”, Journal of Social Psychology, 138 (6), 724-733. 
 
Campbell, Deb, Randy Erdahl, Doug Johnson, Eric Bibelnieks, Michael Haydock, Mark 
Bullock and Harlan Crowder (2001), “Optimizing Customer Mail Streams at 
Fingerhut”, Interfaces, 31 (1), 77-90. 
 
Chib, Siddhartha and Edward Greenberg (1995), “Understanding the Metropolis-
Hastings Algorithm”, American Statistician, 49 (4), 327-335. 
 
Clarke, Darral G. (1976), “Econometric Measurement of the Duration of Advertising 
Effect on Sales”, Journal of Marketing Research, 13 (4), 345-357. 
 
Colombo, Richard and Weina Jiang (1999), “A Stochastic RFM Model”, Journal of 
Interactive Marketing, 13 (3), 2-12. 
 
Dahl, Darren W., Heather Honea and Rajesh V. Manchanda (2003), “The Nature of 
Self-Reported Guilt in Consumption Contexts”, Marketing Letters, 14 (3), 159-
171. 
 
Dahl, Darren W., Heather Honea and Rajesh V. Manchanda (2005), “Three Rs of 
Interpersonal Consumer Guilt: Relationship, Reciprocity, Reparation”, Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 15 (4), 307-315. 
180
References 
 
172 
Danaher, Peter J., André Bonfrer and Sanjay Dhar (2008), “The Effect of Competitive 
Advertising Interference on Sales for Packaged Goods”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 45 (2), 211-225. 
 
Darlington, Richard B. and Clifford E. Macker (1966), “Displacement of Guilt-
produced Altruistic Behavior”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (4), 
442-443. 
 
Diamond, William D. and Sara Gooding-Williams (2002), “Using Advertising 
Constructs and Methods to Understand Direct Mail Fundraising Appeals”, 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12 (3), 225-242. 
 
Diamond, William D. and Stephanie M. Noble (2001), “Defensive Responses to 
Charitable Direct Mail Solicitations”, Journal of Interactive Marketing, 15 (3), 2-
12. 
 
Direct Marketing Association (2007), DMA 2007 Statistical Fact Book: The Definitive 
Source for Direct Marketing Benchmarks, New York: Direct Marketing 
Association. 
 
Donkers, Bas, Richard Paap, Jedid-Jah Jonker and Philip Hans Franses (2006), 
“Deriving Target Selection Rules from Endogenously Selected Samples”, Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, 21(5), 549-562. 
 
D’Souza, Giles and Ram C. Rao (1995), “Can Repeating an Advertisement More 
Frequently than the Competition Affect Brand Preference in a Mature Market”, 
Journal of Marketing, 59 (2), 32-42. 
 
Dutch consumers’ association (2005), “Moderne Liefdadigheid Irriteert Gevers”, 
Consumentengids, December, 28-31. 
 
Dwyer, F. Robert (1997), “Customer Lifetime Valuation to Support Marketing 
Decision Making”, Journal of Direct Marketing, 11 (4), 6-13. 
181
References 
 
 173 
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip J. Grossman (2006), “Subsidizing Charitable 
Contributions: A Field Test Comparing Matching and Rebate 
Subsidies,” Working Paper, Virginia Tech. 
 
Eckel, Catherine C., Philip J. Grossman and Rachel M. Johnston (2005), “An 
Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis”, Journal of Public Economics, 
89 (8), 1543-1560. 
 
Elliott, Michael T. and Paul S. Speck (1998), “Consumer Perceptions of Advertising 
Clutter and Its Impact across Various Media”, Journal of Advertising Research, 38 
(1), 29-41. 
 
Elsner, Ralf, Manfred Krafft and Arnd Huchzermeier (2004), “The 2003 ISMS Practice 
Prize Winner – Optimizing Rhenania’s Direct Marketing Business Through 
Dynamic Multilevel Modeling (DMLM) in a Multicatalog-Brand Environment”, 
Marketing Science, 23 (2), 192-206. 
 
Falk, Armin (2007), “Gift Exchange in the Field”, Econometrica, 75 (5), 1501-1511. 
 
Fishbein, Martin and Icek Ajzen (1975), Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An 
Introduction to Theory and Research, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Fok, Dennis, Csilla Horváth, Richard Paap and Philip Hans Franses (2006), “A 
Hierarchical Bayes Error Correction Model to Explain Dynamic Effects of Price 
Changes”, Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (3), 443-461. 
 
Francis, Nick and Neville Holland (1999), “The Diary of a Charity Donor: an 
Exploration of Research Information from the Royal Mail Consumer Panel and 
Mail Characteristics Survey”, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Marketing, 4 (3), 217-223. 
 
Frey, Bruno S. and Stephan Meier (2004a), “Pro-Social Behavior in a Natural Setting”, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 54 (1), 65-88. 
 
182
References 
 
174 
Frey, Bruno S. and Stephan Meier (2004b), “Social Comparisons and Pro-social 
Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment”, American 
Economic Review, 94 (5), 1717-1722. 
 
Geman, Stuart and Donald Geman (1984), “Stochastic Relaxations, Gibbs 
Distributions, and the Bayesian Restoration of Images”, IEEE Transaction on 
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 6 (6), 721-741. 
 
Giving USA (2007), “U.S. charitable giving reaches $295.02 billion in 2006”, press 
releases, http://www.aafrc.org/press_releases/gusa/20070625.pdf. 
 
Gönül, Füsun F. and Meng Ze Shi (1998), “Optimal Mailing of Catalogs: A New 
Methodology Using Estimable Structural Dynamic Programming Models”, 
Management Science, 44 (9), 1249-1262. 
 
Gönül, Füsun F. and Frenkel Ter Hofstede (2006), “How to Compute Optimal Catalog 
Mailing Decisions”, Marketing Science, 25 (1), 65-74. 
 
Greyser, Stephen A. (1973), “Irritation in Advertising”, Journal of Advertising Research, 
13 (1), 3-10. 
 
Guy, Bonnie S. and Wesley E. Patton (1989), “The Marketing of Altruistic Causes: 
Understanding Why People Help”, Journal of Consumer Marketing, 6 (1), 19-30. 
 
Haggberg, Maggie (1992), “Why Donors Give”, Fund Raising Management, 23 (2), 39-
40. 
 
Harrison, Glenn W. and John. A. List (2004), “Field Experiments”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 42 (4), 1009-1055. 
 
Heckman, James J. (1981), “The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of 
Initial Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time, Discrete Data Stochastic 
Process”, in Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, C. 
Manski and D. McFadden (Eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press. 
183
References 
 
 175 
Hibbert, Sally, Andrew Smith, Andrea Davies and Fiona Ireland (2007), “Guilt 
Appeals: Persuasion Knowledge and Charitable Giving”, Psychology and 
Marketing, 24 (8), 723-742. 
 
Hobert, James P. and George Casella (1996), “The Effect of Improper Priors on Gibbs 
Sampling in Hierarchical Linear Mixed Models”, Journal of American Statistical 
Association, 91 (436), 1461-1473. 
 
Huhmann, Bruce A. and Timothy P. Brotherton (1997), “A Content Analysis of Guilt 
Appeals in Popular Magazine Advertisements”, Journal of Advertising, 26 (2), 35-
45. 
 
Izard, Carroll E. (1977), Human Emotions, New York: Plenum. 
 
Jedidi, Kamel, Carl F. Mela and Sunil Gupta (1999). “Managing Advertising and 
Promotion for Long-Run Profitability”, Marketing Science, 18 (1), 1-22. 
 
Jewell, Robert D. and H. Rao Unnava (2003), “When Competitive Interference can be 
Beneficial”, Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (2), 283-291. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Jack L. Knetsch (1992), “Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase 
of Moral Satisfaction”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22 
(1), 57-70. 
 
Karlan, Dean and John A. List (2007), “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? 
Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment”, American Economic 
Review, 97 (5), 1774-1793. 
 
Keller, Kevin L. (1991), “Memory and Evaluation Effects in Competitive Advertising 
Environments,” Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (4), 463-476. 
 
Kestnbaum, Robert D., Kate T. Kestnbaum and Pamela W. Ames (1998), “Building a 
Longitudinal Contact Strategy”, Journal of Interactive Marketing, 12 (1), 56-62. 
 
184
References 
 
176 
Khan, Uzma and Ravi Dhar (2006), “Licensing Effect in Consumer Choice”, Journal of 
Marketing Research, 43 (2), 259-266. 
 
Konow, James (2006), “Mixed Feelings: Theories and Evidence of Warm Glow and 
Altruism”, Working Paper, Loyola Marymount University. 
 
Korgaonkar, Pradeep K., Eric J. Karson and Ishmael P. Akaah (1997), “Direct 
Marketing Advertising: The Assents, the Dissents, and the Ambivalents”, Journal 
of Advertising Research, 37 (5), 41-55. 
 
Krebs, Dennis L. (1970), “Altruism – An Examination of the Concept and a Review of 
the Literature”, Psychological Bulletin, 73 (4), 258-302. 
 
Landry, Craig, Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price and Nicholas G. Rupp 
(2006), “Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a 
Field Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2), 747-782. 
 
Lascu, Dana-Nicoleta. (1991), “Consumer Guilt: Examining the Potential of a New 
Marketing Construct”, Advances in Consumer Research, 18 (1), 290-293. 
 
Leeflang, Peter S.H., Dick R. Wittink, Michel Wedel and Philippe A. Naert (2000), 
Building Models for Marketing Decisions, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List (2007), “What Do Laboratory experiments 
Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 21 (2), 153-174. 
 
Lindsey, Lisa L.M. (2005), “Anticipated Guilt as a Behavioral Motivation – An 
Examination of Appeals to Help Unknown Others through Bone Marrow 
Donation”, Human Communication Research, 31 (4), 453-481. 
 
List, John A. (2007), “Field Experiments: A Bridge Between Lab and Naturally-
Occurring Data”, Working Paper No. 12992, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
185
References 
 
 177 
List, John A. and David Lucking-Reiley (2002), “The Effects of Seed Money and 
Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital 
Campaign”, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (1), 215-233. 
 
List, John A. and David Reiley (2008), “Field Experiments”, “The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics”, Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
List, John A. and Daniel Rondeau (2003), “The Impact of Challenge Gifts on 
Charitable Giving: An Experimental Investigation”, Economics Letters, 79 (2), 
153-159. 
 
Liu, Wendy and Jennifer L. Aaker (2008), “The Happiness of Giving: The Time-Ask 
Effect”, Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming. 
 
Manchanda, Puneet, Peter E. Rossi and Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2004), “Response 
Modeling with Nonrandom Marketing-mix Variables”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 41 (4), 467-478. 
 
Mazar, Nina, On Amir and Dan Ariely (2007), “The Dishonesty of Honest People: A 
Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance”, working paper. 
 
McCulloch, Robert E., Nicholas G. Polson and Peter E. Rossi (2000), “A Bayesian 
Analysis of the Multinomial Probit Model with Fully Identified Parameters”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 99 (1), 173-193. 
 
Meier, Stephan (2007), “Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? 
Matching Donations in a Field Experiment”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 5 (6), 1203-1222. 
 
Meier, Stephan and Bruno S. Frey (2004), “Matching Donations: Subsidizing 
Charitable Giving in a Field Experiment”, Working Paper No. 181, Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
 
186
References 
 
178 
Monin, Benoit and Dale T. Miller (2001), “Moral Credentials and the Expression of 
Prejudice”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81 (1), 33-43. 
 
Naik, Prasad A., Murali K. Mantrala and Alan G. Sawyer (1998), “Planning Media 
Schedules in the Presence of Dynamic Advertising Quality”, Marketing Science, 17 
(3), 214-235. 
 
Naik, Prasad A. and Nanda Piersma (2002), “Understanding the Role of Marketing 
Communications in Direct Marketing”, Econometric Institute Report EI 2002-
13, Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
 
Naik, Prasad A., Kalyan Raman and Russell S. Winer (2005), “Planning Marketing-Mix 
Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects”, Marketing Science, 24 (1), 25-34. 
 
NFP Synergy (2004), “Disgusted or Delighted: What Does the Concern the  
Public About Charities?”, http://www.nfpsynergy.net/reportdownload.php?pdf= 
Disgusted or delighted March 2004.pdf 
 
O’Keefe, Daniel J. and Marianne Figgé (1997), “A Guilt-based Explanation of the Door-
in-the-face Influence Strategy”, Human Communication Research, 24 (1), 64-81. 
 
Onze Wereld (2008), “Doet U Genoeg Voor Een Betere Wereld?”, Onze Wereld, 2, 8-
10, http://www.onzewereld.nl/index.php?page=3&articleId=596. 
 
Pauwels, Koen, Dominique M. Hanssens and S. Siddarth (2002), “The Long-Term 
Effects of Price Promotions on Category Incidence, Brand Choice, and Purchase 
Quantity,” Journal of Marketing Research, 39 (4), 421-449. 
 
Piersma, Nanda and Jedid-Jah Jonker (2004), “Determining the Optimal Direct 
Mailing Frequency”, European Journal of Operational Research, 158 (1), 173-182. 
 
Podsakoff, Philip M. and Dennis W. Organ (1986), “Self-Reports in Organizational 
Research: Problems and Prospects”, Journal of Management, 12 (4), 531-544. 
 
187
References 
 
 179 
Prins, Remco and Peter C. Verhoef (2007), “Marketing Communication Drivers of 
Adoption Timing of a New E-Service among Existing Customers”, Journal of 
Marketing, 71 (2), 169-183. 
 
Rawlings, Edna I. (1970), “Reactive Guilt and Anticipatory Guilt in Altruistic 
Behavior”, in Altruism and Helping Behavior, Macaulay, J.R. and Berkowitz, L. 
(Eds), New York, NY: Academic Press, 163-177. 
 
Regan, Judith W. (1971), “Guilt, Perceived Injustice, and Altruistic Behavior”, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 18 (1), 124-132. 
 
Richins, Marsha L. (1997), “Measuring Emotions in the Consumption Experience”, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (2), 127-146. 
 
Rondeau, Daniel and John A. List (2008), “Matching and Challenge Gifts to Charity: 
Evidence from Laboratory and Natural Field Experiments”, Working Paper No. 
13728, National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1982), “Charitable Giving and “Excessive” Fundraising”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92 (2), 193-212. 
 
Rossi, Peter E., Robert E. McCulloch and Greg M. Allenby (1996), “The Value of 
Purchase History Data in Target Marketing”, Marketing Science, 15 (4), 321-340. 
 
Rothschild, Michael L. (1979), “Marketing Communications in Nonbusiness Situations 
or Why It’s So Hard to Sell Brotherhood Like Soap”, Journal of Marketing, 43 (2), 
11-20. 
 
Sargeant, Adrian (1999), “Charitable Giving: Towards a Model of Donor Behaviour”, 
Journal of Marketing Management, 15 (4), 215-238. 
 
Sargeant, Adrian and Jürgen Kähler (1999), “Returns on Fundraising Expenditures in 
the Voluntary Sector”, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10 (1), 5-19. 
 
188
References 
 
180 
Shang, Jen and Rachel T.A. Croson (2008), “Field Experiments in Charitable 
Contribution: The Impact of Social Influence on the Voluntary Provision of 
Public Goods”, Economic Journal, under review. 
 
Shapiro, Benson P. (1973), “Marketing for Nonprofit Organizations”, Harvard Business 
Review, 51 (5), 123-132. 
 
Simester, Duncan I., Yu Hu, Erik Brynjolfsson and Eric T. Anderson (2007), 
“Dynamics of Retail Advertising: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, Economic 
Inquiry, forthcoming. 
 
Simester, Duncan I., Peng Sun and John N. Tsitsiklis (2006), “Dynamic Catalog 
Mailing Policies", Management Science, 52 (5), 683-696. 
 
Smith, Gerald E. and Paul D. Berger (1996), “The Impact of Direct Marketing Appeals 
on Charitable Marketing Effectiveness”, Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 24 (3), 219-232. 
 
Speck, Paul Surgi and Michael T. Elliott (1997), “Predictors of Advertising Avoidance 
in Print and Broadcast Media”, Journal of Advertising, 26 (3), 61-76. 
 
Stafford, Marla Royne, Eric M. Lippold and C. Todd Sherron (2003), “The 
Contribution of Direct Mail Advertising to Average Weekly Unit Sales”, Journal 
of Advertising Research, 43 (2), 172-179. 
 
Tangney, June P., Jeff Stuewig and Debra J. Mashek (2007), “Moral Emotions and 
Moral Behavior”, Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345-372. 
 
Tanner, Martin A. and Wing Hung Wong (1987), “The Calculation of Posterior 
Distributions by Data Augmentation”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 82 (398), 528-549. 
 
Thaler, Richard (1985), “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice”, Marketing 
Science, 4 (3), 199-214. 
189
References 
 
 181 
TNS NIPO (2003), “Goede Doelen Doen Goed Werk! Zolang Ze Mij Maar Niet Lastig 
vallen”, TNS NIPO Publications, http://www.tns-nipo.com/pages/nieuws-pers-
vnipo.asp?file=persvannipo\goededoelen03.htm. 
 
Train, Kenneth (2003), Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Unnava, H. Rao and Deepak Sirdeshmukh (1994), “Reducing Competitive Ad 
Interference”, Journal of Marketing Research, 31 (3), 403-411. 
 
Van Diepen, Merel, Bas Donkers and Philip Hans Franses (2008a), “Dynamic and 
Competitive Effects of Direct Mailings: A Charitable Giving Application”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming. 
 
Van Diepen, Merel, Bas Donkers and Philip Hans Franses (2008b), “Does Irritation 
Induced by Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations?”, ERIM Report ERS-
2008-036-MKT, Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12704. 
 
Verhoef, Peter C., Penny N. Spring, Janny C. Hoekstra and Peter S.H. Leeflang (2003), 
“The Commercial Use of Segmentation and Predictive Modeling Techniques for 
Database Marketing in the Netherlands”, Decision Support Systems, 34 (4), 471-
481. 
 
Yoo, Boonghee and Rujirutana Mandhachitara (2003), “Estimating Advertising Effects 
on Sales in a Competitive Setting”, Journal of Advertising Research, 43 (3), 310-
321. 
 
Zajonc, Robert B. (1968), “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure”, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 9 (Supp. 2 Pt. 2), 1-27. 
 
Zielske, Hubert A. (1959), “The Remembering and Forgetting of Advertising”, Journal 
of Marketing, 23 (3), 239-243. 
190
 
 
191
 
183 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
 
Merel van Diepen (1981) obtained her master’s degree in 
econometrics with honors from the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
in December 2003. In January 2004 she started her PhD research in 
the fields of marketing and econometrics at the Erasmus Research 
Institute of Management. Her main research interests are 
econometric models in marketing and charitable giving. She 
presented her research at various international conferences and part 
of her work will be published in the Journal of Marketing Research.  
192
 
 
 
193
 
 
 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT  (ERIM) 
 
ERIM PH.D. SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
 
Althuizen, N.A.P., Analogical Reasoning as a Decision Support Principle for Weakly 
Structured Marketing Problems, Promotor: Prof. dr. ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2006-
095-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-129-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8190 
Alvarez, H.L., Distributed Collaborative Learning Communities Enabled by Information 
Communication Technology, Promotor: Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2006-080-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-112-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7830 
Appelman, J.H., Governance of Global Interorganizational Tourism Networks: Changing 
Forms of Co-ordination between the Travel Agency and Aviation Sector, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. F.M. Go & Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom, EPS-2004-036-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-060-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1199 
Assem, M.J. van den, Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Stake 
TV Game Show and Related Experiments, Promotor: Prof. dr. J. Spronk, EPS-2008-
138-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-173-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Baquero, G, On Hedge Fund Performance, Capital Flows and Investor Psychology, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2006-094-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-131-
X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8192 
Berens, G., Corporate Branding: The Development of Corporate Associations and their 
Influence on Stakeholder Reactions, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-
2004-039-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-065-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1273 
Berghe, D.A.F. van den, Working Across Borders: Multinational Enterprises and the 
Internationalization of Employment, Promotors: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder & Prof. 
dr. E.J.J. Schenk, EPS-2003-029-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-05-34, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1041 
Berghman, L.A., Strategic Innovation Capacity: A Mixed Method Study on Deliberate 
Strategic Learning Mechanisms, Promotor: Prof. dr. P. Mattyssens, EPS-2006-087-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-120-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7991 
194
 
 
Bijman, W.J.J., Essays on Agricultural Co-operatives: Governance Structure in Fruit and 
Vegetable Chains, Promotor: Prof. dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2002-015-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-024-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/867 
Bispo, A., Labour Market Segmentation: An investigation into the Dutch hospitality 
industry, Promotors: Prof. dr. G.H.M. Evers & Prof. dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2007-
108-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-136-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10283 
Blindenbach-Driessen, F., Innovation Management in Project-Based Firms, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2006-082-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-110-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7828 
Boer, C.A., Distributed Simulation in Industry, Promotors: Prof. dr. A. de Bruin & Prof. 
dr. ir. A. Verbraeck, EPS-2005-065-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-093-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6925 
Boer, N.I., Knowledge Sharing within Organizations: A situated and Relational 
Perspective, Promotor: Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-060-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
086-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6770 
Boer-Sorbán, K., Agent-Based Simulation of Financial Markets: A modular, Continuous-
Time Approach, Promotor: Prof. dr. A. de Bruin, EPS-2008-119-LIS, ISBN: 90-
5892-155-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10870 
Boon, C.T., HRM and Fit: Survival of the Fittest!?, Promotors: Prof. dr. J. Paauwe & 
Prof. dr. D.N. den Hartog, EPS-2008-129-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-162-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Brito, M.P. de, Managing Reverse Logistics or Reversing Logistics Management? 
Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker & Prof. dr. M. B. M. de Koster, EPS-2004-035-
LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-058-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1132 
Brohm, R., Polycentric Order in Organizations: A Dialogue between Michael Polanyi 
and IT-Consultants on Knowledge, Morality, and Organization, Promotors: Prof. 
dr. G. W. J. Hendrikse  & Prof. dr. H. K. Letiche, EPS-2005-063-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-095-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6911 
Brumme, W.-H., Manufacturing Capability Switching in the High-Tech Electronics 
Technology Life Cycle, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof. dr. ir. 
L.N. Van Wassenhove, EPS-2008-126-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-150-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
195
 
 
Burgers, J.H., Managing Corporate Venturing: Multilevel Studies on Project Autonomy, 
Integration, Knowledge Relatedness, and Phases in the New Business Development 
Process, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, 
EPS-2008-136-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-174-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Campbell, R.A.J., Rethinking Risk in International Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2001-005-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-008-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/306 
Chen, H., Individual Mobile Communication Services and Tariffs, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
L.F.J.M. Pau, EPS-2008-123-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-158-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11141 
Chen, Y., Labour Flexibility in China’s Companies: An Empirical Study, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. A. Buitendam & Prof. dr. B. Krug, EPS-2001-006-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-
012-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/307  
Damen, F.J.A., Taking the Lead: The Role of Affect in Leadership Effectiveness, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2007-107-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10282 
Daniševská, P., Empirical Studies on Financial Intermediation and Corporate Policies, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2004-044-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-070-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1518 
Delporte-Vermeiren, D.J.E., Improving the Flexibility and Profitability of ICT-enabled 
Business Networks: An Assessment Method and Tool, Promotors: Prof. mr. dr. 
P.H.M. Vervest & Prof. dr. ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2003-020-LIS, ISBN: 90-
5892-040-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/359 
Derwall, J.M.M., The Economic Virtues of SRI and CSR, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. 
Koedijk, EPS-2007-101-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-132-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8986 
Dijksterhuis, M., Organizational Dynamics of Cognition and Action in the Changing 
Dutch and US Banking Industries, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & 
Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2003-026-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-048-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1037 
Elstak, M.N., Flipping the Identity Coin: The Comparative Effect of Perceived, Projected 
and Desired Organizational Identity on Organizational Identification and Desired 
Behavior, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2008-117-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-148-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10723 
196
 
 
Erken, H.P.G., Productivity, R&D and Entrepreneurship, Promotor: Prof. dr. A.R. 
Thurik, EPS-2008-147-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-179-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Fenema, P.C. van, Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software Projects, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2002-019-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-030-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/360 
Fleischmann, M., Quantitative Models for Reverse Logistics, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. 
J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2000-002-LIS, ISBN: 35-4041-
711-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1044 
Flier, B., Strategic Renewal of European Financial Incumbents: Coevolution of 
Environmental Selection, Institutional Effects, and Managerial Intentionality, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-
2003-033-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-055-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1071 
Fok, D., Advanced Econometric Marketing Models, Promotor: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. 
Franses, EPS-2003-027-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-049-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1035 
Ganzaroli, A., Creating Trust between Local and Global Systems, Promotors: Prof. dr. K. 
Kumar & Prof. dr. R.M. Lee, EPS-2002-018-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-031-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/361 
Gilsing, V.A., Exploration, Exploitation and Co-evolution in Innovation Networks, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen, EPS-2003-
032-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-054-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1040 
Ginkel, W.P. van, The Use of Distributed Information in Decision Making Groups: The 
Role of Shared Task Representations, Promotor: Prof. dr. D. van Knippenberg, 
EPS-2007-097-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8424 
Govers, R., Virtual Tourism Destination Image: Glocal Identities Constructed, Perceived 
and Experienced, Promotors: Prof. dr. F.M. Go & Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-
069-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-107-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6981 
Graaf, G. de, Tractable Morality: Customer Discourses of Bankers, Veterinarians and 
Charity Workers, Promotors: Prof. dr. F. Leijnse & Prof. dr. T. van Willigenburg, 
EPS-2003-031-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-051-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1038 
Groot, E.A. de, Essays on Economic Cycles, Promotors: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses & 
Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2006-091-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-123-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8216 
197
 
 
Gutkowska, A.B., Essays on the Dynamic Portfolio Choice, Promotor: Prof. dr. A.C.F. 
Vorst, EPS-2006-085-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-118-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7994 
Hagemeijer, R.E., The Unmasking of the Other, Promotors: Prof. dr. S.J. Magala & Prof. 
dr. H.K. Letiche, EPS-2005-068-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-097-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6963 
Halderen, M.D. van, Organizational Identity Expressiveness and Perception 
Management: Principles for Expressing the Organizational Identity in Order to 
Manage the Perceptions and Behavioral Reactions of External Stakeholders, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. S.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2008-122-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-153-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10872 
Hartigh, E. den, Increasing Returns and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2005-067-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-098-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6939 
Hermans. J.M., ICT in Information Services; Use and Deployment of the Dutch Securities 
Trade, 1860-1970,  Promotor: Prof. dr. drs. F.H.A. Janszen, EPS-2004-046-ORG, 
ISBN 90-5892-072-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1793 
Heugens, P.P.M.A.R., Strategic Issues Management: Implications for Corporate 
Performance, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof. dr. C.B.M. van 
Riel, EPS-2001-007-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-009-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/358 
Heuvel, W. van den, The Economic Lot-Sizing Problem: New Results and Extensions, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. A.P.L. Wagelmans, EPS-2006-093-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-124-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1805 
Hoedemaekers, C.M.W., Performance, Pinned down: A Lacanian Analysis of Subjectivity 
at Work, Promotors: Prof. dr. S. Magala & Prof. dr. D.H. den Hartog, EPS-2008-
121-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-156-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10871 
Hooghiemstra, R., The Construction of Reality: Cultural Differences in Self-serving 
Behaviour in Accounting Narratives, Promotors: Prof. dr. L.G. van der Tas RA & 
Prof. dr. A.Th.H. Pruyn, EPS-2003-025-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-047-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/871 
Hu, Y., Essays on the Governance of Agricultural Products: Cooperatives and Contract 
Farming, Promotors: Prof. dr. G.W.J. Hendrkse & Prof. Dr. B. Krug, EPS-2007-
113-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-145-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10535 
Huij, J.J., New Insights into Mutual Funds: Performance and Family Strategies, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. M.C.J.M. Verbeek, EPS-2007-099-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-134-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9398 
198
 
 
Huurman, C.I., Dealing with Electricity Prices, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.D. Koedijk, EPS-
2007-098-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-130-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9399 
Iastrebova, K, Manager’s Information Overload: The Impact of Coping Strategies on 
Decision-Making Performance, Promotor: Prof. dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2006-
077-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-111-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7329 
Iwaarden, J.D. van, Changing Quality Controls: The Effects of Increasing Product 
Variety and Shortening Product Life Cycles, Promotors: Prof. dr. B.G. Dale & Prof. 
dr. A.R.T. Williams, EPS-2006-084-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-117-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7992 
Jansen, J.J.P., Ambidextrous Organizations, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch 
& Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2005-055-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-081-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6774 
Jennen, M.G.J., Empirical Essays on Office Market Dynamics, Promotors: Prof. dr. C.G. 
Koedijk & Prof. dr. D. Brounen, EPS-2008-140-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-176-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Jong, C. de, Dealing with Derivatives: Studies on the Role, Informational Content and 
Pricing of Financial Derivatives, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2003-023-
F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-043-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1043 
Keizer, A.B., The Changing Logic of Japanese Employment Practices: A Firm-Level 
Analysis of Four Industries, Promotors: Prof. dr. J.A. Stam & Prof. dr. J.P.M. 
Groenewegen, EPS-2005-057-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-087-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6667 
Kijkuit, R.C., Social Networks in the Front End: The Organizational Life of an Idea, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom, EPS-2007-104-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-137-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10074 
Kippers, J., Empirical Studies on Cash Payments, Promotor: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, 
EPS-2004-043-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-069-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1520 
Klein, M.H., Poverty Alleviation through Sustainable Strategic Business Models: Essays 
on Poverty Alleviation as a Business Strategy, Promotor: Prof. dr. H.R. 
Commandeur, EPS-2008-135-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-168-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Kole, E., On Crises, Crashes and Comovements, Promotors: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk & 
Prof. dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2006-083-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-114-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7829 
199
 
 
Kooij-de Bode, J.M., Distributed Information and Group Decision-Making: Effects of 
Diversity and Affect, Promotor: Prof. dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2007-115-
ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10722 
Knapp, S., The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to Enhance Safety at 
Sea, Promotor: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2007-096-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-
127-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7913 
Koppius, O.R., Information Architecture and Electronic Market Performance, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof. dr. ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2002-013-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-023-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/921 
Kotlarsky, J., Management of Globally Distributed Component-Based Software 
Development Projects, Promotor: Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-059-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-088-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6772 
Kuilman, J., The Re-Emergence of Foreign Banks in Shanghai: An Ecological Analysis, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. B. Krug, EPS-2005-066-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-096-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6926 
Langen, P.W. de, The Performance of Seaport Clusters: A Framework to Analyze Cluster 
Performance and an Application to the Seaport Clusters of Durban, Rotterdam and 
the Lower Mississippi, Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. drs. H.W.H. 
Welters, EPS-2004-034-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-056-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1133 
Le Anh, T., Intelligent Control of Vehicle-Based Internal Transport Systems, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2005-051-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-079-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6554 
Le-Duc, T., Design and Control of Efficient Order Picking Processes, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2005-064-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-094-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6910 
Leeuwen, E.P. van, Recovered-Resource Dependent Industries and the Strategic Renewal 
of Incumbent Firm: A Multi-Level Study of Recovered Resource Dependence 
Management and Strategic Renewal in the European Paper and Board Industry, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-
2007-109-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-140-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10183 
Lentink, R.M., Algorithmic Decision Support for Shunt Planning, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
L.G. Kroon & Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2006-073-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
104-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7328 
Liang, G., New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in 
China, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-047-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-073-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1795 
200
 
 
Liere, D.W. van, Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions: A Multi-
Method Multi-Level Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Networks, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2007-105-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-139-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10181 
Loef, J., Incongruity between Ads and Consumer Expectations of Advertising, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. W.F. van Raaij & Prof. dr. G. Antonides, EPS-2002-017-MKT, ISBN: 90-
5892-028-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/869 
Londoño, M. del Pilar, Institutional Arrangements that Affect Free Trade Agreements: 
Economic Rationality Versus Interest Groups, Promotors: Prof. dr. H.E. 
Haralambides & Prof. dr. J.F. Francois, EPS-2006-078-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-108-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7578 
Maas, A.A., van der, Strategy Implementation in a Small Island Context: An Integrative 
Framework, Promotor: Prof. dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2008-127-LIS, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-160-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Maeseneire, W., de, Essays on Firm Valuation and Value Appropriation, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. J.T.J. Smit, EPS-2005-053-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-082-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6768 
Mandele, L.M., van der, Leadership and the Inflection Point: A Longitudinal Perspective, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2004-042-
STR, ISBN: 90-5892-067-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1302 
Meer, J.R. van der, Operational Control of Internal Transport, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2000-001-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
004-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/859 
Mentink, A., Essays on Corporate Bonds, Promotor: Prof. dr. A.C.F. Vorst, EPS-2005-
070-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-100-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7121 
Meyer, R.J.H., Mapping the Mind of the Strategist: A Quantitative Methodology for 
Measuring the Strategic Beliefs of Executives, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van 
Tulder, EPS-2007-106-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-141-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10182 
Miltenburg, P.R., Effects of Modular Sourcing on Manufacturing Flexibility in the 
Automotive Industry: A Study among German OEMs, Promotors: Prof. dr. J. 
Paauwe & Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2003-030-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-052-
6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1039 
Moerman, G.A., Empirical Studies on Asset Pricing and Banking in the Euro Area, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2005-058-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-090-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6666 
201
 
 
Mol, M.M., Outsourcing, Supplier-relations and Internationalisation: Global Source 
Strategy as a Chinese Puzzle, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2001-
010-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-014-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/355 
Mom, T.J.M., Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities: The Influence of 
Organizational Factors and Knowledge Inflows, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. Van 
den Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2006-079-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-116-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765 
Mulder, A., Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public Goods, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-045-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-071-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1790 
Muller, A.R., The Rise of Regionalism: Core Company Strategies Under The Second 
Wave of Integration, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-038-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-062-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1272 
Nalbantov G.I., Essays on Some Recent Penalization Methods with Applications in 
Finance and Marketing, Promotor: Prof. drP.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2008-132-F&A, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-166-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Nguyen, T.T., Capital Structure, Strategic Competition, and Governance, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2008-148-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-178-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Ning, H., Hierarchical Portfolio Management: Theory and Applications, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. J. Spronk, EPS-2007-118-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-152-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10868 
Noeverman, J., Management Control Systems, Evaluative Style, and Behaviour: 
Exploring the Concept and Behavioural Consequences of Evaluative Style, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. E.G.J. Vosselman & Prof. dr. A.R.T. Williams, EPS-2007-120-
F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-151-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10869 
Oosterhout, J., van, The Quest for Legitimacy: On Authority and Responsibility in 
Governance, Promotors: Prof. dr. T. van Willigenburg & Prof.mr. H.R. van 
Gunsteren, EPS-2002-012-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-022-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362 
Paape, L., Corporate Governance: The Impact on the Role, Position, and Scope of 
Services of the Internal Audit Function, Promotors: Prof. dr. G.J. van der Pijl & 
Prof. dr. H. Commandeur, EPS-2007-111-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-143-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10417 
202
 
 
Pak, K., Revenue Management: New Features and Models, Promotor: Prof. dr. ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2005-061-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-092-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362/6771 
Pattikawa, L.H, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Evidence from Drug 
Introduction in the U.S., Promotors: Prof. dr. H.R.Commandeur, EPS-2007-102-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-135-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9626 
Peeters, L.W.P., Cyclic Railway Timetable Optimization, Promotors: Prof. dr. L.G. Kroon 
& Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2003-022-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-042-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/429 
Pietersz, R., Pricing Models for Bermudan-style Interest Rate Derivatives, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. A.A.J. Pelsser & Prof. dr. A.C.F. Vorst, EPS-2005-071-F&A, ISBN: 90-
5892-099-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7122 
Poel, A.M. van der, Empirical Essays in Corporate Finance and Financial Reporting, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. A. de Jong & Prof. dr. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2007-133-F&A, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-165-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Popova, V., Knowledge Discovery and Monotonicity, Promotor: Prof. dr. A. de Bruin, 
EPS-2004-037-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-061-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1201 
Pouchkarev, I., Performance Evaluation of Constrained Portfolios, Promotors: Prof. dr. J. 
Spronk & Dr. W.G.P.M. Hallerbach, EPS-2005-052-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-083-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6731 
Prins, R., Modeling Consumer Adoption and Usage of Value-Added Mobile Services, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses & Prof. dr. P.C. Verhoef, EPS-2008-128-
MKT, ISBN: 978/90-5892-161-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Puvanasvari Ratnasingam, P., Interorganizational Trust in Business to Business E-
Commerce, Promotors: Prof. dr. K. Kumar & Prof. dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2001-
009-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-017-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/356 
Quak, H.J., Sustainability of Urban Freight Transport: Retail Distribution and Local 
Regulation in Cities, Promotor: Prof. dr.M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2008-124-LIS, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-154-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11990 
Radkevitch, U.L, Online Reverse Auction for Procurement of Services, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2008-137-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-171-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Rinsum, M. van, Performance Measurement and Managerial Time Orientation, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. F.G.H. Hartmann, EPS-2006-088-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-121-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7993 
203
 
 
Romero Morales, D., Optimization Problems in Supply Chain Management, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Dr. H.E. Romeijn, EPS-2000-003-LIS, ISBN: 
90-9014078-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/865 
Roodbergen, K.J., Layout and Routing Methods for Warehouses, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2001-004-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-005-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/861 
Rook, L., Imitation in Creative Task Performance, Promotor: Prof. dr. D.L. van 
Knippenberg, EPS-2008-125-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11555 
Schauten, M.B.J., Valuation, Capital Structure Decisions and the Cost of Capital, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. J. Spronk & Prof. dr. D. van Dijk, EPS-2008-134-F&A, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-172-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Schramade, W.L.J., Corporate Bonds Issuers, Promotor: Prof. dr. A. De Jong, EPS-2006-
092-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-125-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8191 
Schweizer, T.S., An Individual Psychology of Novelty-Seeking, Creativity and Innovation, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-048-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-077-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1818 
Six, F.E., Trust and Trouble: Building Interpersonal Trust Within Organizations, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. dr. A.M. Sorge, EPS-2004-040-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-064-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1271 
Slager, A.M.H., Banking across Borders, Promotors: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder & Prof. 
dr. D.M.N. van Wensveen, EPS-2004-041-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-066-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1301 
Sloot, L., Understanding Consumer Reactions to Assortment Unavailability, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. dr. E. Peelen & Prof. dr. P.C. Verhoef, EPS-
2006-074-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-102-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7438 
Smit, W., Market Information Sharing in Channel Relationships: Its Nature, Antecedents 
and Consequences, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof. dr. ir. B. 
Wierenga, EPS-2006-076-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-106-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7327 
Sonnenberg, M., The Signalling Effect of HRM on Psychological Contracts of 
Employees: A Multi-level Perspective, Promotor: Prof. dr. J. Paauwe, EPS-2006-
086-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-119-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7995 
Speklé, R.F., Beyond Generics: A closer Look at Hybrid and Hierarchical Governance, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA, EPS-2001-008-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-
011-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/357 
204
 
 
Szkudlarek, B.A., Spinning the Web of Reentry: [Re]connecting reentry training theory 
and practice, Promotor: Prof. dr. S.J. Magala, EPS-2008-143-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-177-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Teunter, L.H., Analysis of Sales Promotion Effects on Household Purchase Behavior, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. B. Wierenga & Prof. dr. T. Kloek, EPS-2002-016-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-029-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/868 
Tims, B., Empirical Studies on Exchange Rate Puzzles and Volatility, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2006-089-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-113-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8066 
Tuk, M.A., Empirical Studies on Exchange Rate Puzzles and Volatility, Promotors: Prof. 
dr. ir. A. Smidts & Prof.dr. D.H.J. Wigboldus, EPS-2008-130-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-164-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Valck, K. de, Virtual Communities of Consumption: Networks of Consumer Knowledge 
and Companionship, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof. dr. ir. B. 
Wierenga, EPS-2005-050-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-078-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6663 
Valk, W. van der, Buyer-Seller Interaction Patterns During Ongoing Service Exchange, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. J.Y.F. Wynstra & Prof. dr. ir. B. Axelsson, EPS-2007-116-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-146-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10856 
Verheul, I., Is There a (Fe)male Approach? Understanding Gender Differences in 
Entrepreneurship, Prof. dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2005-054-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-080-
1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/2005 
Vis, I.F.A., Planning and Control Concepts for Material Handling Systems, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2002-014-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-021-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/866 
Vlaar, P.W.L., Making Sense of Formalization in Interorganizational Relationships: 
Beyond Coordination and Control, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & 
Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2006-075-STR, ISBN 90-5892-103-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7326 
Vliet, P. van, Downside Risk and Empirical Asset Pricing, Promotor: Prof. dr. G.T. Post, 
EPS-2004-049-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-07-55, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1819 
Vlist, P. van der, Synchronizing the Retail Supply Chain, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. 
van Nunen & Prof. dr. A.G. de Kok, EPS-2007-110-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-142-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10418 
205
 
 
Vries-van Ketel E. de, How Assortment Variety Affects Assortment Attractiveness: 
A Consumer Perspective, Promotors: Prof. dr. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof. dr. ir. A. 
Smidts, EPS-2006-072-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-101-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7193 
Vromans, M.J.C.M., Reliability of Railway Systems, Promotors: Prof. dr. L.G. Kroon, 
Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker & Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2005-062-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-089-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6773 
Vroomen, B.L.K., The Effects of the Internet, Recommendation Quality and Decision 
Strategies on Consumer Choice, Promotor: Prof. dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2006-
090-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-122-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8067 
Waal, T. de, Processing of Erroneous and Unsafe Data, Promotor: Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, 
EPS-2003-024-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-045-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/870 
Watkins Fassler, K., Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
J. Spronk & Prof. dr. D.J. van Dijk, EPS-2007-103-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-138-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10065 
Wennekers, A.R.M., Entrepreneurship at Country Level: Economic and Non-Economic 
Determinants, Promotor: Prof. dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2006-81-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-115-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7982 
Wielemaker, M.W., Managing Initiatives: A Synthesis of the Conditioning and 
Knowledge-Creating View, Promotors: Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof. dr. C.W.F. 
Baden-Fuller, EPS-2003-28-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-050-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1042 
Wijk, R.A.J.L. van, Organizing Knowledge in Internal Networks: A Multilevel Study, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2003-021-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-
039-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/347 
Yu, M, Enhancing Warehouse Performance by Efficient Order Picking, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2008-139-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-167-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Zhang, X., Strategizing of Foreign Firms in China: An Institution-based Perspective, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. B. Krug, EPS-2007-114-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-147-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10721 
Zhu, Z., Essays on China’s Tax System, Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Krug & Prof. dr. G.W.J. 
Hendrikse, EPS-2007-112-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-144-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10502 
206
 
 
Zwart, G.J. de, Empirical Studies on Financial Markets: Private Equity, Corporate 
Bonds and Emerging Markets, Promotors: Prof. dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek & Prof. dr. 
D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2008-131-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-163-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
MEREL VAN DIEPEN
Dynamics and Competition
in Charitable GivingMER
E
L V
A
N
 D
IE
P
E
N
-  D
y
n
a
m
ics a
n
d
 C
o
m
p
e
titio
n
 in
 C
h
a
rita
b
le
 G
iv
in
g
ERIM PhD Series
Research in Management
E
ra
sm
u
s 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
 I
n
st
it
u
te
 o
f 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
-
E
R
IM
159
E
R
IM
D
e
si
g
n
 &
 l
a
yo
u
t:
 B
&
T
 O
n
tw
e
rp
 e
n
 a
d
vi
e
s 
 (
w
w
w
.b
-e
n
-t
.n
l)
  
  
P
ri
n
t:
 H
a
ve
k
a
  
 (
w
w
w
.h
a
ve
k
a
.n
l)DYNAMICS AND COMPETITION IN CHARITABLE GIVING
Nowadays potential donors receive many direct mailings from many different charities,
all soliciting their donations. As charities depend for a large part on their revenues from
direct mail it is important to uncover the precise effects of charitable direct mailings on
donating behavior. Existing studies on donating behavior generally focus on a single
decision context, that is, a single donation to a single charitable cause. In reality, however,
people receive many donation requests, and the responses to these requests may not be
independent. 
In this thesis we study the dynamic and competitive effects of charitable direct mailings
on donating behavior. We present two direct mailing response models, with the first focusing
primarily on the competitive dimension, and the second focusing mainly on the dynamic
dimension. To calibrate these models we have access to a unique dataset consisting of the
databases of multiple charity organizations, providing us with detailed information on
direct mailings and donations at the individual donor’s level. In addition, we conducted a
direct mailing field experiment in cooperation with various charities. In the analysis of this
experiment, we zoom in on the direct mailing effects on actual behavior and on the underlying
motivational process. We establish that substantial dynamic and competitive effects exist
and that the single decision context can thus not be justified for properly analyzing direct
mailing response behavior. We also provide some practical implications of these results for
charities. One of our surprising results is that - contrary to the public opinion - charities
would have to send even more mailings in order to increase their revenues.
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